70th Infantry Brigade War Diary January 1941. - Revision history

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← Older revision		Revision as of 11:34, 4 April 2020
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	The following photograph - courtesy of The Yorkshire Post - shows the staff of Brigade HQ in January 1941 and appeared in a publication by the newspaper covering the forces in Iceland at the time. ''The author's father is standing sixth from the left in the row immediately behind the seated Officers.''		The following photograph - courtesy of The Yorkshire Post - shows the staff of Brigade HQ in January 1941 and appeared in a publication by the newspaper covering the forces in Iceland at the time. ''The author's father is standing sixth from the left in the row immediately behind the seated Officers.''

−	[[File:Bde_HQ_Staff_January_1941.jpg\|~~200px~~\|thumb\|centre\|Brigade HQ Staff January 1941]]	+	[[File:Bde_HQ_Staff_January_1941.jpg\|800px\|thumb\|centre\|Brigade HQ Staff January 1941]]

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 '''10th January 1941'''
-The Brigade Commander held a further Conference with Brigadier Lammie of 147 Infantry Brigade to discuss the future interchange of positions.  70th Brigade was to take over the South West Sector, including the important ports of REYKJAVIK and [[Hafnafjordur]] from 147th Brigade in the early days of March 1941.  147th Brigade would combine the defence of the Western Sector with the role of Force Mobile Reserve.  At Battalion level it was arranged that 1st Tyneside Scottish would interchange with 1/6 Duke of Wellington’s Regiment in REYKJAVIK, and 11th Durham Light Infantry would take over the [[Hafnafjordur]] area from 1/7 Duke of Wellington’s Regiment.
+The Brigade Commander held a further Conference with Brigadier Lammie of 147 Infantry Brigade to discuss the future interchange of positions.  70th Brigade was to take over the South West Sector, including the important ports of [[Reykjavik]] and [[Hafnafjordur]] from 147th Brigade in the early days of March 1941.  147th Brigade would combine the defence of the Western Sector with the role of Force Mobile Reserve.  At Battalion level it was arranged that 1st Tyneside Scottish would interchange with 1/6 Duke of Wellington’s Regiment in [[Reykjavik]], and 11th Durham Light Infantry would take over the [[Hafnafjordur]] area from 1/7 Duke of Wellington’s Regiment.
-th Durham Light Infantry were expected to remain in their existing positions until relieved by 1/5 West Yorkshire Regiment early in May.  This meant that 10th DLI would come under the command of 147th Brigade for operational purposes during March and April but would remain part of 70th Brigade for administration and training purposes.  In respect of the Medical Services, 187th Field Ambulance – attached to 70th Brigade - would change locations with 160th Field Ambulance in REYKJAVIK at a date to be arranged later.
+th Durham Light Infantry were expected to remain in their existing positions until relieved by 1/5 West Yorkshire Regiment early in May.  This meant that 10th DLI would come under the command of 147th Brigade for operational purposes during March and April but would remain part of 70th Brigade for administration and training purposes.  In respect of the Medical Services, 187th Field Ambulance – attached to 70th Brigade - would change locations with 160th Field Ambulance in [[Reykjavik]] at a date to be arranged later.
 '''11th January 1941'''
@@ Line 202: / Line 202: @@
 (c) [[Pingvellir]]
-and to counter-attack against any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.
+and to counter-attack against any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – [[Reykjavik]] area.
 The methods the Reserve was expected to use relied, firstly, on motor transport moves – where the troops were anticipated to move embussed, in the case of an attack on HUNAFLOI, to the vicinities of HVITAVELLIR and STADUR, or in the case of an approach via [[Kaldadarnes]], to SANDSKEID and KOTSTROND.
-The next method was expected to be by counter-attack, should REYKJAVIK or [[Hafnafjordur]] be attacked, by a move on foot across country to VATNSENDI – the location of a major radio station.
+The next method was expected to be by counter-attack, should [[Reykjavik]] or [[Hafnafjordur]] be attacked, by a move on foot across country to VATNSENDI – the location of a major radio station.
-In the event of an enemy move against the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area the Reserve Force was expected to immediately attack enemy landing parties, beginning with the establishment of “pivot points” once the Invasion Code Word “JULIUS” was issued.  These pivot points were three in number –
+In the event of an enemy move against the [[Brautarholt]] – [[Reykjavik]] area the Reserve Force was expected to immediately attack enemy landing parties, beginning with the establishment of “pivot points” once the Invasion Code Word “JULIUS” was issued.  These pivot points were three in number –
-(a)	the river line north of the junction between the roads from REYKJAVIK to [[Pingvellir]] and REYKJAVIK to [[Brautarholt]].  This was planned to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI, less detachments at FORT CAMERON, FORT ROUILLE and FORT YORK, with a Section of the 711th Construction Company under command.  11th DLI were also to be responsible for maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks and other defences in this area.
+(a)	the river line north of the junction between the roads from [[Reykjavik]] to [[Pingvellir]] and [[Reykjavik]] to [[Brautarholt]].  This was planned to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI, less detachments at FORT CAMERON, FORT ROUILLE and FORT YORK, with a Section of the 711th Construction Company under command.  11th DLI were also to be responsible for maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks and other defences in this area.
 (b)	the high ground at [[Lagafell]].  This was to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI supported by a platoon of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa – though these latter troops were to be at 30 minutes notice to rejoin the Force Reserve.
-(c)	The high ground astride the road from REYKJAVIK to [[Brautarholt]] including GRAFARHOLT HILL and KELDNAHOLT HILL.  This was to be held by a platoon of 1st Tyneside Scottish.  The Battalion was also to have the responsibility of constructing and maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks, covering posts and for the laying of Anti-Tank mines when the Code Word was issued.
+(c)	The high ground astride the road from [[Reykjavik]] to [[Brautarholt]] including GRAFARHOLT HILL and KELDNAHOLT HILL.  This was to be held by a platoon of 1st Tyneside Scottish.  The Battalion was also to have the responsibility of constructing and maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks, covering posts and for the laying of Anti-Tank mines when the Code Word was issued.
 The 11th DLI were expected to reconnoitre the positions at [[Lagafell]] and mark out sites of proposed trenches ''and presumably MG posts also''.
@@ Line 288: / Line 288: @@
 Similarly the Flag Officer in Command of Naval Forces had arranged that patrol ships sighting an enemy or suspicious vessel would fire a series of green flares or rockets – the sighting of which would be reported to HQ 70th Brigade.
-A general alarm in REYKJAVIK would be given by a rocket, or rockets, fired from the HQ of 147  Infantry Brigade.
+A general alarm in [[Reykjavik]] would be given by a rocket, or rockets, fired from the HQ of 147  Infantry Brigade.
 '''The Appendix A to this Operation Order''' sets out the Order of March of the Force Reserve, and its composition and command structure, dependent on the direction to be followed – to the North, to [[Pingvellir]] or to [[Kaldadarnes]].  ''The aim would be to balance the Force and ensure a correct mix of fighting and support troops and equipment for the location concerned.''

@@ Line 200: / Line 200: @@
 (b) [[Kaldadarnes]] or
-(c) PINGVELLIR
+(c) [[Pingvellir]]
 and to counter-attack against any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.
@@ Line 210: / Line 210: @@
 In the event of an enemy move against the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area the Reserve Force was expected to immediately attack enemy landing parties, beginning with the establishment of “pivot points” once the Invasion Code Word “JULIUS” was issued.  These pivot points were three in number –
-(a)	the river line north of the junction between the roads from REYKJAVIK to PINGVELLIR and REYKJAVIK to [[Brautarholt]].  This was planned to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI, less detachments at FORT CAMERON, FORT ROUILLE and FORT YORK, with a Section of the 711th Construction Company under command.  11th DLI were also to be responsible for maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks and other defences in this area.
+(a)	the river line north of the junction between the roads from REYKJAVIK to [[Pingvellir]] and REYKJAVIK to [[Brautarholt]].  This was planned to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI, less detachments at FORT CAMERON, FORT ROUILLE and FORT YORK, with a Section of the 711th Construction Company under command.  11th DLI were also to be responsible for maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks and other defences in this area.
 (b)	the high ground at [[Lagafell]].  This was to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI supported by a platoon of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa – though these latter troops were to be at 30 minutes notice to rejoin the Force Reserve.
@@ Line 290: / Line 290: @@
 A general alarm in REYKJAVIK would be given by a rocket, or rockets, fired from the HQ of 147  Infantry Brigade.
-'''The Appendix A to this Operation Order''' sets out the Order of March of the Force Reserve, and its composition and command structure, dependent on the direction to be followed – to the North, to PINGVELLIR or to [[Kaldadarnes]].  ''The aim would be to balance the Force and ensure a correct mix of fighting and support troops and equipment for the location concerned.''
+'''The Appendix A to this Operation Order''' sets out the Order of March of the Force Reserve, and its composition and command structure, dependent on the direction to be followed – to the North, to [[Pingvellir]] or to [[Kaldadarnes]].  ''The aim would be to balance the Force and ensure a correct mix of fighting and support troops and equipment for the location concerned.''
 '''Appendix B to the Order''' sets out the calculation of the transport loads required to move the Reserve Force North with its personnel, rations, petrol, baggage, wire and ammunition.  The rendezvous points for the transport are set out together with the details of the baggage, fuel and rations to be carried.

@@ Line 212: / Line 212: @@
 (a)	the river line north of the junction between the roads from REYKJAVIK to PINGVELLIR and REYKJAVIK to [[Brautarholt]].  This was planned to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI, less detachments at FORT CAMERON, FORT ROUILLE and FORT YORK, with a Section of the 711th Construction Company under command.  11th DLI were also to be responsible for maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks and other defences in this area.
-(b)	the high ground at LAGAFELL.  This was to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI supported by a platoon of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa – though these latter troops were to be at 30 minutes notice to rejoin the Force Reserve.
+(b)	the high ground at [[Lagafell]].  This was to be held by a platoon of 11th DLI supported by a platoon of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa – though these latter troops were to be at 30 minutes notice to rejoin the Force Reserve.
 (c)	The high ground astride the road from REYKJAVIK to [[Brautarholt]] including GRAFARHOLT HILL and KELDNAHOLT HILL.  This was to be held by a platoon of 1st Tyneside Scottish.  The Battalion was also to have the responsibility of constructing and maintaining the Anti-Tank blocks, covering posts and for the laying of Anti-Tank mines when the Code Word was issued.
-The 11th DLI were expected to reconnoitre the positions at LAGAFELL and mark out sites of proposed trenches ''and presumably MG posts also''.
+The 11th DLI were expected to reconnoitre the positions at [[Lagafell]] and mark out sites of proposed trenches ''and presumably MG posts also''.
 The Operation Order then went on to describe the action to be taken should the War Office notify that the likelihood of an invasion of Iceland was stronger then normal – in which case a message “Prepare for Julius” would be issued.  Such a message would imply that intelligence had been received, or definite intentions of enemy action had been observed – leading to an increased state of vigilance and redressing of any relaxation in the state of readiness.

@@ Line 198: / Line 198: @@
 (a) HUNAFLOI,
-(b) KALDADARNES or
+(b) [[Kaldadarnes]] or
 (c) PINGVELLIR
@@ Line 204: / Line 204: @@
 and to counter-attack against any enemy penetration in the [[Brautarholt]] – REYKJAVIK area.
-The methods the Reserve was expected to use relied, firstly, on motor transport moves – where the troops were anticipated to move embussed, in the case of an attack on HUNAFLOI, to the vicinities of HVITAVELLIR and STADUR, or in the case of an approach via KALDADARNES, to SANDSKEID and KOTSTROND.
+The methods the Reserve was expected to use relied, firstly, on motor transport moves – where the troops were anticipated to move embussed, in the case of an attack on HUNAFLOI, to the vicinities of HVITAVELLIR and STADUR, or in the case of an approach via [[Kaldadarnes]], to SANDSKEID and KOTSTROND.
 The next method was expected to be by counter-attack, should REYKJAVIK or [[Hafnafjordur]] be attacked, by a move on foot across country to VATNSENDI – the location of a major radio station.
@@ Line 290: / Line 290: @@
 A general alarm in REYKJAVIK would be given by a rocket, or rockets, fired from the HQ of 147  Infantry Brigade.
-'''The Appendix A to this Operation Order''' sets out the Order of March of the Force Reserve, and its composition and command structure, dependent on the direction to be followed – to the North, to PINGVELLIR or to KALDADARNES.  ''The aim would be to balance the Force and ensure a correct mix of fighting and support troops and equipment for the location concerned.''
+'''The Appendix A to this Operation Order''' sets out the Order of March of the Force Reserve, and its composition and command structure, dependent on the direction to be followed – to the North, to PINGVELLIR or to [[Kaldadarnes]].  ''The aim would be to balance the Force and ensure a correct mix of fighting and support troops and equipment for the location concerned.''
 '''Appendix B to the Order''' sets out the calculation of the transport loads required to move the Reserve Force North with its personnel, rations, petrol, baggage, wire and ammunition.  The rendezvous points for the transport are set out together with the details of the baggage, fuel and rations to be carried.

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 '''8th January 1941'''
-The Brigade Commander had a further Conference with the General Officer Commanding regarding the accommodation for 10th DLI and later inspected the Camps of 1st TS at BALDURSHAGI.
+The Brigade Commander had a further Conference with the General Officer Commanding regarding the accommodation for 10th DLI and later inspected the Camps of 1st TS at [[BALDURSHAGI]].
 '''10th January 1941'''

@@ Line 260: / Line 260: @@
 Under the Local Defence Scheme, as there was the possibility of considerable fifth-column activity all local Headquarters were expected to have their own local alarm schemes for the protection of their HQ buildings, which would be put into effect when “JULIUS” was issued.
-After the departure of the Force Reserve from ALAFOSS the second-in-command of 11th DLI would be responsible for co-ordinating the local defence of the various camps in that area including Brigade HQ, the HQ of 143rd Field Regiment and that of the 711th Construction Company.
+After the departure of the Force Reserve from [[Alafoss]] the second-in-command of 11th DLI would be responsible for co-ordinating the local defence of the various camps in that area including Brigade HQ, the HQ of 143rd Field Regiment and that of the 711th Construction Company.
 With reference to supplies, each Unit within the Force Reserve would maintain two days’ rations ready to move with them, additional to the reserves already held – now 13 days’ worth.  The Order went on to specify that, of the two days’ rations referred to, one would be carried in the “B” Echelon transport and the other on the individual man – biscuits and chocolate in his Mess Tin and a tin each of preserved meat ''(probably "bully-beef")'' and meat and vegetable stew (M & V) in his haversack – with the balance held on the platoon truck.

@@ Line 165: / Line 165: @@
 ''In addition it is more than likely that there were typing errors made in completing this Appendix as it has not been possible to identify some of these men by name at all  (one example is “Christer” who may well turn out to be “Christie”).  Further information will be needed to finalise this work.''
-The following photograph - courtesy of The Yorkshire Post - shows the staff of Brigade HQ in January 1941 and appeared in a publication by the newspaper covering the forces in Iceland at the time.
+The following photograph - courtesy of The Yorkshire Post - shows the staff of Brigade HQ in January 1941 and appeared in a publication by the newspaper covering the forces in Iceland at the time.  ''The author's father is standing sixth from the left in the row immediately behind the seated Officers.''
 [[File:Bde_HQ_Staff_January_1941.jpg|200px|thumb|centre|Brigade HQ Staff January 1941]]