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70th Brigade War Diary June 1940

Source – The National Archives File WO 167/385

1st June 1940

Personnel from the Brigade were scattered in various Reception Camps around the country, having landed from DUNKIRK. The Brigadier reported to Southern Command.

2nd June 1940

The Brigadier reported to South West Area at PLYMOUTH and was told that the 23rd Division would be reformed at LAUNCESTON. All Reception Camps were notified of this in order to start the process of collecting members of the Brigade in that area.

3rd June 1940

Brigadier Kirkup reported to LAUNCESTON at 11:00 hours. The Staff Captain and the Intelligence Officer joined him at LAUNCESTON at 21:00 hours.

In the temporary absence of Major General Herbert, Brigadier Kirkup acted as the Divisional Commander of 23rd Division.

4th June 1940

Personnel from the 70th Brigade HQ and the three Battalions, together with 8th and 9th RNF and Royal Engineers were accommodated in Scarne Camp. The Second Echelon (the War Diary does not specify who this included, or where they had come from) arrived and were also accommodated in the same Camp.

The 69th Brigade personnel were accommodated in the Pennygillan Camp.

At this stage there was no commander of 1st TS, while Lt Col C.D. Marley remained in command of 10th DLI and Captain A.W. Shipley commanded the men of 11th DLI.

5th to 8th June 1940

As Divisional personnel began arriving at LAUNCESTON from the various Reception Camps across the country, the Brigadier and the A.A.Q.M.G. of 23rd Division made numerous reconnaissances to find suitable Camps for the various units of the Division.

9th June 1940

To make more room at Scarne Camp for the 8th and 9th RNF, together with 1st TS, it was decided to move 70th Brigade HQ and the personnel of 10th and 11th DLI to the Ballard Institute at PLYMOUTH.

Lydford became the HQ of 23rd Division.

10th June 1940

The Brigadier visited Area Command and was given orders to arrange for the feeding of certain personnel who were embarking for France.

The War Office made a general order granting 48 hours leave, plus travelling time, for all personnel who had been evacuated from the B.E.F.

11th June 1940

Four trains containing 68 Officers and 1,537 Other Ranks – in units of the 52nd Division - arrived at Millbay Docks between 08:10 and 10::00 hours and were fed sandwiches and tea by a team from the Brigade before embarking on the ship El Mansour, which departed the Dock at 13:30 hours.

Two further trains with other units of the same Division holding 25 Officers and 850 Other Ranks arrived between 12:50 and 13:30 hours and were given a meal before departing on the Ville D’Algere from the Dock.

At 18:30 hours the Brigade received a further request from the A.A.Q.M.G. that the Brigade should feed part of a Canadian Division who were embarking for France the following day.

12th June 1940

Two trains containing units of the 1st Canadian Division, totalling 25 Officers and 750 men arrived at Millbay Docks between 10:00 and 11:30 hours and were fed before embarking for France at 13:30 hours.

13th June 1940

All the personnel of the Brigade who were no on leave proceeded to OAKHAMPTON and were accommodated as follows:-

10th DLI Showground Camp.

1st TS South Zeal.

11th DLI South Tawton.

14th to 18th June 1940

Over this period the Officers and men of the Brigade were returning from their 48 hours leave.

19th June 1940

Orders were received from Southern Command that the 23rd Division was to be disbanded. (This was a War Office decision not specific to 23rd Division but applied to all those duplicate Divisions which had been raised in 1939. Brigades were either to return to their parent Divisions or become Independent.)

69th Brigade was to be moved to 50th Division and 70th Brigade was to become an Independent Mobile Brigade under the command of South West Area.

The formal signal from Southern Command did not arrive until 25th June 1940 – sent by G Ops 353 – and read as follows:-

“SECRET The 70th Inf Bde is to form an independent inf bde gp with 125 Fd Regt R A 507 Fd Coy R E and 187 Fd Amb. This Bde Gp will be unable to function unless it is provided with its complement of signal personnel – i e one Arty Regt Sig Sec and one Inf Bde Sig Sec with a Sig Officer in cmnd of both sections. 2 Comd 23 Div has recommended 2/Lt D C J Bell M C for the abovementioned appointment”

(The irony of a Command instruction which recognises from the outset that a fully manned and equipped Brigade could not operate without proper communications must have struck the men of 70th Brigade as rather “closing the stable door after the horse has bolted”, given the confusion and loss of life which might have been avoided in France and Flanders a month earlier, had the same Signals infrastructure been in place then.)

Also on 19th June orders were given by Northern Command that the 23rd Division details (immatures etc) who had been based at Chester-le-Street under the command of Major F. Taylor were to join their respective Brigades.

21st June 1940

The 70th Brigade men who had been part of the 23rd Divisional details arrived at OKEHAMPTON at 12:00 hours.

Major F. Taylor assumed command of 11th DLI from Captain Shipley.

On this date the London Gazette published four gallantry awards in respect of men of the Brigade and these were listed – together with the accompanying citations – within the War Diary as follows:-

Lt J. Oldham Lt Q.M. 10th Battalion The Durham Light Infantry - awarded Military Cross.

At AUBIGNY on the night of 20th May 1940 this Officer showed the greatest courage and devotion to duty which was an example to all ranks. Ordered earlier in the day to rendezvous at HERMAVILLE, in spite of definite information he had later received that hostile A.F.V. were operating in that area. He displayed great determination in contacting the Battalion and warning them of their danger. Having actually encountered hostile A.F.V. on the road, his energy and resolution was remarkable. Through keeping this rendezvous he was largely instrumental in saving this Battalion from being isolated.

2/Lt J.K. Dunn 1st Battalion Tyneside Scottish (BW) - awarded Military Cross

At FORET de NIEPPE on 25th May 1940 this Officer displayed courage and a devotion to duty which was an inspiration and an example to all ranks. Throughout the day the troops under his command who were holding a position were subjected to practically continuous bombing and machine-gun fire. This Officer although suffering from considerable fatigue was always cheerful and constantly among his men, moving them into alternative positions preparatory to repelling any enemy land attack which seemed imminent. I attribute the fact that the position was held and consolidated until relieved by another Division, was largely due to the splendid example set by this Officer.

Sgt A. Hall 11th Battalion The Durham Light Infantry – awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

For conspicuous gallantry, leadership and coolness under fire at BULSCAMPS on 30th May 1940. Sgt Hall’s platoon occupied a position in a rearguard action which was essential to hold to ensure the safety of other troops. Under heavy shell fire, enemy bombing and machine-gun fire, he kept a grip on the situation and his fine example to (of?) resource steadied his own and neighbouring troops at a critical moment. Having completed his task he withdrew under orders and occupied another position in perfect order.

Private Thomas Dabner 11th Battalion The Durham Light Infantry – awarded Military Medal

For conspicuous gallantry and daring initiative whilst in the hands of the enemy during night of 21st May 1940 in the vicinity of BEAUMETZ. This private soldier who was driving a truck was ambushed and captured. The enemy, after disarming him, loaded his truck with British wounded and ordered him to follow a tank into action. After continuing some distance during the night which was moonlight he escaped with his truck at a road junction. Driving at speed and with considerable skill, he eventually found and reported to 186 Fd Ambulance to whom he delivered his wounded who gave verification of this daring feat.

23rd June 1940

The Brigadier, Brigade Major and Staff Captain attended a Conference at Area Command at 15:00 hours. Orders were received that the Brigade HQ was to move to TAVISTOCK and the units of the Brigade were to be accommodated as follows:-

10th DLI – to remain at the Showground Camp, OKEHAMPTON.

11th DLI – TAVISTOCK.

1st TS – YELVERTON.

24th June 1940

A reconnaissance was made by the Brigadier at TAVISTOCK and the C.O.s of 11th DLI and 1st TS at met the Brigadier at TAVISTOCK at 14:30 hours.

26th June 1940

Brigade HQ moved to TAVISTOCK by Motor Transport and were established at the Drill Hall.

11th DLI and 1st TS moved to TAVISTOCK and YELVERTON respectively by train.

11th DLI were accommodated in Abbotsfield Camp TAVISTOCK and 1st TS were in billets at YELVERTON.

Each of the Brigade’s Battalions received reinforcement drafts as follows:-

150 men of King’s Shropshire Yorkshire Light Infantry and 124 men of the South Lancashire Regiment to 10th DLI. (The diary mistakenly identified the transfer from KSLI as being from KOLI, which was at first taken as being King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry)).

261 men from the Black Watch to 1st TS.

225 men from the Royal Scots Fusiliers to 11th DLI. (The diary mistakenly identified the transfer as being from King's Own Scottish Borderers). The errors were discovered with the help of the Regimental Museums of the Black Watch and the King's Shropshire Light Infantry and access to the Regimental Enlistment Army Books 358.

(It is this type of information which demonstrates the value of checking against the Enlistment Books of the Regiments concerned in order to identify the men who were posted in these movements, so that they can be included in the Battalion databases. The exception is the reinforcement to 1st TS from the Black Watch as, due to the Battalion being part of the Black Watch, the transfer would not be recorded in the Regimental Books.)

27th June 1940

Major C.W. Oxley 2i/c of 1st TS was appointed to command the Battalion by authority of the War Office, in a teleprinter message dated 26th June.

29th June 1940

Lt Col R.F. Ware reported to Brigade HQ at 18:30 hours to assume command of 11th DLI, replacing Lt Col Bramwell – now known to be a Prisoner of War. This appointment was also authorised by War Office teleprinter message on 26th June.

30th June 1940

Captain Ricketts of the DLI reported to Brigade HQ at 19:30 hours to take over the duties of Brigade Major from Captain G.S. Fillingham, who had been posted to the DLI Infantry Training Centre at Brancepeth.

23rd Division was finally disbanded and the Divisional Staff proceeded to various appointments.

In what appears to be an Appendix to the June War Diary a note is included of manpower details for the Brigade.

By the end of June the strength of the three Battalions – including the recently transferred replacements – was as follows:-

1st TS 493

10th DLI 735

11th DLI 673

No figure is quoted for Brigade HQ so those men may be included within the Battalion totals or not – at this stage it is not possible to tell.

The Brigade had received information that the following Officers were Prisoners of War in Germany:-

11th DLI

Lt-Col John Bramwell

10th DLI

2/Lt J.H. Davis 2/Lt E.A. Ede 2/Lt H. Moon Captain E.V. Cave (Padre) 2/Lt A.J. Smith

1st TS

Lt-Col H. Swinburne A/Capt E. Adams A/Capt H.S. Maughan 2/Lt A.A. Dodds 2/Lt C.T. Cohen A/Capt G. Harker A/Capt J.L.R. Croft 2/Lt G. Dunn 2/Lt D. Colquhon 2/Lt H. Gellatly 2/Lt J. Noble

The strength of the Brigade when it left for France to join the B.E.F. on 24th April 1940 was 83 Officers and 1927 Men. It returned with 41 Officers and 882 Men. 42 Officers and 1045 Men were missing, PoWs or killed.

The analysis across the units of the Brigade, as at 30th June 1940 (when much information about casualties and Prisoners had yet to be received) showed the following:-

Brigade HQ left the UK with 6 Officers and 37 Men, returning with all 6 Officers but 34 Men, leaving three men missing.

1st TS left with 26 Officers and 641 Men, returning with only 5 Officers and 120 Men. Three men were known to have been killed and 11 Officers and 4 Men were known to be Prisoners – leaving 10 Officers and 524 Men unaccounted for at that date.

10th DLI left with 27 Officers and 621 Men, returning with 18 Officers and 344 Men. One Officer and one Man were known to have been killed and 5 Officers were known to be Prisoners, leaving 3 Officers and 276 Men unaccounted for at that date.

11th DLI left with 24 Officers and 628 Men, returning with 12 Officers and 384 Men. One Officer and one Man were known to be Prisoners, there was no knowledge of those killed, leaving 11 Officers and 233 Men unaccounted for.

(Sadly, over the succeeding weeks, the list of those killed grew considerably in size as information was received.)

The other attachment to the War Diary for June 1940 were the maps of the Brigade’s area of operations in South Devon. No reference is made to these maps in the text of the June War Diary but they are the Ordnance Survey sheet for Torquay and Dartmouth – Sheet 145 (Devonshire) in one-inch scale and are marked in what appears to be chinagraph pencil with apparent Company dispositions stretching along the South Devon coast between Start Point in the South to Redlap Cove in the North.

A set of brackets is marked along a stretch of the coast fronting Start Bay from Tinsey Head in the South to Shiphill Rock in the North and marked with the legend “Landings between these limits”.

(Given that the larger part of this section of coast consists of the infamous Slapton Sands it is suggested that these markings are areas which the Battalion in that location was expected to defend against possible seaborne invasion).

Several “dots” are also marked at locations inland – all of which are on higher ground – I could see eleven of them, with a possible twelfth near Dartmouth. It may be that these were locations for pillboxes or other defence works. The area behind Slapton Sands also shows what may have been fall-back secondary, or even tertiary defensive positions – demonstrating defence in depth. Other key areas are also marked as though defence would be concentrated initially on probable routes off the Sands, with secondary defences further back on higher ground, and tertiary defences further back still in the countryside, leading to what may have been the pillboxes.

An alternative, and on reflection, a more likely explanation is that these maps show a possible invasion scenario, with the boundaries that an attacker would be expected to reach – and that what I had taken to be a line of defences was, in fact, a directional arrow showing the thrust an advance was expected to take. It is possible that these were marked up to show what the defence would need to overcome in the event of a seaborne invasion centred on SLAPTON SANDS.

Further research will be done within the digital archives of the Defence of Britain Project but, unfortunately, the work already done using this source has produced little or no evidence of remaining defenceworks in this area.

I would advance the theory that the defenceworks at Slapton Sands which the troops taking part in the ill-fated Exercise Tiger in April 1944 were ordered to attack, in a simulation of the Normandy landings, were more than likely those constructed in 1940 by the men of 70th Brigade, and the civilian contractors they were working with.)

(A further anecdote from my father concerns this period in the Brigade’s existence. As a member of the Brigade M.T. Section he often had other driving duties in addition to being personal driver to Brigadier Kirkup.

On one occasion, as duty driver, he was rostered to drive the “liberty” truck to take men from the Camps to a nearby village for an evening out – focussed, of course, on the local public houses.

He recounted how the Orderly Sergeant mounted the truck full of men and gave them all a most solemn warning, before they set off, about the strength of the local brew – which of course was “scrumpy” or rough cider. These were largely hard manual workers, and drinkers, from the industrial North-East, used to heavy beer in large quantities and they did not take too kindly to what they regarded as a “schoolboy lecture” on the dangers of alcohol.

After dropping the party in the village, my father returned to Camp with the truck, having arranged to collect the men at 10:30 that evening.

When he drew the truck into the village for the pickup of the libertymen the sight greeted him of a long line of khaki-clad bodies, stretched out along the grass verge outside one of the public houses, surrounded by amused locals.

With the odd exception, the troops had all ignored the sergeant’s warning, and had also ignored the fact that the locals were drinking half-pints of scrumpy, very slowly. After consuming three or four pints each, speedily, they had succumbed to the surprising alcoholic strength of this native brew and had been carried outside into the fresh air to await their transport, much to the amusement of the local worthies.

The couple of men who were still vertical carried the comatose infantrymen on to the truck and the return journey was much quieter than the trip to the village. At Camp they were put to bed by their comrades and, in the morning, faced the inevitable hangovers, and the Orderly Sergeant’s warning that they needed to be ready for parade in good order, and sober!

The experience was one which those men took on board as a learning event, and did not repeat so enthusiastically again.)

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