1st Tyneside Scottish November 1940 - Revision history

70bgadmin at 10:05, 4 May 2018

2018-05-04T10:05:26Z

70bgadmin at 11:03, 3 May 2018

2018-05-03T11:03:09Z

70bgadmin at 09:54, 3 May 2018

2018-05-03T09:54:43Z

70bgadmin at 16:23, 2 May 2018

2018-05-02T16:23:26Z

70bgadmin at 10:22, 2 May 2018

2018-05-02T10:22:27Z

70bgadmin at 14:38, 1 May 2018

2018-05-01T14:38:05Z

70bgadmin at 14:48, 30 April 2018

2018-04-30T14:48:02Z

70bgadmin at 19:32, 28 April 2018

2018-04-28T19:32:34Z

70bgadmin at 11:20, 16 May 2013

2013-05-16T11:20:34Z

70bgadmin at 21:22, 10 May 2012

2012-05-10T21:22:39Z

@@ Line 47: / Line 47: @@
 '''16th November 1940'''
-A route march was carried out through REYKJAVIK by the Pipe Band, Battalion HQ, A Company, C Company and part of HQ Company.
+A route march was carried out through [[Reykjavik]] by the Pipe Band, Battalion HQ, A Company, C Company and part of HQ Company.
 '''18th November 1940'''
@@ Line 55: / Line 55: @@
 ''This Operation Order is dated 18th November and sets out the Strategic Overview of the Iceland situation and the forces involved in preparing to meet any enemy threat of invasion or attack.  The introductory “information” paragraphs are of a nature that is repeated in many Iceland documents of this type and refer to fifth-column activity in Iceland and its strategic importance as far as defending the sea-lanes against air and submarine attack are concerned.''
-''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, [[Kaldadarnes]] and [[Pingvellir]] and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.''
+''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, [[Kaldadarnes]] and [[Pingvellir]] and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – [[Reykjavik]] area.''
 ''The areas to which the Battalion might have to travel embussed are listed as HVITAVELLIR BRIDGE, STADUR, SANDSKEID and KOTSTROND – depending on the direction from which the threat emerged, and reconnaissance of routes to these locations were expected to be carried out by the Battalion as soon as possible. ''

@@ Line 17: / Line 17: @@
 '''9th November 1940'''
-One Platoon (less one Section) of D Company, under the command of Captain A.L. Campbell, proceeded to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selfoss_(town) SELFOSS].
+One Platoon (less one Section) of D Company, under the command of Captain A.L. Campbell, proceeded to [[Selfoss]].
-''In Appendix 1 to the November 1940 War Diary are the Administrative and Operational Instructions for the Platoon providing the guard at SELFOSS on this occasion – dated 8th November 1940.''
+''In Appendix 1 to the November 1940 War Diary are the Administrative and Operational Instructions for the Platoon providing the guard at [[Selfoss]] on this occasion – dated 8th November 1940.''
 ''The document sets out the arrangements in some detail, beginning with Strength of the force, its Task, Method, Administration, Ammunition, Rations, Clothing, Inter-Communication, Regimental Aid Post, General information and the timings to be followed.''
@@ Line 25: / Line 25: @@
 ''The overall strength – based on a Rifle Platoon (less one Rifle Section) – also included 2 Stretcher-Bearers, 2 Signallers, 3 Drivers (and two 15cwt trucks) and a Motorcycle Orderly, giving a total manpower of 2 Officers ( the Platoon Commander and Captain Campbell as Detachment Commander) and 30 men.''
-''Their role was to; defend the Bridge at SELFOSS against sabotage and hold it, at all costs, against attack, observe the Aerodrome ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalda%C3%B0arnes R.A.F. KALDADARNES]) and report anything occurring direct to Force HQ, and to patrol the roads between SELFOSS,  [[Pingvellir]] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apavatn APAVATN] with particular attention to the SOGFOSS Power Station and the Bridge at ALVIDRA.''
+''Their role was to; defend the Bridge at [[Selfoss]] against sabotage and hold it, at all costs, against attack, observe the Aerodrome ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalda%C3%B0arnes R.A.F. KALDADARNES]) and report anything occurring direct to Force HQ, and to patrol the roads between [[Selfoss]],  [[Pingvellir]] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apavatn APAVATN] with particular attention to the SOGFOSS Power Station and the Bridge at ALVIDRA.''
-''The Detachment Commander was expected to draft a Defence Scheme and forward it to Force HQ.  (A copy of this dated 12th November, and an amendment dated 19th November, list; the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, the manning of the Bridge Guard at SELFOSS, and the scale and frequency of the daily road patrols.)
+''The Detachment Commander was expected to draft a Defence Scheme and forward it to Force HQ.  (A copy of this dated 12th November, and an amendment dated 19th November, list; the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, the manning of the Bridge Guard at [[Selfoss]], and the scale and frequency of the daily road patrols.)
 ''
 ''Rations, petrol, oil and lubricants for three days were to be taken by the Detachment and arrangements were to be made by Brigade for the R.A.F. Station to provide rations on a daily basis.  The Detachment was to be taken, with their baggage, by transport, being ready to leave the Battalion Camp at 10:00 hours on 9th November.''
@@ Line 39: / Line 39: @@
 ''Other troops in the vicinity were a Detachment Flight of 98 Squadron, R.A.F. with 120 men and 18 Light Machine Guns, and a Platoon of Machine-Gunners from the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa.''
-''Captain Campbell was ordered to contact the Hiring Officer at SELFOSS at 13:00 hours and inspect the available billets which the Detachment would use until their Nissen Huts were erected.''
+''Captain Campbell was ordered to contact the Hiring Officer at [[Selfoss]] at 13:00 hours and inspect the available billets which the Detachment would use until their Nissen Huts were erected.''
 '''13th November 1940'''

@@ Line 25: / Line 25: @@
 ''The overall strength – based on a Rifle Platoon (less one Rifle Section) – also included 2 Stretcher-Bearers, 2 Signallers, 3 Drivers (and two 15cwt trucks) and a Motorcycle Orderly, giving a total manpower of 2 Officers ( the Platoon Commander and Captain Campbell as Detachment Commander) and 30 men.''
-''Their role was to; defend the Bridge at SELFOSS against sabotage and hold it, at all costs, against attack, observe the Aerodrome ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalda%C3%B0arnes R.A.F. KALDADARNES]) and report anything occurring direct to Force HQ, and to patrol the roads between SELFOSS,  [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%9Eingvellir PINGVELLIR] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apavatn APAVATN] with particular attention to the SOGFOSS Power Station and the Bridge at ALVIDRA.''
+''Their role was to; defend the Bridge at SELFOSS against sabotage and hold it, at all costs, against attack, observe the Aerodrome ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalda%C3%B0arnes R.A.F. KALDADARNES]) and report anything occurring direct to Force HQ, and to patrol the roads between SELFOSS,  [[Pingvellir]] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apavatn APAVATN] with particular attention to the SOGFOSS Power Station and the Bridge at ALVIDRA.''
 ''The Detachment Commander was expected to draft a Defence Scheme and forward it to Force HQ.  (A copy of this dated 12th November, and an amendment dated 19th November, list; the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, the manning of the Bridge Guard at SELFOSS, and the scale and frequency of the daily road patrols.)
@@ Line 55: / Line 55: @@
 ''This Operation Order is dated 18th November and sets out the Strategic Overview of the Iceland situation and the forces involved in preparing to meet any enemy threat of invasion or attack.  The introductory “information” paragraphs are of a nature that is repeated in many Iceland documents of this type and refer to fifth-column activity in Iceland and its strategic importance as far as defending the sea-lanes against air and submarine attack are concerned.''
-''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, [[Kaldadarnes]] and PINGVELLIR and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.''
+''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, [[Kaldadarnes]] and [[Pingvellir]] and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.''
 ''The areas to which the Battalion might have to travel embussed are listed as HVITAVELLIR BRIDGE, STADUR, SANDSKEID and KOTSTROND – depending on the direction from which the threat emerged, and reconnaissance of routes to these locations were expected to be carried out by the Battalion as soon as possible. ''

@@ Line 67: / Line 67: @@
 '''21st November 1940'''
-A Field Firing Exercise was held at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleifarvatn KLEIFERVATN] in which Battalion HQ, A Company, C Company and the Carriers and Signals Platoons from HQ Company took part.  The Exercise had to be abandoned after some 3 ½ hours due to a heavy snowstorm.
+A Field Firing Exercise was held at [[Kleifarvatn]] in which Battalion HQ, A Company, C Company and the Carriers and Signals Platoons from HQ Company took part.  The Exercise had to be abandoned after some 3 ½ hours due to a heavy snowstorm.
 A copy of the Instructions for the Field Firing Exercise were attached to the November 1940 War Diary as Appendix 3.    The Exercise was to take place several times, involving the different units of the Brigade.
-The Exercise was set in the context of an enemy attack by troop-carrying aircraft in the SANDSKEID area, supported by light tanks and infantry guns also brought in by air.  Elements of the Force Reserve were rushed to the site and had engaged the enemy but were facing skilfully prepared positions near the landing ground.  During the ensuing night the enemy forces had pushed through the rough valleys leading to the side of [[Helgafell]].  R.A.F. reconnaissance suggested that the enemy intended to seize part of the KLEIFERVATN area as a secondary base of operations against RETKJAVIK, probably with the assistance of small mobile detachments of troops.
+The Exercise was set in the context of an enemy attack by troop-carrying aircraft in the SANDSKEID area, supported by light tanks and infantry guns also brought in by air.  Elements of the Force Reserve were rushed to the site and had engaged the enemy but were facing skilfully prepared positions near the landing ground.  During the ensuing night the enemy forces had pushed through the rough valleys leading to the side of [[Helgafell]].  R.A.F. reconnaissance suggested that the enemy intended to seize part of the [[Kleifervatn]] area as a secondary base of operations against RETKJAVIK, probably with the assistance of small mobile detachments of troops.
-For the context of the Exercise, friendly forces were assumed to be training in the KLEIFERVATN area, including a unit of Field Artillery and troops from a Field Ambulance.
+For the context of the Exercise, friendly forces were assumed to be training in the [[Kleifervatn]] area, including a unit of Field Artillery and troops from a Field Ambulance.
 The enemy were seen as moving South from [[Helgafell]] and the Battalion Commander was given orders from Brigade HQ to attack and destroy the enemy.

@@ Line 55: / Line 55: @@
 ''This Operation Order is dated 18th November and sets out the Strategic Overview of the Iceland situation and the forces involved in preparing to meet any enemy threat of invasion or attack.  The introductory “information” paragraphs are of a nature that is repeated in many Iceland documents of this type and refer to fifth-column activity in Iceland and its strategic importance as far as defending the sea-lanes against air and submarine attack are concerned.''
-''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, KALDADARNES and PINGVELLIR and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.''
+''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, [[Kaldadarnes]] and PINGVELLIR and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.''
 ''The areas to which the Battalion might have to travel embussed are listed as HVITAVELLIR BRIDGE, STADUR, SANDSKEID and KOTSTROND – depending on the direction from which the threat emerged, and reconnaissance of routes to these locations were expected to be carried out by the Battalion as soon as possible. ''

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 '''4th November 1940'''
-B Company, reinforced by a Platoon of R Company, took over the defence of the BRAUTARHOLT area, posts being manned from 13:30 hours.
+B Company, reinforced by a Platoon of R Company, took over the defence of the [[Brautarholt]] area, posts being manned from 13:30 hours.
 C Company were relieved at the VATNSENDI Wireless Station by a Platoon of R Company.
@@ Line 55: / Line 55: @@
 ''This Operation Order is dated 18th November and sets out the Strategic Overview of the Iceland situation and the forces involved in preparing to meet any enemy threat of invasion or attack.  The introductory “information” paragraphs are of a nature that is repeated in many Iceland documents of this type and refer to fifth-column activity in Iceland and its strategic importance as far as defending the sea-lanes against air and submarine attack are concerned.''
-''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, KALDADARNES and PINGVELLIR and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the BRAUTARHOLT – REYKJAVIK area.''
+''The Force Reserve is described and those units under the command of 70th Brigade are listed – see earlier references for the detail of these.  The specific role of 1st Tyneside Scottish, and the areas in which they were expected to operate are described.  This included countering threats from HUNAFLOI, KALDADARNES and PINGVELLIR and counter-attacking any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.''
 ''The areas to which the Battalion might have to travel embussed are listed as HVITAVELLIR BRIDGE, STADUR, SANDSKEID and KOTSTROND – depending on the direction from which the threat emerged, and reconnaissance of routes to these locations were expected to be carried out by the Battalion as soon as possible. ''
@@ Line 87: / Line 87: @@
 '''28th November 1940'''
-The Administrative Instructions for the relief of the BRAUTARHOLT Detachment were issued and attached to the War Diary as Appendix 4.
+The Administrative Instructions for the relief of the [[Brautarholt]] Detachment were issued and attached to the War Diary as Appendix 4.
 '''30th November 1940'''
-Appendix 4 was amended, as the relief of the troops at BRAUTARHOLT was postponed for 48 hours.
+Appendix 4 was amended, as the relief of the troops at [[Brautarholt]] was postponed for 48 hours.
 The Instructions for the relief included; the use of Advance Parties, the timing of the exchanges of troops, the responsibility for accommodation stores, the taking of full-scale G1098 arms, ammunition and equipment, the arrangements for rations, the briefing on positions before formal handover, and the need for certificates showing that instructions had been complied with.

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 '''Source Document Reference WO 176/339 at The National Archives'''
-'''At Baldurshagi. '''
+'''At [[BALDURSHAGI]]. '''
 '''4th November 1940'''
@@ Line 61: / Line 61: @@
 ''In the context of a counter-attack the Battalion was thought likely to have to move to the area of the VATNSENDI Wireless Station, across country, on foot.''
-''Instructions were included for the building of defensive positions, including anti-tank blocks and covering posts, and minelaying, with Royal Engineer assistance.  The Battalion was expected to be provided with adequate transport at BALDURSHAGI to move its personnel and stores to its identified locations.''
+''Instructions were included for the building of defensive positions, including anti-tank blocks and covering posts, and minelaying, with Royal Engineer assistance.  The Battalion was expected to be provided with adequate transport at [[BALDURSHAGI]] to move its personnel and stores to its identified locations.''
 ''2/Lt Bell was identified as Liaison Officer to be based at Brigade HQ supported by a Despatch Rider.''

@@ Line 79: / Line 79: @@
 A detailed scenario involving Infantry, Carriers, Mortars and Artillery was developed which involved; the attacking Infantry being fired over by the 25pdrs of the 143rd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, smoke and high explosive being delivered by the unit’s 2” Mortars, and live small-arms fire from the rifles and Light Machine Guns of the Infantry and their Carriers.
-As has been postulated previously, this may have been one of the earliest occasions in the Second World War when training was carried out so realistically, and particularly with the live firing of Artillery over the heads of attacking Infantry.
+''As has been postulated previously, this may have been one of the earliest occasions in the Second World War when training was carried out so realistically, and particularly with the live firing of Artillery over the heads of attacking Infantry.''
 '''25th November 1940'''

@@ Line 67: / Line 67: @@
 '''21st November 1940'''
-A Field Firing Exercise was held at KLEIFERVATN in which Battalion HQ, A Company, C Company and the Carriers and Signals Platoons from HQ Company took part.  The Exercise had to be abandoned after some 3 ½ hours due to a heavy snowstorm.
+A Field Firing Exercise was held at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleifarvatn KLEIFERVATN] in which Battalion HQ, A Company, C Company and the Carriers and Signals Platoons from HQ Company took part.  The Exercise had to be abandoned after some 3 ½ hours due to a heavy snowstorm.
 A copy of the Instructions for the Field Firing Exercise were attached to the November 1940 War Diary as Appendix 3.    The Exercise was to take place several times, involving the different units of the Brigade.
@@ Line 75: / Line 75: @@
 For the context of the Exercise, friendly forces were assumed to be training in the KLEIFERVATN area, including a unit of Field Artillery and troops from a Field Ambulance.
-The enemy were seen as moving South from HELGAFELL and the Battalion Commander was given orders from Brigade HQ to attack and destroy the enemy.  A detailed scenario involving Infantry, Carriers, Mortars and Artillery was developed which involved the attacking Infantry being fired over by the 25pdrs of the 143rd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, smoke and high explosive being delivered by the unit’s 2” Mortars, and live small-arms fire from the rifles and Light Machine Guns of the Infantry and their Carriers.
+The enemy were seen as moving South from HELGAFELL and the Battalion Commander was given orders from Brigade HQ to attack and destroy the enemy.
 As has been postulated previously, this may have been one of the earliest occasions in the Second World War when training was carried out so realistically, and particularly with the live firing of Artillery over the heads of attacking Infantry.
-th November 1940
+'''25th November 1940'''
 The Battalion Concert Party, under 2/Lt Paton, proceeded on tour.
-th November 1940
+'''28th November 1940'''
 The Administrative Instructions for the relief of the BRAUTARHOLT Detachment were issued and attached to the War Diary as Appendix 4.
-th November 1940
+'''30th November 1940'''
 Appendix 4 was amended, as the relief of the troops at BRAUTARHOLT was postponed for 48 hours.
@@ Line 93: / Line 95: @@
 The Instructions for the relief included; the use of Advance Parties, the timing of the exchanges of troops, the responsibility for accommodation stores, the taking of full-scale G1098 arms, ammunition and equipment, the arrangements for rations, the briefing on positions before formal handover, and the need for certificates showing that instructions had been complied with.
-(Attached to the War Diary for November, but not referenced within it, is a substantial document headed “Appendix F” which deals with Ammunition and Weapons.  It is unfortunately unclear as to which prime document it is an Appendix for – but it is thought likely that this will be a Force HQ paper which has been adapted to the Battalion positions and locations of 1st Tyneside Scottish.
+''(Attached to the War Diary for November, but not referenced within it, is a substantial document headed “Appendix F” which deals with Ammunition and Weapons.  It is unfortunately unclear as to which prime document it is an Appendix for – but it is thought likely that this will be a Force HQ paper which has been adapted to the Battalion positions and locations of 1st Tyneside Scottish.''
-−
-The first page of the Appendix identifies the scale of .303 ammunition to be carried by Company, including the tracer rounds loaded in the Bren Magazines on a 1 in 6 ratio.  Based on 120 rifles per Company plus nine Bren guns – one per Section – the typical Rifle Company held 26,000 rounds, including 2,250 tracer rounds.
-−
-On a Battalion basis of 25 Anti-Tank Rifles – one per Rifle Platoon plus additional weapons for the tank-hunting and anti-aircraft Platoons – and an average of 40 .55 rounds per rifle, plus a reserve per weapon of 120 rounds – the total allocation, including a Battalion Reserve, was 5,280 rounds.
-−
-There were expected to be 195 H.E. and 117 Smoke 3” Mortar bombs, 864 H.E. and 288 Smoke 2” Mortar bombs, and 480 M36 Hand Grenades.
-Provision was made for pistol ammunition at 18 rounds per weapon, of which six were held in Company Reserve.  Having introduced the Thompson Sub-Machine Gun at Section level this was also provided for at the rate of 36,000 rounds for the Battalion, of which only 50 was held by the tommygunner himself, the remaining 950 rounds per gun being held as a Company Reserve.  (It should be explained that the British Army used the box magazine for the Thompson – generally holding ten rounds per magazine – rather than the fifty-round drum magazine so often portrayed when the weapon is illustrated.)
+''The first page of the Appendix identifies the scale of .303 ammunition to be carried by Company, including the tracer rounds loaded in the Bren Magazines on a 1 in 6 ratio.  Based on 120 rifles per Company plus nine Bren guns – one per Section – the typical Rifle Company held 26,000 rounds, including 2,250 tracer rounds.
-Vickers Medium Machine-Gun ammunition, in belts, was treated as trench stores and handed over to relieving units, along with the guns in the relevant Sector, when assignments changed.
+''There were expected to be 195 H.E. and 117 Smoke 3” Mortar bombs, 864 H.E. and 288 Smoke 2” Mortar bombs, and 480 M36 Hand Grenades.''
-Verey Signal Pistols were held at defensive positions together with a quantity of coloured flare cartridges – generally 12 Red, 12 Green and 24 White per pistol.  Similarly, Molotov Cocktail Bombs were also regarded as trench stores and were held in considerable numbers – 925 for the Battalion as a whole.  Anti-personnel mines – 200 in number – were held as a Battalion Reserve, while Anti-Tank Mines were again held at relevant defensive positions.
+''Provision was made for pistol ammunition at 18 rounds per weapon, of which six were held in Company Reserve.  Having introduced the Thompson Sub-Machine Gun at Section level this was also provided for at the rate of 36,000 rounds for the Battalion, of which only 50 was held by the tommygunner himself, the remaining 950 rounds per gun being held as a Company Reserve.  (It should be explained that the British Army used the box magazine for the Thompson – generally holding ten rounds per magazine – rather than the fifty-round drum magazine so often portrayed when the weapon is illustrated.)''
-The document goes on to describe the detail of who carries what scale of ammunition – based on everyone with a rifle carrying at least 50 rounds.  Each Bren Gun was to be accompanied by 12 filled magazines of 28 rounds each, including 1 in 6 tracer bullets, with the balance of ammunition being held ready for magazines to be filled – a task which would be undertaken when emergency code words were issued.  Similar provision was made for Anti-Tank Rifles and 2” Mortars.
+''Vickers Medium Machine-Gun ammunition, in belts, was treated as trench stores and handed over to relieving units, along with the guns in the relevant Sector, when assignments changed.''
-Work was also done to assess what ammunition could be carried over a reasonable distance by a Section without access to transport – this again is of value as it gives some idea of the scale and weight involved in ensuring that the Section had its full complement of ammunition for all of its weapons.
+''Verey Signal Pistols were held at defensive positions together with a quantity of coloured flare cartridges – generally 12 Red, 12 Green and 24 White per pistol.  Similarly, Molotov Cocktail Bombs were also regarded as trench stores and were held in considerable numbers – 925 for the Battalion as a whole.  Anti-personnel mines – 200 in number – were held as a Battalion Reserve, while Anti-Tank Mines were again held at relevant defensive positions.''
-The paper also clarifies what would be carried in the Universal Pouches on individual webbing – such as grenades or Bren magazines -  and what would be carried [usually Bren magazines] in the Utility Pouches.  The same exercise was carried out to specify what would be the ammunition load of the men in the Platoon Headquarters – including the 2” Mortar crew and the Anti-Tank Riflemen.)
+''The document goes on to describe the detail of who carries what scale of ammunition – based on everyone with a rifle carrying at least 50 rounds.  Each Bren Gun was to be accompanied by 12 filled magazines of 28 rounds each, including 1 in 6 tracer bullets, with the balance of ammunition being held ready for magazines to be filled – a task which would be undertaken when emergency code words were issued.  Similar provision was made for Anti-Tank Rifles and 2” Mortars.''
 To contact the author by e-mail with any queries, or to send information - [mailto:70brigade@newmp.org.uk click here].