GS Branch Summary of 23rd Division Operations 10th to 31st May 1940
This Summary of Operations was attached to the GS Branch War Diary for May - contained in file WO 167/262 - and effectively sets out, in a more literary form, the activities, movements and actions in which the Division was involved - thus complementing the War Diary itself.
Where information subsequently cast doubts upon the statements made in this Summary I have indicated the queries by using italic script. Otherwise, the material is as it was submitted. Because of the length of the document it has been separated into sections by date.
PREAMBLE
23rd Division was despatched to France during April 1940 for labour on the aerodromes of the Air Component. The Division was to return to England to complete its training after three months. There were two other "second-line" Divisions also sent to France as a source of labour - including 46 Division, mentioned within the War Diary
Individual training had not been completed at the time of embarkation. Only a small proportion of the men had fired a rifle and none had been properly exercised in Bren Gun or Anti-Tank Rifle. This is partly challenged as far as 70 Brigade is concerned - reference is made in the Brigade and Battalion War Diaries to the efforts made to ensure that the War Course on the Rifle had been fired by everybody.
Since the Division was intended for labour overseas and not for operations during the three months in question, it was sent overseas with only a small and modified scale of weapons, equipment and transport. Each Infantry Battalion was allocated 8 Anti-Tank Rifles and 18 Bren Guns - although of this allotment some 25 Bren Guns remained in the UK for the defence of merchant shipping. No pistols had been issued. Battalions had only twelve vehicles each.
The Divisional Artillery and Signals remained in the UK and only a modified Despatch Rider Section under 2/Lt D Bell went overseas from that Signals component. Only one Field Ambulance, rather than two, went overseas - in this case 186 Field Ambulance accompanied by one Field Hygiene Section.
On arrival in France the Division was immediately dispersed over a wide area to the aerodrome sites on which they were to work, and where they were accommodated in tented camps. Work was well underway by the end of April with the intention that the week would consist of four day's labour work, two day's training and one day's rest.
On the day of the German invasion - 10th May 1940 - the Division was dispersed as follows:-
HQ 23rd Division Miraumont N47
HQ 69th Brigade Becourt N36
HQ 70th Brigade Hurlingcourt N10
HQ Royal Engineers Miraumont N47
HQ 233rd Field Company Royal Engineers Becourt N36
HQ 507th Field Company Royal Engineers Beaucourt N37
HQ 508th Field Park Company Royal Engineers Tinques H20
8th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Motorcycle Battalion) Dirval H21
9th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Machine-Gun Battalion) Monchy le Breton H21
5th East Yorkshires Grevillers N47
6th Green Howards Irles N47
7th Green Howards Thelus H40
10th Durham Light Infantry Nuncq H10
11th Durham Light Infantry Nuncq H10
1st Tyneside Scottish Beauvoir N19EAUDRICOURT
Supply Echelon Beaudricourt N19
186th Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps Miraumont N47
33rd Field Hygiene Section Royal Army Medical Corps Miraumont N47
Provost Company, Corps of Royal Military Police Grandecourt N47
with the exception of the Field Park Company the Royal Engineers units were distributed around the Division in Sections.
At 05:30 hours on 10th May the aerodrome at GREVILLERS and the Supply Echelon at BEAUDRICOURT suffered serious casualties as a result of enemy bombing. Further casualties were caused by the later explosions of delayed action bombs at both sites. Immediate arrangements to prepare slit trenches and conceal of tentage were made. Work on the aerodromes continued but air raid alarms at night meant that troops had few opportunities to rest during the subsequent three weeks.
On the night of 12th/13th May 10 DLI with one Platoon of 1 Tyneside Scottish were sent to ABBEVILLE for the defence of aerodromes North and South of the River SOMME. This was only achieved by pooling unit transport from 70 Brigade, 9 RNF, 186 Fd Amb and a Construction Company, Royal Engineers, rendering those units immobile while the movement was in progress.
On 14th May 23rd Division, with the addition of an Infantry Brigade from 46th Division,was made responsible for all aerodrome defence from the Belgian frontier to the River SOMME.
On 16th May 9 RNF and 5 EY were further dispersed in small detachments over enormous areas about LILLERS H23 and DOUAI H60 respectively to guard vulnerable points.
GHQ then, on 17th May at 08:30 ordered 23rd Division to hold a position on the CANAL DU NORD between RUYALCOURT N67 and ARLIEUX N79 - a front totalling some 17 miles. At the time the order was received the Division was dispersed over an area extending from LILLERS in the North to ALBERT in the South - 70 miles, and from ABBEVILLE in the West to DOUAI in the East - 80 miles. Units had little transport and little if any means of communication. The men were inadequately equipped and trained - it will be recalled that there was no Divisional Artillery and, in particular, no Anti-Tank Regiment available.
Following receipt of the above orders from GHQ - to which the Labour Divisions reported - a conference was held at Divisional HQ at which the Brigadiers and Commander Royal Engineers were present. General Herbert gave preliminary orders from the map and these were confirmed later in Operation Order No 1.
In outline these were that:-
The front was divided into two sectors - the dividing line being the CAMBRAI - ARRAS Road, the road itself being included in the left sector.
70 Brigade, supported by 507 Field Company would take the right sector and 69 Brigade, supported by 203 Field Company, would take the left sector. 8 RNF (Motorcycle Battalion) and the Provost Company would remain in reserve at ST LEGER N58. 186 Fd Amb would establish Advanced Dressing Stations in each of the two sectors.
186 Fd Amb and the Main Dressing Station would be at Miraumont N47.
The Infantry units would put out bridgeheads to cover the preparation of the bridges for demolition. All troops to be in position by 18:30 hours. Divisional HQ would be at CHERISY N59.
A reconnaissance of the CANAL DU NORD identified some 17 bridges in all - several not included on existing maps. The canal proved to be dry at several points - particularly across most of 70 Brigade's front - and there were many places which would allow Armoured Fighting Vehicles to cross without hindrance. Immediately to the right of the right sector the canal ran for three miles in a tunnel and therefore represented no obstacle at all.
By 18:30 all troops were in position on the line of the canal, with the exception of 10 DLI, Reserve Battalion of 70 Brigade, which had to be collected from its scattered positions around ABBEVILLE and as a result did not reach its canal positions until midnight.
At about 18:00 hours on 17th May Major Burns, Royal Artillery, reported to Divisional HQ that he was brining an improvised Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (this is "A" Field Regiment mentioned in the War Diary) of 13 guns to support the position. He was advised that the right sector was the most vulnerable and to site the major portion of his guns to support that area. The guns did not actually arrive until the afternoon of 18th May and were a mixed lot - eight 18-pounders, three 25-pounders and two 4.5" Howitzers.
Major Burns had no signallers or signal equipment and no gun instruments. Guns had to be laid in some cases by peering up the muzzles. Four of the guns were discovered later to be missing oil in their recoil cylinders. The crews had never worked together before. Despite these difficulties Major Burns worked enthusiastically on 17th and 18th May, selecting gun positions which would allow direct fire on an advancing enemy, especially approach avenues for tanks. All guns were in position by the evening of 18th May.
Also on 17th May a batch of French Anti-Tank Guns and some more Anti-Tank Rifles came to the Division, The guns were of an unfamiliar new type but were issued to the Infantry Battalions. The Anti-Tank Rifles were issued to units throughout the Division. The Provost Company were despatched to join the rear Divisional HQ at MIRAUMONT.
Communication proved a constant difficulty - the Division had no radio or telephone equipment and the only link with GHQ at ARRAS was via Despatch Rider or civilian telephone - a "precarious link necessitating speech in parables on account of secrecy".
The Division was never able to contact MacFarlane's Force - supposed to be on 23rd Divisions left - nor 12 Division or the GHQ Royal Engineers, who were supposed to be holding the line in the South. French Territorial troops - supposedly holding the canal crossings to the front of the Division - were not there. This latter item is a crucial point and has only recently been highlighted for the first time, to my knowledge, in the current works on Dunkirk of both Hugh Sebag-Montefiore and Major General Julian Thompson. This point will be referred to in other War Diaries
Because GHQ did not have exact information on the whereabouts of enemy forces they issued a warning on 17th May at 10:00 hours for all GHQ troops (including 23rd Division) to be prepared to move at a moment's notice. GHQ also advised that no further pack trains were to be expected for at least four days - as a result ration scales were reduced to half scale (and even this was not available) and that troops were to "live off the country". No supplies actually reached the Division until its arrival in England some fifteen days later. Some mention of foraging will be found in other War Diaries.
The night of 17th/18th May was quiet although there was much troop movement - mainly French - observed along the CAMBRAI - ARRAS road. Superimposed on these movements were streams of refugees going in all directions, but mainly from CAMBRAI towards ARRAS and BAPAUME and these caused considerable road blockages. Roads were bombed and machine-gunned by low flying enemy aircraft in the evening of 17th May, leading to heavy casualties, both civilian and military. The village of BOURSIES suffered particularly badly.
18th May 1940
On the morning of 18th May the G.O.C. made a recommaissance of the right Brigade sector, and the land over the tunnel immediately to the South of the sector - as mentioned above - and he reported that he was anxious about this flank. At 15:00 hours the Commender Royal Engineers from GHQ called at 23rd Division HQ and reported that his teams of Sappers, preparing bridges for demolition North of PERONNE had been fired on by enemy tanks. On telephoning this intelligence to GHQ the Division was ordered to refuse its right flank - this was done by withdrawing 70 Brigade into the villages between the CAMBRAI - ARRAS road and the railway running from MARQUOIN to BOYELLES N48.
70 Brigade was ordered to make tank-proof localities in those villages. On the left front, 69 Brigade were ordered to make similar localities in the villages behind their front.
23rd Division moved HQ from CHERISY to MONCHY LE PREOX N59 during the night 18th/19th May, arriving at MONCHY at 01:30 hours. 8 RNF joined HQ there from their previous location at ST LEGER. MONCHY was still inhabited and orders were given to evacuate civilians.
19th May 1940
Captain A S C Browne - the Division G III - was sent to GHQ at ARRAS as liaison officer. GHQ had moved and the Division was informed that they were now to be part of PETREFORCE, under the command of Major General Petre - who was in charge of the ARRAS defences. This change was confirmed by a GHQ Operation Instruction No 42 dated 18th May.
Divisional HQ and 8 RNF set about the task of putting MONCHY in a state of defence, barricading roads and setting up anti-tank positions. A field gun had been added to the defences. Before leaving CHERISY, orders had been given for all the bridges over the CANAL DU NORD to be blown, leaving the two main road bridges, carrying the CAMBRAI - ARRAS and CAMBRAI - BAPAUME roads till last.
At 06:00 hours on 19th enemy tanks had approached the canal positions and opened fire on the demolition parties. Despite this, all planned demolitions were completed successfully without casualties, with the exception of two men from 5 EY who were killed accidentally.
At 08:00 hours General Herbert and Col Hare (Divisional G I) reported the situation to General Petre in ARRAS. They reurned at 10:00 with orders for the Division to move back that evening to the line of the LA BASSEE Canal between ROBECQ H3435 and LA BASSEE H5125. The Division was to march to THELUS, about six miles North of ARRAS, where it was hoped RASC transport would be available to embus the troops. With this in mind reconnaissance parties were sent to the new positions. These parties included the Commander Royal Engineers - Lt Col Kennedy, and the Commander Royal Artillery - Major Burns, while Col Gulland, A.A. and Q.M.G. went to HELUS to reconnoitre the embussing point.
At 16:00 hours Capt Browne came to Divisional HQ to say that the position had materially improved, that ARRAS was to be held at all costs and that the move back to the LA BASSEE canal was cancelled. The new Divisional role was to hold the line of the ARRAS to DOULLENS road from SAULTY N29 to ARRAS, together with the line of the ARRAS to LENS road, while also providing two Battalions for the defence of ARRAS itself. It was argued that these positions were devoid of anti-tank obstacles and that a better proposition would be to bring the line forward to the line of the River SCARPE between ARRAS and BIACHE N5901 - PETREFORCE agreed this suggestion.
Preliminary moves were, by this time, already underway to THELUS and it was seen as difficult to relocate 70 Brigade to their new positions West of ARRAS. This was done but took extra time - as a result of which the units were only just coming in to position at dawn on 20th May. It was at this point that enemy tanks appeared and over-ran much of 70 Brigade. The move of 70 Brigade to their new locations on the ARRAS - DOULLENS road had entailed a march of 17 miles as the crow flies - 25 using roads and tracks (none of which led in the right direction) - in darkness, by troops already tired, over unknown and unreconnoitred country. More detail of this movement and the Panzer Divisions attacks will be found in the Brigade and Battalion War Diaries.
20th May 1940
69 Brigade, on the left of the Division, was in position by dawn on 20th May and the Divisional HQ had moved to MONT ST ELOI. In view of the great length of the front the Division was expected to cover it was not possible to make two Battalions available for ARRAS defence and General Petre was informed of this.
At 08:30 hours Capt Browne arrived at Divisional HQ with orders for a Battalion to be released to reinforce the Welsh Guards in ARRAS. 8 RNF were ordered in from THELUS and the move was completed by noon.
Heavy firing West and North of ARRAS could be heard from MONT ST ELOI and, having had no news of 70 Brigade, Captain Hedley G III was sent at noon to GOUY N39, where the Brigade HQ was supposed to be. He had orders for the Brigade to withdraw to the area AGNIERES - FREVIN CAPPELLE - ACQ. When he reached GOUY he found the Adjutant and one company of 10 DLI (this should read 11 DLI ) engaged with enemy tanks in and around the village. This detachment was ordered to withdraw and Capt Hedley was sent on to SAVY H30 to find 70 Brigade HQ. En route he met Lt Col Marley with part of 10 DLI near FOISSEAUX N 39 and warned that he was approaching an area containing enemy armoured vehicles - this initiative probably saved this unit from destruction.
When he reached SAVY Capt Hedley gave Brg Kirkup the G.O.C.'s orders for the withdrawal of 70 Brigade and the Brigadier accompanied him back to Divisional HQ. On reaching MONT ST ELOI Brg Kirkup reported that his Brigade had been heavily attacked early in the morning, while moving to take up their new positions and had been largely lost. Scattered exhausted elements of 70 Brigade were known to be still in the vicinity of the ARRAS - HOUSAIN road and Brg Kirkup left Divisional HQ to effect the withdrawal of the rest of his Brigade and to get them back to new positions.
12 Lancers were asked to co-operate from their HQ at MONT ST ELOI and later reported a party of about 100 men from 70 Brigade - including wounded - immobile from exhaustion near VILLERS-MINGOVAL H31. (An eye-witness account of the rescue of some of these men will be found elsewhere in the War Diaries).
The G.O.C. had meanwhile visited 69 Brigade and found their two forward Battalions intermingled with French troops on the River SCARPE, tired and without tools or equipment to improve their positions. General Herbert considered them redundant in that situation and later in the day requested PETREFORCE to agree that they be withdrawn to THELUS. He was instructed by the C.G.S. of GHQ that no withdrawal was to take place and that PETRFORCE (including 23rd Division) was now under the orders of 5th Division, with HQ at VIMY.
