1st Tyneside Scottish October 1941 - Revision history

70bgadmin at 10:14, 4 May 2018

2018-05-04T10:14:56Z

70bgadmin at 11:11, 3 May 2018

2018-05-03T11:11:40Z

70bgadmin at 09:57, 3 May 2018

2018-05-03T09:57:58Z

70bgadmin at 16:24, 2 May 2018

2018-05-02T16:24:51Z

70bgadmin at 17:58, 30 April 2018

2018-04-30T17:58:13Z

70bgadmin at 19:23, 18 June 2014

2014-06-18T19:23:02Z

70bgadmin at 14:34, 8 May 2013

2013-05-08T14:34:38Z

70bgadmin at 14:32, 8 May 2013

2013-05-08T14:32:04Z

70bgadmin at 14:31, 8 May 2013

2013-05-08T14:31:03Z

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70bgadmin at 14:11, 8 May 2013

2013-05-08T14:11:21Z

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@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 '''4th October 1941'''
-All US troops having left the REYKJAVIK Sub-Sector, the Defence Scheme was amended accordingly.  A copy was attached to the War Diary as Appendix 1 – for details see below.
+All US troops having left the [[Reykjavik]] Sub-Sector, the Defence Scheme was amended accordingly.  A copy was attached to the War Diary as Appendix 1 – for details see below.
 '''5th October 1941'''
@@ Line 96: / Line 96: @@
 '''Appendix 1 – Changes to the Defence Scheme to accommodate the US Marines Mobile Column.'''
-This small document was Amendment No 2 to the Defence Scheme for the REYKJAVIK Sub-Sector and simply was a notification – dated 4th October 1941 – that the American Marines would act as a Mobile Column in conjunction with British Forces in the defence of ICELAND.
+This small document was Amendment No 2 to the Defence Scheme for the [[Reykjavik]] Sub-Sector and simply was a notification – dated 4th October 1941 – that the American Marines would act as a Mobile Column in conjunction with British Forces in the defence of ICELAND.
-'''Appendix 2 - Operation Instruction for the moves between REYKJAVIK and HAFNARFJORDUR.'''
+'''Appendix 2 - Operation Instruction for the moves between [[Reykjavik]] and HAFNARFJORDUR.'''
-The first document was the Administrative Instruction for the Inter-Battalion relief between [[Hafnafjordur]] and REYKJAVIK – the mutual relief of 11th DLI by 1st Tyneside Scottish.
+The first document was the Administrative Instruction for the Inter-Battalion relief between [[Hafnafjordur]] and [[Reykjavik]] – the mutual relief of 11th DLI by 1st Tyneside Scottish.
-The composition of the Advance Parties from the Battalion were specified – they were due to be exchanged on 7th October, with the relief itself taking place 9th and 10th October.  Rear Parties were to be left at the discretion of Company Commanders but all troops were to be clear of their existing Posts by 12:00 hours on 11th October.  All G1098 stores were to be taken, but equipment, weapons and Defence Stores essential for the REYKJAVIK Sub-Sector were to be handed over (such as secret documents, Medium Machine Guns, Verey pistols and ammunition).
+The composition of the Advance Parties from the Battalion were specified – they were due to be exchanged on 7th October, with the relief itself taking place 9th and 10th October.  Rear Parties were to be left at the discretion of Company Commanders but all troops were to be clear of their existing Posts by 12:00 hours on 11th October.  All G1098 stores were to be taken, but equipment, weapons and Defence Stores essential for the [[Reykjavik]] Sub-Sector were to be handed over (such as secret documents, Medium Machine Guns, Verey pistols and ammunition).
 Reserves – such as rations and fuel, were to be handed over in situ.  Signals Officers would arrange the takeover of telephone exchanges.  Weapon Training Officers would hand over Ranges, and any plans for future developments of Ranges.
@@ Line 111: / Line 111: @@
-The exercise was predicated on US troops having taken over the defence of ICELAND, supported by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, with the UK forces, less 146 Brigade, concentrated at REYKJAVIK, preparatory to leaving for another posting overseas.
+The exercise was predicated on US troops having taken over the defence of ICELAND, supported by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, with the UK forces, less 146 Brigade, concentrated at [[Reykjavik]], preparatory to leaving for another posting overseas.
 Without warning, German airborne landings took place in several locations – including APAVATN, together with fierce air attacks on the airfields.  A total of an estimated three Battalions, with supporting Artillery, were understood to have landed.

@@ Line 115: / Line 115: @@
 Without warning, German airborne landings took place in several locations – including APAVATN, together with fierce air attacks on the airfields.  A total of an estimated three Battalions, with supporting Artillery, were understood to have landed.
-th Brigade was moved to deal with the threat from APAVATN, crossing the ALVIDRA bridge.  147th Brigade moved over the SELFOSS bridge to deal with the threat from the ODDI direction.  The briefing note then gave the locations of “own troops” at 10:30 hours – in the case of the 1st Tyneside Scottish, they were in Brigade Reserve located around the road and track junction reference 721937.  The Germans had a Battalion and supporting Artillery opposite 70th Brigade.
+th Brigade was moved to deal with the threat from APAVATN, crossing the ALVIDRA bridge.  147th Brigade moved over the [[Selfoss]] bridge to deal with the threat from the ODDI direction.  The briefing note then gave the locations of “own troops” at 10:30 hours – in the case of the 1st Tyneside Scottish, they were in Brigade Reserve located around the road and track junction reference 721937.  The Germans had a Battalion and supporting Artillery opposite 70th Brigade.
 '''Appendix 4 – Operation Instruction for Force Exercise No 12.'''

@@ Line 119: / Line 119: @@
 '''Appendix 4 – Operation Instruction for Force Exercise No 12.'''
-Operation Order No 1 for Force Exercise No 12 indicated that an enemy Infantry Brigade was located in the PINGVELLIR area.  The normal guard at the artificial hop factory at GRAFNINSTRETT was reported as being weak and probably not more than one Platoon in strength.  Well-armed and hostile guerrillas/anarchists were known to be roaming the area, and ambushes of Motor Transport, Headquarters and Despatch Riders – and Columns moving through the terrain – were considered likely.
+Operation Order No 1 for Force Exercise No 12 indicated that an enemy Infantry Brigade was located in the [[Pingvellir]] area.  The normal guard at the artificial hop factory at GRAFNINSTRETT was reported as being weak and probably not more than one Platoon in strength.  Well-armed and hostile guerrillas/anarchists were known to be roaming the area, and ambushes of Motor Transport, Headquarters and Despatch Riders – and Columns moving through the terrain – were considered likely.
 The RAF were making six Lysander aircraft available for Army co-operation.

@@ Line 78: / Line 78: @@
 '''23rd October 1941'''
-The Field firing Scheme at KLEIFERVATN was cancelled due to bad weather conditions.
+The Field firing Scheme at [[Kleifervatn]] was cancelled due to bad weather conditions.
 '''28th October 1941'''
-The Field Firing Scheme at KLEIFERVATN Range was held – postponed from 23rd October – with Major-General Bonesteel and other US Officers as spectators.  The arrangements for the exercise were set out on Appendix 5 attached to the War Diary – for details see below.
+The Field Firing Scheme at [[Kleifervatn]] Range was held – postponed from 23rd October – with Major-General Bonesteel and other US Officers as spectators.  The arrangements for the exercise were set out on Appendix 5 attached to the War Diary – for details see below.
 The Battalion Intelligence Section, and a detachment of No 1 Platoon took part in Force Exercise No 13 in the KALDARSEL VALLEY.  This was an Intelligence Exercise with Major Walton and Captain Boyne amongst the Umpires.
@@ Line 133: / Line 133: @@
 '''Appendix 5 – Operation Instruction for Field Firing Exercise – issued 16th October 1941. '''
-This set of documents described the arrangements for a Field Firing Exercise at KLEIFERVATN on 23rd October 1941.
+This set of documents described the arrangements for a Field Firing Exercise at [[Kleifervatn]] on 23rd October 1941.
 The aim of the exercise was to:-
@@ Line 145: / Line 145: @@
 The exercise was to be rehearsed on 21st October.
-The exercise would be run in three phases.  Following a period of more intense enemy air activity around STAVANGER increased enemy aerial reconnaissance was reported.  As a result, preparations against possible aerial landings and assaults had been made, including the bivouacking of 70th Brigade across the KEFLAVIK Peninsula, 1st Tyneside Scottish being located at KLEIFERVATN, supported by elements of 143 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery.
+The exercise would be run in three phases.  Following a period of more intense enemy air activity around STAVANGER increased enemy aerial reconnaissance was reported.  As a result, preparations against possible aerial landings and assaults had been made, including the bivouacking of 70th Brigade across the KEFLAVIK Peninsula, 1st Tyneside Scottish being located at [[Kleifervatn]], supported by elements of 143 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery.
 For the purpose of the exercise one Section of the Carrier Platoon had been detached to transport the Mortars – ''thus implying that Carden Lloyd Carriers were not available for the Mortar detachments.''  In view of the scale of live firing involved there were a considerable number of Safety Officers detailed.  A trace of the map of the area was included with the papers.

@@ Line 100: / Line 100: @@
 '''Appendix 2 - Operation Instruction for the moves between REYKJAVIK and HAFNARFJORDUR.'''
-The first document was the Administrative Instruction for the Inter-Battalion relief between HAFNAFJORDUR and REYKJAVIK – the mutual relief of 11th DLI by 1st Tyneside Scottish.
+The first document was the Administrative Instruction for the Inter-Battalion relief between [[Hafnafjordur]] and REYKJAVIK – the mutual relief of 11th DLI by 1st Tyneside Scottish.
 The composition of the Advance Parties from the Battalion were specified – they were due to be exchanged on 7th October, with the relief itself taking place 9th and 10th October.  Rear Parties were to be left at the discretion of Company Commanders but all troops were to be clear of their existing Posts by 12:00 hours on 11th October.  All G1098 stores were to be taken, but equipment, weapons and Defence Stores essential for the REYKJAVIK Sub-Sector were to be handed over (such as secret documents, Medium Machine Guns, Verey pistols and ammunition).
@@ Line 153: / Line 153: @@
 An Intelligence Outpost had reported a parachute landing at reference 225890, with an estimated strength of 200 with Mortars and several heavy and light machine guns.  On the basis of this information the Battalion was moved Northwards.
-The Field Battery were to provide support from their existing position and the Battalion was moving towards CAMERON NECK when a further Intelligence Report arrived, indicating that part of the enemy had collected themselves and were moving South West towards the ISLAND, with others taking up defensive posts on Hill reference 2188 North of the ISLAND, while others were seen moving up the steep face of LANGAHLID 2388 - their objective appeared to be securing the heights around KLEIFARVATN and the road to HAFNAFJORDUR.  Given the importance of the road, the CO decided to attack the heights of the ISLAND and surrounding hills.
+The Field Battery were to provide support from their existing position and the Battalion was moving towards CAMERON NECK when a further Intelligence Report arrived, indicating that part of the enemy had collected themselves and were moving South West towards the ISLAND, with others taking up defensive posts on Hill reference 2188 North of the ISLAND, while others were seen moving up the steep face of LANGAHLID 2388 - their objective appeared to be securing the heights around KLEIFARVATN and the road to [[Hafnafjordur]].  Given the importance of the road, the CO decided to attack the heights of the ISLAND and surrounding hills.
 The first phase involved No 4 Platoon and the Reconnaissance Platoon occupying CAMERON NECK and the heights immediately North of that position.  4 Platoon found advance elements of enemy about 4 – 600 yards to their front and opened fire on them.  The Reconnaissance Platoon occupied the heights without incident and held that position until the Main Body was through the NECK, when the Platoon came into reserve.  No artillery was used in this phase.

@@ Line 149: / Line 149: @@
 For the purpose of the exercise one Section of the Carrier Platoon had been detached to transport the Mortars – ''thus implying that Carden Lloyd Carriers were not available for the Mortar detachments.''  In view of the scale of live firing involved there were a considerable number of Safety Officers detailed.  A trace of the map of the area was included with the papers.
-[[File:1_TS_War_Diary_October_1941_App_5_Page_6_Cropped_version.jpg|200px|thumb|centre|Map Trace- KLEIFERVATN]]
+[[File:1_TS_War_Diary_October_1941_App_5_Page_6_Cropped_version.jpg|500px|thumb|centre|Map Trace- KLEIFERVATN]]
 An Intelligence Outpost had reported a parachute landing at reference 225890, with an estimated strength of 200 with Mortars and several heavy and light machine guns.  On the basis of this information the Battalion was moved Northwards.