GS Branch 23rd (Northumbrian) Division 1940.
Darlington - January 1940
The Division noted that a cadre of 187th Field Ambulance, RAMC, reported to the 23rd Division and were stationed at Houghton-le-Skerne, near Darlington. [For more details see the 187th Field Ambulance War Diary.]
Darlington - 7th March 1940
The Divisional staff were warned verbally at 17:00hrs (presumably by either Northern Command or the War Office) about the impending move of the Division to France between 14th – 21st April 1940.
Darlington - 9th March 1940
Preparatory order received at 10:00 hours by the Division regarding the impending move overseas. The troops expected to be included were the Divisional HQ, both Infantry Brigades, the Divisional Engineer units, some Signals personnel and one Field Ambulance.
Darlington - 10th March 1940
Information received that the date of embarkation was estimated to be 15th April 1940.
Darlington 10th April 1940.
Divisional advance parties despatched to the port of embarkation.
Southampton - 11th April 1940
Divisional transport loaded on to the “SS City of Christchurch” for movement to France.
12th April 1940.
Darlington.
Lecture by Brig Aubrey on the German Army to officers and men of the units of the Division.
Southampton.
The Divisional Advance Party embarked at Southampton on the “SS Lady of Man” – and docked at Le Havre 13th April.
Darlington - 14th April 1940.
The main Divisional Road Parties set off for Southampton, and arrived at the docks on 21st April. The troops embarked on the “Ulster Prince” – docking at Le Havre on 22nd April.
Infantry Road Parties were then despatched to Southampton. On the journey there was some experience of seeing enemy aircraft overhead, and then being fired on in anger for the first time.
France - 23rd to 27th April 1940.
On arrival in France the Division were concentrated at BOLBEC then moved to MIRAUMONT.
Darlington - 1st May 1940.
The Division’s Rear Parties left Darlington to join their comrades in France.
France - 2nd May 1940.
Units of the Division started work on aerodrome construction – the core reason for the Division being posted to the B.E.F.
France - 10th May 1940.
German invasion of Belgium and France begins. Some Construction Company casualties from air-raids. None in the Infantry Battalions.
France - 12th May 1940.
Division asked to take over airfield protection in Line of Communication area N & S of ABBEVILLE. Warning order passed to 70 Brigade to select a Battalion for this duty. Extra RNF transport sent to 10 DLI – the Battalion selected for this role.
France - 13th May 1940.
Extra Field Ambulance (transport) truck also sent to 10 DLI.
France - 15th May 1940.
10 DLI arrived ABBEVILLE – Operational order sent out. All woods in vicinity of airfields to be combed, dawn and dusk – emergency operations message. Transport provided to get troops to airfields.
France - 16th May 1940.
Aerodrome defence to take priority over all other work.
France - 17th May 1940.
Bridge guards ordered over all CANAL DU NORD bridges. All units at immediate notice to move. Operational order issued ordering occupation of line CANAL DU NORD from RUYAULCOURT to ARLEUX. 70 Bde HQ at RIENCOURT.
France - 18th May 1940.
Div Cdr (Gen M G Herbert) visits 70 Bde HQ and carries out reconnaissance on right of the Brigade's sector – considers this an open flank BERTINCOURT – YTRES – NEUVILLE – RUYAULCOURT and thinks this is excellent tank country – completely unprotected. Visits HQ 1 TS and briefs Lt-Col Swinburne. Sees 10 DLI in reserve and goes back to Div HQ, reporting open right flank to GHQ.
Allotted artillery turns out to be short of sights and signal instruments. Some guns not working but repaired during day. Two batteries allotted to right sector to cover right rear of right Brigade and two to left sector.
CHERISY 17:00 Verbal orders were issued to Commander Royal Engineers for all bridges to be blown except those on the main roads between ARRAS - CAMBRAI and BAPAUME - CAMBRAI. Thirty minutes later this order was altered to only those bridges NOT shown on the map to be blown now. All bridges on the left Brigade's front had been blown but those on the right Brigade's front had been held up.
Attacks on CRE demolition parties on right of 23 Div by tanks. Anti-Tank guns and ammo sent from GHQ. Troops had not been trained in their use. CANAL DU NORD positions bombed.
CHERISY 22:00 Orders received for liaison officers to be sent to the HQ of Petreforce (commanded by Major-General R L Petre) in ARRAS. Captains A S C Browne and R E Izod were allocated this duty, Captain Izod to return to Divisional HQ once he had reported to Petreforce. Twenty minutes later orders were received placing the Division under the command of Petreforce (the War Diary indicates that these orders were attached as an Appendix but, as mentioned earlier, most of those papers were missing from the file).
Major-General Herbert telephoned Major-General Petre to report the Division's situation and was told to be prepared to withdraw 23rd Division. Only civilian telephones were available and communications were difficult and delayed as a result.
CHERISY 23:10 Commander Royal Engineers was ordered to blow all bridges forthwith, including the two main road bridges. Attempts were made to speak to Brigadier Kirkup at 70 Brigade but the line was interrupted before information could be passed.
At 23:45 Brigadier Lord Downe telephoned to say that a French liaison officer had arrived at his HQ and reported Germans in CAMBRAI - the Brigadier was told to be ready to move.
A few minutes later, communications were re-established with Brigadier Kirkup and he was also told to be ready to move.
France 19th May 1940
CHERISY 00:42
General Herbert contacted General Petre and agreed with him that, in the light of events, the right flank of the 23rd Division should be withdrawn. A request was made for fighters to cover the withdrawal by daylight and this was agreed. Written orders were then sent via Despatch Rider for the Division to withdraw 70 Bde into anti-tank localities behind the railway line inclusive CROISILLES N5489 - excluding MARQUION. 69 Bde were ordered to anti-tank localities in their present area. 9th RNF and Divisional HQ were to withdraw to MONCHY N5597.
Despatch rider messages were then sent to Rear Divisional HQ, 186th Field Ambulance and 33rd Field Hygiene Section to move from MIRAUMONT to the area BAVINCOURT - AVESNES-LE-COMPTE and report to GHQ Troops. The Military Police Provost Company was ordered to move from ST. LEGER N5287 to the same area and also to report to GHQ Troops. Rear parties from 5 EY and 6 GH were ordered to move from GREVILLERS to ST POL and report to any British Officers they encountered.
Once these messages were on their way the Divisional HQ itself moved from CHERISY to MONCHY-LE-PREUX N5587, leaving at 01:55 and arriving at their destination at 02:25.
Once they had arrived at MONCHY a further message - to 9 RNF - ordered the Battalion to concentrate at LESTREM by 10:00 hours on 20th May.
At 03:30 the Divisional Rear Party - Lt Col Hare and Maj Allen - left CHERISY with the Rear Party of 8 RNF, arriving at MONCHY at 04:00.
8 RNF, plus one field gun from the "A" Field Regiment, and supported by Divisional HQ troops, prepared MONCHY for defence, blocking all roads into the village.
At 07:00 General Herbert and Lt Col Hare departed for ARRAS to try and obtain information and orders.
MONCHY - 10:00
The day was relatively quiet , warm and fine. Some German aircraft flew over the village but did not attack.
General Herbert and Lt Col Hare returned from ARRAS with orders for the Division to hold the line of the canal from excluding ROBERCG N3535 - to inclusive LA BASSEE N52. A move to THELUS aerodrome site was organised where it was hoped the Division would be able to access transport for the move to the canal line.
At 11:00 hours orders were issued to the two Infantry Brigades, Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers units to withdraw from their current positions after dark, in small parties, moving off-road wherever possible. The earliest start was anticipated to be up to one Company per Battalion, though not before 17:30 hours. No transport was to be allowed to move until after 20:30 hours. Royal Engineers were ordered to send a reconnaissance back to the canal line to assess bridges for demolition.
Probably because of the telephone communication problems, Maj Trenam, DAQMG was sent to give these verbal orders to Brg Kirkup for 70 Brigade's withdrawal to a position behind the LA BASSEE Canal.
At 17:30 hours a crucial message arrived by hand of Captain Browne - he arrived from ARRAS with a message which began,,,,"situation materially improved".... This message ordered the 23rd Division to hold the anti-tank localities on the line SAULTY N2993 - ARRAS - LENS with two Battalions designated for the defence of ARRAS.
Orders to move to new positions - as described above - had already been issued at 11:00 and it was realised at Divisional HQ that the first parties of the Battalions would already have started their withdrawals, in response to those orders, although it was anticipated that the main body of each unit could be contacted in time to prevent them following. The opening phrase of the order had apparently expressed the hope that those parties which had already set off for THELUS could be collected in due course. The original order has not been seen, but it is suspected that, as indicated, this sequence of changing orders was significant in the subsequent level of casualties suffered by 70 Brigade.
The position regarding the defence of ARRAS and LENS was seen as less clear, as the front to be held by a Division of only two Brigades was 22 miles in length and with two Battalions required for the defence of ARRAS, the remaining five Battalions would be on a very extended front.
Captain Browne was sent back to the HQ of Petreforce to clear up the orders regarding the defence of ARRAS and LENS, with the suggestion that the line of the River SCARPE would be a better anti-tank defensive line than the suggested line of ARRAS to LENS - unless Captain Browne returned with orders to the contrary the Divisional Commander, General Herbert, proposed to adopt those positions for the night 19th/20th May.
The two Infantry Brigades were then contacted with orders cancelling the previous order for the move to the canal line and giving instructions for the occupation of the line SAULTY - ARRAS - line of River SCARPE - to inclusive BIACHE H5901. 70 Brigade was ordered to the right of ARRAS and 69 Brigade to the left of ARRAS, with 8 RNF being sent to THELUS. While the line of defence to be occupied by 69 Brigade was therefore not much altered, this change required 70 Brigade to amend its line of withdrawal from a northerly direction to one going westwards and to routes south of ARRAS.
At 20:00 hours Divisional HQ left MONCHY and moved via THELUS to MON ST ELOI where it was established.
MON ST ELOI - 20th May 1940
04:20 hours - intense air activity heard over ARRAS and areas north of the town.
At 05:20 hours Captain Browne returned from HQ Petreforce and stated that the German attack had started on the line of the river SCARPE and South West of ARRAS at 04:20 hours.
On another fine, warm morning, General Herbert and Major Allen left for ARRAS at 06:00 to see General Petre. They were informed that approximately 20 enemy tanks were in a field South of ARRAS and that an attack on the town was expected. 23rd Division were ordered to provide a Battalion as reinforcements for ARRAS. General Herbert visited the O.C. of 1st Welsh Guards before returning to MON ST ELOI and arranging that 8 RNF would be sent to reinforce them in the defence of ARRAS.
The formal orders for a Battalion to be sent immediately to ARRAS arrived via Captain Browne at 08:30 hours, and he proceeded onwards to THELUS to pass those orders to the Battalion. Captain Browne then took Major Seth Smith, the Adjutant, together with the Intelligence Officer and an orderly into ARRAS to contact 1st Welsh Guards and carry out a reconnaissance.
At 09:30 Major Allen went to THELUS to see 8 RNF depart for ARRAS and collected additional transport, from a park formed by 7 GH, who had taken over responsibility for the defence of THELUS.
The Battalion left for ARRAS at 09:50 preceded by their motor-cycle sub-units, and arrived at 11:00, to find that, although the journey had been without incident, the Welsh Guards in ARRAS had beaten off a German attack.
On the way back to MON ST ELOI from THELUS Major Allen visited the G1 of 50th Division (the original "parent" of 23rd Division) and gave him a report on the position of 23rd Division. He was briefed that the HQ of 50th Division, together with 150 Brigade and two Artillery Regiments had arrived in the VIMY area and had taken up positions south of VIMY RIDGE.
By 12:00 no news or messages had been received from 70 Brigade and Despatch Riders had failed to return. General Herbert ordered Captain Hedley to proceed via ACQ - AUBIGNY - GIVENCHY - LE NOBLE - MENIN - LATTRE to GOUY N89, where 70 Brigade's HQ was understood to have been established.
When Captain Hedley reached GOUY he found a Company of 11 DLI with the Battalion Adjutant, Captain Shipley, engaging an enemy tank.
Captain Shipley stated that 70 Brigade HQ was now at BERLES H30. As Captain Hedley proceeded towards BERLES he met Lt Col Marley, O.C. of 10 DLI at FOSSEUX N39 and took the opportunity of explaining General Herbert's plan for 70 Brigade to fall back on the line AGNIERES H3407 - FREVIN CAPELLE - ACQ H3906. Captain Hedley learned from Lt Col Marley that 70 Brigade had suffered severe casualties in the areas of CHERISY - CROISILLES and BEAUMETZ N39 - SAULTY N39 in attacks by aircraft and tanks.
Captain Hedley then proceeded to BERLES and found 70 Brigade HQ at 15:00 - reporting to Brg Kirkup, who then came to Divisional HQ.
MON ST ELOI 13:30 hours.
General Herbert, accompanied by Col Gulland and Maj Goldingham, left to visit 50th Division where he met General Martell and learned of the plans of the French D.L.M., arriving back at Divisional HQ at 15:30.
Brg Kirkup arrived at 16:00 and reported the heavy attacks on 70 Brigade by dive-bombing aircraft and armoured fighting vehicles. He stated that heavy casualties had been sustained and units had become split up. Captain Browne was immediately despatched to HQ Petreforce to report the situation of 70 Brigade to General Petre.
General Herbert instructed Brg Kirkup to collect what he could of his Brigade and rendezvous at MINGOVAL. It was intended that transport would be gathered at SOUCHEZ after dark for the further withdrawal of 70 Brigade.
At 16:15 hours the HQ of 12th Royal Lancers arrived at Divisional HQ.
At 16:30 hours Captain Browne returned from HQ Petreforce to obtain further information on the situation of 70 Brigade. General Herbert returned to ARRAS with him and, after an interview with General Petre, telephoned GHQ and asked if he could withdraw the forward units of 69 Brigade as they appeared to be redundant, given that the French D.L.M. were also positioned on the line of the River SCARPE. He was advised that the C-in-C's definite order was that there was to be no withdrawal. In addition, he was told that Petreforce, including 23rd Division, was now under the orders of the G.O.C. 5th Division, Major General Franklyn.
At this time, 12 Royal Lancers reported that they had found a party of around 100 exhausted men of 11 DLI, including wounded, in the vicinity of AGNIERES H3507. They were asked to re-establish contact and instruct them to move to MINGOVAL where transport would be sent to collect them.
507 Field Company and 508 Field Park Company, Royal Engineers, were sent to ESSARS H4128 with orders to block all bridges on the LA BASSEE Canal position - exclusive ROBERCG - inclusive LA BASSEE.
For the withdrawal which had taken place on the evening of 19th May the "A" Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, had moved on different roads to those used by 70 Brigade and their guns were now concentrated at THELUS. Here they were examined and overhauled by S.O.M.E. 23rd Division.
At 19:30 hours General Herbert and Captain Browne returned from ARRAS.
At 19:35 12 Royal Lancers reported large numbers of enemy fighting vehicles (tanks and lorries) on the road ARRAS - ST POL travelling in a North-Easterly direction.
At 20:00 hours the Divisional HQ moved again, proceeding to SOUCHEZ where it was established in an Estaminet near the Church.
SOUCHEZ - 21:00 hours
2/Lt Bell, Royal Signals, despatched on motorcycle to make contact with 70 Brigade in the MINGOVAL area.
At 21:15 Lt Col Hare and Maj Slade-Powell took five lorries to search for the hundred men of 11 DLI who had been reported by 12 Royal Lancers earlier in the day.
At 23:00 Lt Wrightson took an Advance Party to GIVENCHY-EN-GOHELLE H41 where arrangements were made to establish Divisional HQ.
SOUCHEZ - 21st May 1940
00:40 hours. 2/Lt Bell returned to SOUCHEZ, having failed to find any trace of 70 Brigade personnel around MINGOVAL.
At 01:00 Divisional HQ left SOUCHEZ and proceeded to GIVENCHY, while General Herbert and Col Gulland remained behind to await the return of Lt Col Hare's party with the men of 11 DLI.
Captain Browne was instructed to report to G.O.C. 5 Division at VIMY and inform general Franklyn of the situation of 23rd Division, and that HQ had moved to GIVENCHY, where HQ was established at 01:40 hours.
See copy of detail diary – 26 pages
Copy of Operational summary – 11 pages.
Copy of narrative and summary 1 Tyneside Scottish – 17 pages.
Copy of detail diary – 7 pages
