View source for GS Branch 23rd (Northumbrian) Division 1940.

'''Darlington - January 1940'''

The Division noted that a cadre of 187th Field Ambulance, RAMC, reported to the 23rd Division and were stationed at Houghton-le-Skerne, near Darlington.  [For more details see the 187th Field Ambulance War Diary.]

'''Darlington - 7th March 1940'''

The Divisional staff were warned verbally at 17:00hrs  (presumably by either Northern Command or the War Office) about the impending move of the Division to France between 14th – 21st April 1940.

'''Darlington - 9th March 1940'''

Preparatory order received at 10:00 hours by the Division regarding the impending move overseas.  The troops expected to be included were the Divisional HQ, both Infantry Brigades, the Divisional Engineer units, some Signals personnel and one Field Ambulance.

'''Darlington - 10th March 1940'''

Information received that the date of embarkation was estimated to be 15th April 1940.

'''Darlington 10th April 1940.'''

Divisional advance parties despatched to the port of embarkation.

'''Southampton - 11th April 1940'''

Divisional  transport loaded on to the “SS City of Christchurch” for movement to France.

'''12th April 1940.'''

'''Darlington.''' 

Lecture by Brig Aubrey on the German Army to officers and men of the units of the Division.

'''Southampton.'''

The Divisional Advance Party embarked at Southampton on the “SS Lady of Man” – and docked at Le Havre 13th April.

'''Darlington - 14th April 1940.'''

The main Divisional Road Parties set off for Southampton, and arrived at the docks on 21st April.  The troops embarked on the “Ulster Prince” – docking at Le Havre on 22nd April.

Infantry Road Parties were then despatched to Southampton.  On the journey there was some experience of seeing enemy aircraft overhead, and then being fired on in anger for the first time.

'''France - 23rd to 27th April 1940.'''

On arrival in France the Division were concentrated at BOLBEC then moved to MIRAUMONT.

'''Darlington - 1st May 1940.'''

The Division’s Rear Parties left Darlington to join their comrades in France.

'''France - 2nd May 1940.'''

Units of the Division started work on aerodrome construction – the core reason for the Division being posted to the B.E.F.

'''France - 10th May 1940.'''

German invasion of Belgium and France begins.  Some Construction Company casualties from air-raids.  None in the Infantry Battalions.

'''France - 12th May 1940.'''

Division asked to take over airfield protection in Line of Communication area N & S of ABBEVILLE.  Warning order passed to 70 Brigade to select a Battalion for this duty.  Extra RNF transport sent to 10 DLI – the Battalion selected for this role.

'''France - 13th May 1940.'''

Extra Field Ambulance (transport) truck also sent to 10 DLI.  

'''France - 15th May 1940.'''

10 DLI arrived ABBEVILLE – Operational order sent out.  All woods in vicinity of airfields to be combed, dawn and dusk – emergency operations message.  Transport provided to get troops to airfields.

'''France - 16th May 1940.'''

Aerodrome defence to take priority over all other work.

'''France - 17th May 1940.'''

Bridge guards ordered over all CANAL DU NORD bridges.  All units at immediate notice to move.
Operational order issued ordering occupation of line CANAL DU NORD from RUYAULCOURT to ARLEUX.  70 Bde HQ at RIENCOURT.

'''France - 18th May 1940.'''

Div Cdr (Gen M G Herbert) visits 70 Bde HQ and carries out reconnaissance on right of the Brigade's sector – considers this an open flank BERTINCOURT – YTRES – NEUVILLE – RUYAULCOURT and thinks this is excellent tank country – completely unprotected.  Visits 
HQ 1 TS and briefs Lt-Col Swinburne.  Sees 10 DLI in reserve and goes back to Div HQ, reporting open right flank to GHQ.

Allotted artillery turns out to be short of sights and signal instruments.  Some guns not working but repaired during day.  Two batteries allotted to right sector to cover right rear of right Brigade and two to left sector.

'''CHERISY 17:00'''  Verbal orders were issued to Commander Royal Engineers for all bridges to be blown except those on the main roads between ARRAS - CAMBRAI and BAPAUME - CAMBRAI.  Thirty minutes later this order was altered to only those bridges NOT shown on the map to be blown now.  All bridges on the left Brigade's front had been blown but those on the right Brigade's front had been held up.

Attacks on CRE demolition parties on right of 23 Div by tanks.  Anti-Tank guns and ammo sent from GHQ.  Troops had not been trained in their use.  CANAL DU NORD positions bombed.

'''CHERISY 22:00'''  Orders received for liaison officers to be sent to the HQ of Petreforce (commanded by Major-General R L Petre) in ARRAS.  Captains A S C Browne and R E Izod were allocated this duty, Captain Izod to return to Divisional HQ once he had reported to Petreforce.  Twenty minutes later orders were received placing the Division under the command of Petreforce  (the War Diary indicates that these orders were attached as an Appendix but, as mentioned earlier, most of those papers were missing from the file).

Major-General Herbert telephoned Major-General Petre to report the Division's situation and was told to be prepared to withdraw 23rd Division.  Only civilian telephones were available and communications were difficult and delayed as a result.

'''CHERISY 23:10'''  Commander Royal Engineers was ordered to blow all bridges forthwith, including the two main road bridges.  Attempts were made to speak to Brigadier Kirkup at 70 Brigade but the line was interrupted before information could be passed.

At 23:45 Brigadier Lord Downe telephoned to say that a French liaison officer had arrived at his HQ and reported Germans in CAMBRAI - the Brigadier was told to be ready to move.

A few minutes later, communications were re-established with Brigadier Kirkup and he was also told to be ready to move.


'''France 19th May 1940'''

'''CHERISY 00:42'''

General Herbert contacted General Petre and agreed with him that, in the light of events, the right flank of the 23rd Division should be withdrawn.  A request was made for fighters to cover the withdrawal by daylight and this was agreed.  Written orders were then sent via Despatch Rider for the Division to withdraw 70 Bde into anti-tank localities behind the railway line inclusive CROISILLES N5489 - excluding MARQUION.  69 Bde were ordered to anti-tank localities in their present area.  9th RNF and Divisional HQ were to withdraw to MONCHY N5597.

Despatch rider messages were then sent to Rear Divisional HQ, 186th Field Ambulance and 33rd Field Hygiene Section to move from MIRAUMONT to the area BAVINCOURT - AVESNES-LE-COMPTE and report to GHQ Troops.  The Military Police Provost Company was ordered to move from ST. LEGER N5287 to the same area and also to report to GHQ Troops.  Rear parties from 5 EY and 6 GH were ordered to move from GREVILLERS to ST POL and report to any British Officers they encountered.

Once these messages were on their way the Divisional HQ itself moved from CHERISY to MONCHY-LE-PREUX N5587, leaving at 01:55 and arriving at their destination at 02:25.

Once they had arrived at MONCHY a further message - to 9 RNF - ordered the Battalion to concentrate at LESTREM by 10:00 hours on 20th May.

At 03:30 the Divisional Rear Party - Lt Col Hare and Maj Allen - left CHERISY with the Rear Party of 8 RNF, arriving at MONCHY at 04:00.

8 RNF, plus one field gun from the "A" Field Regiment, and supported by Divisional HQ troops, prepared MONCHY for defence, blocking all roads into the village.

At 07:00 General Herbert and Lt Col Hare departed for ARRAS to try and obtain information and orders.

'''MONCHY - 10:00'''

The day was relatively quiet , warm and fine.  Some German aircraft flew over the village but did not attack.

General Herbert and Lt Col Hare returned from ARRAS with orders for the Division to hold the line of the canal from excluding ROBERCG N3535 - to inclusive LA BASSEE N52.  A move to THELUS aerodrome site was organised where it was hoped the Division would be able to access transport for the move to the canal line.

At 11:00 hours orders were issued to the two Infantry Brigades, Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers units to withdraw from their current positions after dark, in small parties, moving off-road wherever possible.  The earliest start was anticipated to be up to one Company per Battalion, though not before 17:30 hours.  No transport was to be allowed to move until after 20:30 hours.  Royal Engineers were ordered to send a reconnaissance back to the canal line to assess bridges for demolition.

Probably because of the telephone communication problems, Maj Trenam, DAQMG was sent to give these verbal orders to Brg Kirkup for 70 Brigade's withdrawal to a position behind the LA BASSEE Canal.

At 17:30 hours a crucial message arrived by hand of Captain Browne.  He arrived from ARRAS with a message which began,,,,"situation materially improved"....   This message ordered the 23rd Division to hold the anti-tank localities on the line SAULTY N2993 - ARRAS - LENS while two of their Battalions were designated for the defence of ARRAS.

Orders to move to new positions - as described above - had already been issued at 11:00 and it was realised at Divisional HQ that the first parties of the Battalions would already have started their withdrawals, in response to those orders, although it was anticipated that the main body of each unit could be contacted in time to prevent them following.  The opening phrase of the order had apparently expressed the hope that those parties which had already set off for THELUS could be collected in due course.  The original order has not been seen, but it is suspected that, as indicated, this sequence of changing orders was significant in the subsequent level of casualties suffered by 70 Brigade.

The position regarding the defence of ARRAS and LENS was seen as less clear, as the front to be held by a Division of only two Brigades was 22 miles in length and with two Battalions required for the defence of ARRAS, the remaining five Battalions would be on a very extended front.

Captain Browne was sent back to the HQ of Petreforce to clear up the orders regarding the defence of ARRAS and LENS, with the suggestion that the line of the River SCARPE would be a better anti-tank defensive line than the suggested line of ARRAS to LENS - unless Captain Browne returned with orders to the contrary the Divisional Commander, General Herbert, proposed to adopt those positions for the night 19th/20th May.

The two Infantry Brigades were then contacted with orders cancelling the previous order for the move to the canal line and giving instructions for the occupation of the line SAULTY - ARRAS - line of River SCARPE - to inclusive BIACHE H5901.  70 Brigade was ordered to the right of ARRAS and 69 Brigade to the left of ARRAS, with 8 RNF being sent to THELUS.  While the line of defence to be occupied by 69 Brigade was therefore not much altered, this change required 70 Brigade to amend its line of withdrawal from a Northerly direction to one going Westwards and to routes south of ARRAS.

At 20:00 hours Divisional HQ left MONCHY and moved via THELUS to MON ST ELOI where it was established.

'''MON ST ELOI - 20th May 1940'''

04:20 hours - intense air activity heard over ARRAS and areas north of the town.

At 05:20 hours Captain Browne returned from HQ Petreforce and stated that the German attack had started on the line of the river SCARPE and South West of ARRAS at 04:20 hours.

On another fine, warm morning, General Herbert and Major Allen left for ARRAS at 06:00 to see General Petre.  They were informed that approximately 20 enemy tanks were in a field South of ARRAS and that an attack on the town was expected.  23rd Division were ordered to provide a Battalion as reinforcements for ARRAS.  General Herbert visited the O.C. of 1st Welsh Guards before returning to MON ST ELOI and arranging that 8 RNF would be sent to reinforce them in the defence of ARRAS.

The formal orders for a Battalion to be sent immediately to ARRAS arrived via Captain Browne at 08:30 hours, and he proceeded onwards to THELUS to pass those orders to the Battalion.  Captain Browne then took Major Seth Smith, the Adjutant, together with the Intelligence Officer and an orderly into ARRAS to contact 1st Welsh Guards and carry out a reconnaissance.

At 09:30 Major Allen went to THELUS to see 8 RNF depart for ARRAS and collected additional transport, from a park formed by 7 GH, who had taken over responsibility for the defence of THELUS.

The Battalion left for ARRAS at 09:50 preceded by their motor-cycle sub-units, and arrived at 11:00, to find that, although the journey had been without incident, the Welsh Guards in ARRAS had beaten off a German attack.

On the way back to MON ST ELOI from THELUS Major Allen visited the G1 of 50th Division (the original "parent" of 23rd Division) and gave him a report on the position of 23rd Division.  He was briefed that the HQ of 50th Division, together with 150 Brigade and two Artillery Regiments had arrived in the VIMY area and had taken up positions south of VIMY RIDGE.

By 12:00 no news or messages had been received from 70 Brigade and Despatch Riders had failed to return.  General Herbert ordered Captain Hedley to proceed via ACQ - AUBIGNY - GIVENCHY - LE NOBLE - MENIN - LATTRE to GOUY N89, where 70 Brigade's HQ was understood to have been established.

When Captain Hedley reached GOUY he found a Company of 11 DLI together with the Battalion Adjutant, Captain Shipley, engaging an enemy tank.

Captain Shipley stated that 70 Brigade HQ was now at BERLES H30.  As Captain Hedley proceeded towards BERLES he met Lt Col Marley, O.C. of 10 DLI at FOSSEUX N39 and took the opportunity of explaining General Herbert's plan for 70 Brigade to fall back on the line AGNIERES H3407 - FREVIN CAPELLE - ACQ H3906.  Captain Hedley learned from Lt Col Marley that 70 Brigade had suffered severe casualties in the areas of CHERISY - CROISILLES and BEAUMETZ N39 - SAULTY N39 in attacks by aircraft and tanks.

Captain Hedley then proceeded to BERLES and found 70 Brigade HQ at 15:00 - reporting to Brg Kirkup, who then came to Divisional HQ.

MON ST ELOI 13:30 hours.

General Herbert, accompanied by Col Gulland and Maj Goldingham, left to visit 50th Division where he met General Martell and learned of the plans of the French D.L.M., arriving back at Divisional HQ at 15:30.

Brg Kirkup arrived at 16:00 and reported the heavy attacks on 70 Brigade by dive-bombing aircraft and armoured fighting vehicles.  He stated that heavy casualties had been sustained and units had become split up.  Captain Browne was immediately despatched to HQ Petreforce to report the situation of 70 Brigade to General Petre.  

General Herbert instructed Brg Kirkup to collect what he could of his Brigade and rendezvous at MINGOVAL.  It was intended that transport would be gathered at SOUCHEZ after dark for the further withdrawal of 70 Brigade.

At 16:15 hours the HQ of 12th Royal Lancers arrived at Divisional HQ.

At 16:30 hours Captain Browne returned from HQ Petreforce to obtain further information on the situation of 70 Brigade.  General Herbert returned to ARRAS with him and, after an interview with General Petre, telephoned GHQ and asked if he could withdraw the forward units of 69 Brigade as they appeared to be redundant, given that the French D.L.M. were also positioned on the line of the River SCARPE.  He was advised that the C-in-C's definite order was that there was to be no withdrawal.  In addition, he was told that Petreforce, including 23rd Division, was now under the orders of the G.O.C. 5th Division, Major General Franklyn.

At this time, 12 Royal Lancers reported that they had found a party of around 100 exhausted men of 11 DLI, including wounded, in the vicinity of AGNIERES H3507.  They were asked to re-establish contact and instruct them to move to MINGOVAL where transport would be sent to collect them.

507 Field Company and 508 Field Park Company, Royal Engineers, were sent to ESSARS H4128 with orders to block all bridges on the LA BASSEE Canal position - exclusive ROBERCG - inclusive LA BASSEE.

For the withdrawal which had taken place on the evening of 19th May the "A" Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, had moved on different roads to those used by 70 Brigade and their guns were now concentrated at THELUS.  Here they were examined and overhauled by S.O.M.E. 23rd Division.

At 19:30 hours General Herbert and Captain Browne returned from ARRAS.

At 19:35 12 Royal Lancers reported large numbers of enemy fighting vehicles (tanks and lorries) on the road ARRAS - ST POL travelling in a North-Easterly direction.

At 20:00 hours the Divisional HQ moved again, proceeding to SOUCHEZ where it was established in an Estaminet near the Church.

'''SOUCHEZ - 21:00 hours'''

2/Lt Bell, Royal Signals, was despatched on a motorcycle to make contact with 70 Brigade in the MINGOVAL area.

At 21:15 Lt Col Hare and Maj Slade-Powell took five lorries to search for the hundred men of 11 DLI who had been reported by 12 Royal Lancers earlier in the day.

At 23:00 Lt Wrightson took an Advance Party to GIVENCHY-EN-GOHELLE H41 where arrangements were made to establish Divisional HQ.

'''SOUCHEZ - 21st May 1940''' 

00:40 hours.  2/Lt Bell returned to SOUCHEZ, having failed to find any trace of 70 Brigade personnel around MINGOVAL.

At 01:00 Divisional HQ left SOUCHEZ and proceeded to GIVENCHY, while General Herbert and Col Gulland remained behind to await the return of Lt Col Hare's party with the men of 11 DLI.

Captain Browne was instructed to report to G.O.C. 5 Division at VIMY and inform General Franklyn of the situation of 23rd Division, and that HQ had moved to GIVENCHY, where it was established at 01:40 hours.

'''GIVENCHY - 21st May 1940'''

At 03:00 hours General Herbert, Col Gulland and Lt Col Hare's party arrived at the new Divisional HQ, the transport having failed to find the men of 11 DLI, or any other British troops, in the area they had searched.

Captain Browne returned to 23rd Divisional HQ at 08:30, having attended a conference at 5 Division HQ, during which he had been briefed on the outline of today's counter-attack operations from the North by 5th and 50th Divisions, together with the French Armoured Cavalry Division.  During the night of 20th May 50th Division had taken over the line of the River SCARPE and, as a result, 5 EY and 6 GH were withdrawn to FARBUS - 4 1/2 miles North East of ARRAS (thus concentrating 69 Brigade in the THELUS area). 

Captain Browne also informed General Herbert that Brg Oliver Lees, Brigadier-General Staff at GHQ, had given him orders that 23rd Division should remain in the LENS area during the day and move to SECLIN during the night 21st/22nd May.

Major-General Herbert then proceeded at 09:30 to the HQ of 5 Division at VIMY to see Brg Oliver Lees.

At 09:55 2/Lt Moscrop, O.C. of B Coy, 11 DLI, arrived at Divisional HQ and explained that he had practically the whole of his Company, plus other men from Companies and Units of 70 Brigade - totalling about 120 men in all - at the MONCHY-BRETTON aerodrome site.  After the air and armoured attacks of the previous day his Company had former the Battalion rearguard but had been cut off by enemy action.  He had withdrawn towards NUNCQ aerodrome but had found Germans in FREVENT, so continued Northwards and had reached MONCHY-BRETTON on the evening of 20th May.  He had found his way to Divisional HQ by travelling Eastwards in a truck, having been unable to find either his Battalion, or 70 Brigade, HQs.  The War Diary did not clarify whether 2/Lt Moscrop's party were the men of 11 DLI who had been reported by 12 Royal Lancers as having been seen on the afternoon of the previous day. 

Almost immediately afterwards at 09:57 news was received from 12 Royal Lancers that Lt Col Marley and about 400 men of 10 DLI were at CAMBLAIN, some 9 miles North West of ARRAS.

At 10:15 General Herbert returned and, as a consequence of orders received (presumably from 5 Division or B.G.S.) instructed that the Division was to be withdrawn from the battle area.  Divisional Signals, No 31 Line Section, were to proceed to LOISON at 14:30 and from there to SECLIN at night.  69 Brigade was to be moved from FARBUS to SECLIN by the Troop Carrying Companies, while the known parties from 70 Brigade were to be collected by transport and moved to SECLIN.

Maj Goldingham was ordered to make contact with G.H.Q. Troops and, if the Provost Section could be located, arrange for it to be sent to LOISON for duties relating to the move to LOISON.  Other Divisional trrops which could be located were also to move to SECLIN.  507 Field Company and 508 Field Park Company were instructed to move to SECLIN from ESSARS.

At this stage, there was no news of the whereabouts of the Divisional Rear HQ.

At 14:45 hours the Divisional HQ Party in eight vehicles departed GIVENCHY and arrived at LOISON at 15:30 hours.

'''LOISON - 21st May 1940'''

At 15:40 hours orders were sent out for the 70 Brigade Parties at MONCHY-BRETTON and CAMBLAIN to be collected by transport and brought to SECLIN, with a warning that caution should be exercised, due to the enemy detachments in the areas North and North West of ST POL.

Captain Izod was despatched on a motorcycle to contact 9 RNF at LESTREM.

At 17:30 hours the Divisional HQ left LOISIN and moved to SECLIN where HQ was established.

'''SECLIN - 21st May 1940'''

At 23:00 hours Lt Col Marley of 10 DLI arrived at SECLIN with about 600 all ranks from units of 70 Brigade, having lost touch with Brg Kirkup.  The men, who were exhausted, were guided to GONDECOURT H6427 and attached to units of 69 Brigade, whose Advance Parties had taken over billets.

'''SECLIN - 22nd May 1940'''

At 03:45 hours Captain Izod returned, having successfully contacted 9 RNF at LESTREM.

In the period up to 05:00 69 Brigade were moved by Troop Carrying Company from THELUS to the area GONDECOURT - WATTIGNIES.  At this time the two Engineer Companies - 507 Field and 508 Field Park - completed their concentration at SECLIN.

Later in the day General Herbert visits GHQ at FREMESQUES H6239, as the Division was now under the direct command of GHQ and was given orders for the Division to take up a position on the general line of the River AA and CANAL DE L'AA from PTTE FORT PHILIPPE to exclude ST OMER.  All bridges were to be prepared for demolition.  The troops were to be moved by Troop Carrying Companies with detachments of the 1st Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade for protection.

At 14:00 hours a Conference took place at Divisional HQ where the orders for the occupation of the River AA positions were issued.  69 Brigade were positioned on the right, from the sea to inclusive WATTEN H16, 70 Brigade, with 9 RNF under command, on the left from exclusive WATTEN to ST OMER.  Reconnaissance parties were to select dispersal points.  Commanding Officers and the Infantry and Engineer reconnaissance parties then left for the positions.

After a short break a further Conference, including Brg Viscount Downe and Lt Col Marley, discussed the organisation of the various transport columns and these were decided as follows :-

Column 1 - to include 6 GH, 7 GH, 233 Field Company (approximately 100 men), and two sections of the Troop Carrying Company to follow route B, embussing at GONDECOURT at 21:30 hours.

Column 2 - to include 10 DLI, 11 DLI (600 men in total), 507 Field Company, 508 Field Park Company and one section from the Troop Carrying Company to follow route A, embussing at WATTINGIES at 22:00 hours.

Column 3 - to include Brg Kirkup and 200 men of 70 Brigade, 9 RNF and one section of the Troop Carrying Company, also to follow route A, but embussing at a road junction H4438 North of LESTREM.

Column 4 - to include 5 EY, one section of 233 Field Company (30 men) and one section of the Troop Carrying Company, following route B and embussing at WATTINGIES at 22:30 hours.

Route A was designated as LA BASSEE - ESTAIRES - STRAZEELE - HAZEBROUCK - CASSEL - PT DU JOUR H1761.
Route B was designated to be the same as far as CASSEL and then via DUNKERQUE.
Divisional HQ was be set up at BELLEZEELE H1966.

At 17:30 hours Brg Norman, the commander of 1st Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade, arrived at Divisional HQ, accompanied by the C.O. of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, to collect orders regarding their role in protecting the columns.  However, of the Troop Carrying Companies, only No 4 could be found.

In the light of this, General Herbert, with his G staff officers visited GHQ to obtain another Troop Carrying Company and to report a route change from the original orders, due to the exposed position of the road ST OMER - WATTEN.

At 18:10 hours Divisional HQ closed down at SECLIN and moved to BELLEZEELE.

General Herbert and his staff left GHQ at 19:30 and proceeded to LILLE, collected No 12 Troop Carrying Company and made arrangements for them to lift the parts of the Division not being carried by No 4 Company.

Captains Hedley and Izod were despatched on motorcycles at 21:00 to LESTREM to pass the movement details to 9 RNF and Brg Kirkup's Party.

General Herbert accompanied by Lt Col Hare and Maj Allen visited the 46 Divisional HQ at SAILLY at 21:45 to see Major-General Curtis who commanded POLFORCE and were given details of a report of enemy tanks having crossed the canal in the vicinity of ST OMER. 

'''BELLEZEELE 22nd May 1940'''

Col Gulland established Divisional HQ at 22:00 hours.

While still at SAILLY General Herbert was advised at 22:30 that command of the "A" Field Regiment was now reverting to 23rd Division from 46th Division.

At 23:00 General Herbert was telephoned by GHQ and told that all the 23rd Division embussed columns were to be intercepted and stopped.  A motor contact officer had been sent from GHQ to deal with this.  Maj Allen of the G staff was sent out to stop the columns as their heads reached the road junction just South East of ESTAIRES H43.  When he arrived at that point there was no sign of the columns, despite his reconnaissance of the area.  Maj Allen returned to ESTAIRES and at the South East of the town met Brg Norman and the sentry, posted by the motor contact officer, to intercept the columns.  Maj Allen then returned to SAILLY and reported the situation to General Herbert.

'''SAILLY 23rd May 1940'''

At 01:00 as General Herbert had been unable to contact GHQ he despatched Maj Allen back to the road junction South East of ESTAIRES with instructions for the embussed move of the Division to continue, as he was anxious that it should be concluded before daylight.  Maj Allen met the motor contact officer from GHQ - Captain Winter - at the junction and advised him of General Herbert's decision.  As Capt Winter was also unable to contact GHQ he left for their location to report the situation.

Shortly afterwards General Herbert is able to talk to Brg Lees at GHQ and, after explaining the situation, is told that the columns must be stopped and returned to SECLIN as the area has become particularly important.

At 03:00 the columns - excluding that containing 6 GH, were finally contacted at ESTAIRES and turned back to SECLIN via ARMENTIERES.

Captains Hedley and Izod, accompanied by Brg Kirkup, whom they had contacted at METEREN, reported to Divisional HQ at BELLEZEELE at 05:00.  Brg Kirkup then returned to his men at METEREN.

Majors Allen and Slade-Powell were despatched from ESTAIRES at 05:00 to advise Divisional HQ at BELLEZEELE to return to SECLIN and arrange for similar orders to be sent to Brg Viscount Downe and the Parties in the 69 Brigade area.  General Herbert and Lt Col Hare returned to SECLIN from ESTAIRES.

The two Majors arrived at BELLEZEELE Divisional HQ, giving Col Gulland the G.O.C.'s order to return.  2/Lt Bell was sent out to contact the 69 Brigade Parties, but returned at 11:00 having been unable to find them.

While the HQ was still at BELLEZEELE, an order was received from "X" Line of Communications ordering the destruction of all bridges from GRAVELINES to ST OMER.  This could not be done as all the explosives were with the Engineer units, currently returning to SECLIN.  There was also the complication that the Divisional front excluded ST OMER.

At 12:00 hours Col Gulland ordered Divisional HQ to return to SECLIN via SUEX - South of BERGUES-PROVEN - WESTOUTRE-LOCRE-NEUVE EGLISE - LIGNY - GONDECOURT.  While en route Col Gulland called at the HQ of USHERFORCE (formerly "X" Line of Communications) and briefed Brg Usher.  Further en route the HQ Party came upon Capt Burr of 1 TS with his 61 men, and he was instructed to report to SECLIN.  (More detail of Capt Burr's journeys can be found under the War Diary of 1 TS).

At SECLIN General Herbert received orders from GHQ via a liaison officer confirming that the Division was to occupy the line of the River AA and CANAL DE L'AA in accordance with original instructions.  In the light of this a message was sent to POLFORCE requesting the release of Brg Kirkup's party.  General Herbert took the opportunity of returning to GHQ with the liaison officer to explain that no troop carrying resources were now available and, as no other Troop Carrying Companies were able to be found, GHQ amended the instructions and sent other forces to the River and Canal line, leaving the 23rd Division at SECLIN.  The request for the release of Brg Kirkup's Party was not agreed and they remained with POLFORCE.

At 15:30 hours Staff Officers from Division (Lt Col Kennedy, Majors Allen and Slade-Powell) made contact with Brg Viscount Downe in BERGUES and learnt that 6 GH had been placed under the orders of USHERFORCE and were engaged in holding the River AA line in the GRAVELINES area.  Lt Cols Keating and Richmond Brown were still in the areas allotted to their Battalions for the original move to the line of the River AA and the 69 Brigade staff had been directed to remain in BERGUES under the orders of Brg Usher, and that therefore they could not return to SECLIN as instructed by the Division.

Divisional staff reached SECLIN at 18:00 hours where they were joined by Capt Burr's 1 TS Party at 20:00 hours that evening.  Given the possibility of the Division having to return to the line of the River AA the 186 Field Ambulance remained at OOST-CAPPEL H37 where it contacted 12 Casualty Clearing Station.

'''SECLIN - 24th May 1940'''

During the night of 23rd/24th May there had been a constant stream of transport and refugees through SECLIN.  

At 05:30 the transport of the 5th and 50th Divisions passed through SECLIN.

At 09:45 General Herbert set off for GHQ for orders and returned at 11:30 with the instructions that the Division was to move to an area between the sea and ST OMER as soon as transport could be made available.  8 RNF from ARRAS, and Brg Kirkup's force, including 9 RNF at ST OMER would rejoin the Division as soon as they were released from their current role - indeed 8 RNF was understood to be already en route from ARRAS.

At 11:30 hours the Commander Royal Engineers, with 507 Field Company and 508 Field Park Company, left SECLIN for BERGUES H2877.

Having arrived at BERGUES Commander Royal Engineers reported at 13:50 hours that Brg Viscount Downe and 186 Field Ambulance had left that location and their present whereabouts were unknown.  CRE established his HQ at LES MOERES H3432 and was in touch with Brg Usher who had indicated that he could assist regarding the position on the New Canal Line.

During the day stragglers were collected and fed by the Division from increasingly depleted stocks then sent on to their Brigade or Divisional locations where these were known, others being retained as no information could be obtained as to where they should be sent.

Information was received that the ARRAS garrison, including 8 RNF, had been ordered to evacuate early in the morning.  Parties from 8 RNF began arriving at SECLIN during the day by obtaining lifts on whatever transport was available - including one group which arrived by Municipal Dustcart which they had appropriated.  The Battalion had been ordered to leave all its transport including motorcycles back at ARRAS and move onwards by the road ARRAS - DOUAI.

'''SECLIN - 25th May 1940'''

From dawn onwards enemy aircraft made frequent visits to SECLIN and bombed the town and its vicinity.

A particularly heavy raid arrived at 10:30, causing four casualties in the 508 Field Park Company.

Capt Browne visited the HQ of RUSTYFORCE - returning at 12:40 hours and reported that no transport was available to move the Division out of SECLIN.  6 GH remained in the area of GRAVELINES and 8 RNF was expected to concentrate in SECLIN.  With regard to supplies, the Division was to rely on 1 Corps Dumps.

At 13:01 hours a message, timed at 09:45 from (presumably) GHQ instructed that 23rd Division should now come under 48 Division.  All garrisons on the West Front and certain Divisions on the LA BASSEE Canal were to comprise RUSTYFORCE, including 48 Division.

Parties from 8 RNF, making their way out of ARRAS were being collected by transport and moved to WATTIGNIES H63, these movements being completed by 18:30 hours.

At 20:10 hours a message was received from RUSTYFORCE to the effect that 9 RNF would remain under the command of 46 Division and remain in their present location.

A liaison officer arrived from RUSTYFORCE at 21:35 hours setting out the new areas to which the Division was to move - overnight 25th/26th May to ERQUINGHEM H53 - LIGNY - BEAUCAMPS followed by, on the night 26th/27th May, a move to LE PETIT MORTIER H44.  Warning orders for C.O.'s to report to Divisional HQ were issued forthwith.

Verbal orders were issued at 22:30 hours, including the intelligence that the Division would remain in RUSTYFORCE Reserve and that moves were to take place as set out above.

The details were that 7 GH, the DLI and a detachment of Field Ambulance (not clear whether 186 or 187) would move from GONDECOURT to an area between BEAUCAMPS crossroads and excluding RADINGHAM, the moves to start at 01:00 and 01:30 respectively.  8 RNF and 5 EY to move from WATTINGLEY to an area between excluding BEAUCAMPS crossroads to including LIGNY.  Divisional HQ and Divisional Troops were to move to ERGUINGHEM.


Copy of Operational summary – 11 pages.

Copy of narrative and summary 1 Tyneside Scottish – 17 pages.


Copy of detail diary – 7 pages