Difference between revisions of "70th Infantry Brigade War Diary December 1941."

Latest revision as of 15:31, 13 May 2018

As regards Brigade HQ Staff – Captain Jerrome had returned from the U.K. and resumed his duties as Brigade Intelligence Officer. 2.Lt D.M. Bale, Royal Signals, did not return from U.K. leave, having been posted to a Physical Training Course.

At the beginning of the month it was revealed to the Battalion C.Os. that the Brigade was shortly to be relieved in the South-West of Iceland by US Forces and would be returned to the UK to continue training in Mountain Warfare until absorbed in 49 Mountain Division.

3rd December 1941

Captain D.C. MacNichol, Staff Captain, left by air for the U.K. to visit the War Office in connection with the forthcoming relief of the Brigade. Advance parties for the units were to be formed from those already on leave, who were stopped from returning to ICELAND.

2/Lt A.F. Munford, 11th DLI, who had been acting as Staff Captain at Force HQ took over the duties of Staff Captain at Brigade HQ.

4th December 1941

The weather continued to be wet with occasional high winds but now the first snow fell. The depth was rarely more than a few inches but the snow and subsequent frosts made the roads treacherous for transport.

5th December 1941

70th Infantry Brigade Administrative Instruction was issued and a copy attached to the War Diary at Appendix A, giving details of the relief which was expected to take place on or about 14th December. 10th DLI was not included in this relief as the Battalion was to remain behind and follow the rest of the Brigade – returning to the U.K. with a later convoy some two weeks later.

The Administrative Instruction was classified as “Most Secret” and those in possession of a copy were told to release only such details or paragraphs as were absolutely necessary for individuals to carry out allotted tasks.

The troops to depart for the U.K. were identified as 70th Brigade HQ, the HQ Signal Section, Light Aid Detachment and the Protective Platoon, together with 11th DLI and 1st TS.

An Appendix listed the proposed disposal of the vehicles used by these formations. Some more specialist vehicles were to be retained in Iceland and handed over to Ordnance, or direct to other units. The bulk of the wheeled vehicles were to be returned with the Brigade to the U.K. So, while the Light Aid Detachment were to leave their Leyland Breakdown Truck, two-stroke car and two motorcycles, they were taking their two 30cwt lorries. All Carriers and Battalion motorcycles were to be left behind in Iceland. Brigade Signals were to take the whole of their vehicles with them, however – including the motorcycles for their Despatch Riders. Brigade HQ passed its Office truck over to 294 Field Company Royal Engineers.

It will also have been noted from an earlier War Diary that the Brigade Light Aid Detachment had constructed two “armoured cars” for use in airfield defence in their own workshops – probably from Bedford 15cwt chassis. The disposal scheme had these being handed over to the US Forces – an interesting reverse of “Lend-Lease”.

All R.A.S.C. vehicles which had been on loan to the Brigade were to be returned before departure – cleaned, maintained and fully equipped with tools.

All G1098 stores and equipment (including small arms and ammunition) was to travel with the Brigade, together with sleeping bags and three blankets per man and the ski equipment (but not the suits).

Rations and fuel were to be scaled down and two days’ travelling rations taken with the units. Arrangements were made for the checking and handing over of accommodation and stores. All buildings were to be maintained and repaired if necessary before departure.

Prisoners were to travel with their units, while those in hospital would travel to the U.K. from the Transit Camp once discharged - kit would be held there awaiting their return from hospital.

The Brigade Commander carried out an administrative inspection of the 1st Tyneside Scottish Camps at Hafnafjordur as follows:-

Cloisters, Gardar Road, Gardar, Amotherby, Slingsby. The inspection of the remainder of the Battalion, which had been intended to take place the next day, was cancelled.

Lt H.L. Troughton R.A.O.C. arrived back at Brigade HQ from the North East Sector and took over the duties of the Officer Mechanical Engineering, vice Captain G.A. Lester, who had returned to the U.K. a few days earlier.

6th December 1941

The Brigade Commander, Brigade Major and Staff Captain attended a conference at Force HQ to settle administrative details of the relief of the Brigade and to clarify the embarkation of stores and vehicles. In view of the short time available for packing stores, which were to be loaded from 08:00 hours on Monday 8th December, the whole weekend was spent by the units in packing.

8th December 1941

Stores loaded from 08:00 hours by 11th DLI and 1st TS on S.S. BOLSTA at Hafnafjordur.

9th December 1941

70th Infantry brigade Administrative Instruction No 2 and Operation Instruction No 16 were issued and copies were attached to the War Diary as Appendix B and Appendix C respectively.

Appendix B set out the details of the troops due to be embarked on the S.S. SOBIESKI at 12:00 hours on 13th December. In addition to Brigade HQ and the two Battalions the passengers encompassed:

30 Construction Section Royal Signals (1 Officer and 60 men)

No 1 Docks Operating Company (1 Officer and 18 men)

221 Squadron RAF (7 Officers and 250 men)

Norwegian detachment (4 Officers and 15 men)

Lt Col Oxley of the 1st TS was appointed O.C. troops on board, and 1st TS were also to provide the Ship’s Adjutant, Sergeant Major, and some of the Troop Deck Sergeants – the remainder coming from 11th DLI.

Spare kit – such as spare rations, kitbags and Tropal Coats were to be loaded on to the S.S. ALOUETTE on Friday 12th December – times for loading were allocated. The procedure would be under the command of an Officer from 11th DLI with a Loading Party from both Battalions, who would then guard the ship overnight on 12th/13th December, go out with the ship once S.S. SOBIESKI arrived, transfer the baggage and then remain on the SOBIESKI, while the ALOUETTE returned to MID QUAY to take on board the next phase of baggage.

Arrangements were made for these men to be fed by 11th DLI.

The baggage handling was expected to continue on 13th and 14th December with “accompanied Baggage” being loaded and transferred to the troopship.

Appendix C dealt with the relief of the Brigade by U.S. Forces. The relieving unit was the 10th Regiment U.S. Infantry (less one Battalion). Two Batteries of the 46th Field Artillery Battalion were to relieve 366 Field Battery, and 187 Field Ambulance would also be relieved (the instruction did not specify what units would take their place).

The overall aim was for the relief to be fully tactical – 50% manning of all posts would continue until relieved by US troops on an operational basis.

10th Infantry Regiment had agreed to send Advance Parties on the day before relief takes place. Handover was planned to take place as far as possible in advance of the actual move – with units and sub-units agreeing mutually on matters such as vehicle parking and turn-round.

The first echelon of incoming troops were expected to leave their Camps at 06:00 hours and arrive at the British Camps at 07:00 hours. By that time British troops should have cleared all but one hut (such as the recreation building) where stores could be held until departure.

British troops were to man positions at 09:00 hours and the U.S. troops would take over those posts at 09:20 hours, or as soon as visibility permitted. British troops would then return to the designated hut until it was time to depart for the docks. Guides would remain to show the U.S. troops the remaining posts they were to occupy.

The troops handing over were to explain to their reliefs:-

(i)Section tasks and the fixed line of the Light Machine Gun.

(ii)Location and tasks of neighbouring posts.

(iii)Location of Platoon and Company HQ.

(iv)Location and task of neighbouring supporting arms.

(v)Task of the local Mobile reserve.

The permanent range cards were to be handed over to the relief.

Sub-Sector Commanders were to ensure that their reliefs were fully supplied with all tactical, topographical and other information relating to the operational role they were assuming.

The Skiing and Snowshoe Instructors from the Norwegian Forces were to move with the Battalions to the U.K. Lt Rollnees of the Norwegian Forces was to join 11th DLI from the 10th DLI on 12th December and remain with the 11th.

Ammunition within the South-West Sector was to either remain with the units which had been under command – such as the Pioneer Companies – or in the case of the Reserve Store of ammunition, collected by Ordnance staff and receipts obtained.

Stores to be handed over to relieving units included mines, Molotov Bombs, reserve wiring and defence stores and Signal Stores. Surplus stores beyond G1098 scale would be returned to Ordnance.

An Appendix to this instruction dealt specifically with the disposal of documents. Those to be destroyed concerned the destruction of dumps – most secret and personal – Intelligence Summaries and any other secret correspondence to do with Iceland. Defence schemes, telephone directories, maps, code names and location lists were to be handed over to relieving units. Correspondence in sealed envelopes, martial law proclamations cipher equipment and signal codes were to be returned to Force HQ.

A detailed timetable for the movement to the docks of the three parties of troops from the Brigade was set out in a separate Appendix. The troops were to be taken to the S.S. SOBIESKI in the lighters “Leinster” and “Tordenskold”

Some modest delay in embarking the Brigade had to be accepted, as it was considered essential that the relieving U.S. troops were given an opportunity to take over the posts in daylight – which did not arrive until after 09:00 hours.

On 9th December stores were loaded by Brigade HQ – including the Signal Section and the Light Aid Detachment – on to the S.S. BOLSTA at Hafnafjordur.

13th December 1941

The convoy was due to arrive and embarkation begin at 15:00 hours. However, due to a delayed departure, the convoy did not arrive.

14th December 1941

The embarkation of the second party had been due to begin at 10:30 hours.

16th December 1941

The convoy arrived in Reykjavik at 19:00 hours.

17th December 1941

The first party (200 of 11th DLI, 100 of 1st TS and 40 of Brigade HQ) embarked on the S.S. SOBIESKI at 15:00 hours.

18th December 1941

The embarkation of the remainder of the troops was to begin at 09:30 hours, and the move of the U.S. troops from their Camps began as planned at 06:00 hours, but a high wind had arisen during the night, causing the SOBIESKI to drag her anchor and then steam out of the roads.

Difficulty was experienced in recalling her and thus, by 11:30 hours, although U.S. troops had taken over the South-West Sector and the relief had been completed, no further embarkation had been possible. However, by 19:00 hours the wind had abated sufficiently for the SOBIESKI to return to her mooring and the delayed embarkation of the remainder was resumed at 2100 hours – and was complete by 0445, 19th December.

19th December 1941

Baggage loading continued on the SOBIESKI throughout the day and at 22:00 hours the convoy – including the “leave ship” S.S. ORBITA, with 366 Field Battery and 187 Field Ambulance aboard – sailed.

20th – 21st December 1941

At sea. Weather was at first poor, with much seasickness for all ranks.

(Not everyone, however, was seasick. Down in one of the holds a continuous card game was in progress – strictly, of course, against Army Regulations – but at the close my father arose £38 richer after a very successful four days of playing “Three Card Brag”. A rough modern equivalent of his scale of winnings would be £1,200).

22nd December 1941

The convoy arrived in the River Clyde off GOUROCK at 22:00 hours.

23rd December 1941

Disembarkation of baggage began at 09:00 hours.

Disembarkation of the troops started at 2200 hours – half of Brigade HQ and most of 11th DLI - and entrained at 23:00 hours.

(What disembarking troops had not expected was to be greeted by Customs staff, keen to examine kitbags and webbing pouches for contraband. My father was in the first group to leave the ship, as he had to collect the Brigadier’s Staff Car which was being unloaded, and he found himself second in the queue on the gangway. The soldier in front of him was somewhat the worse for drink and, on being asked by the Customs Officer on the quayside whether he had any cigarettes, replied ….”Thousands, lad – do you want one?” His kitbag was emptied on the dock and tins of Woodbines tumbled out in profusion.

My father – whose kitbag was literally square with tins of cigarettes – was suddenly thrust aside by a Major, forcing his way down the gangway and waving his swagger cane at the Customs Officer…”Out of the way, man – these men are due to catch a train on their way home!”

The Major then waved my very fortunate father, and the hundreds of men behind him, off the ship, leaving the Customs Officer to concentrate on his initial victim who, by then, was emptying his pockets and the rest of his kit.)

Any of the men who had not had leave during their time in Iceland were sent straight on leave from GOUROCK.

24th December 1941

06:00 – 08:00 the second party – the rest of Brigade on SOBIESKI - entrained.

At 15:15 hours the Brigade HQ First Party arrived at LLANDILO.

At 18:00 hours the 11th DLI First Party arrived at Pembroke Dock.

25th December 1941

By 08:00 hours all troops had reached their destinations. (1st TS to the LLANELLY area, 366 Field Battery to CRESSELLY HOUSE, CAREW, 187 Field Ambulance to VELINDRE).

28th December 1941

At 11:00 hours the Brigade Commander held a conference to discuss operational roles and administrative problems. The notes of the conference were attached to the War Diary as Appendix D. This set out that:-

As regards Operational Roles, 1st TS was primarily responsible for the defence of PEMBREY BEACH, the Aerodrome ( or possibly the RAF Station) and the Royal Ordnance Factory at PEMBREY. The static defence of PEMBREY BEACH would be provided by the Company stationed at PEMBREY BEACH CAMP. In normal times only patrols would be required. A Mobile Reserve would be provided by reinforcements from the Company at ASHBURNAM.

11th DLI would be responsible for the defence of Pembroke Dock under the Officer Commanding troops, PEMBROKE DOCKS. A Mobile Column would also be made available as reinforcement to ANGLE Aerodrome and EAST BLOCKHOUSE, in co-operation with a Mobile Column from the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Range at CASTLEMARTIN.

10th DLI were expected to go into Reserve when they arrived from Iceland.

The secondary role of 70th Infantry Brigade was to act as a Mobile Reserve with the general task of attacking and destroying any enemy forces landing in the CAMARTHEN Sub-area or the SWANSEA Sector.

In an emergency 70th Infantry Brigade would take command of all troops and Home Guards in the CAMARTHEN Sub-area and the Advance HQ would move to Sub-area HQ at CAMARTHEN.

Until their guns arrived, 366 Field Battery were responsible for their own defences using rifles and Light Machine Guns. On the arrival of their guns they would act in accordance with instruction from 70th Brigade. All units were expected to liaise with Home Guard units.

Vacancies on various courses were indicated and applications invited.

Units were asked to indent for any deficiencies to bring them up to full G1098 equipment scale.

Appendix E to the War Diary was a detailed location statement setting out the units and offices in South Wales with addresses and telephone numbers. While clearly an administrative document used for finding contact details such a comprehensive paper gives an interesting picture of the range and scale of units within one area of the country.

The area was run from Western Command, based in CHESTER, with South Wales District headquartered at ABERGAVENNY, the Severn Sub-area at LLANTRISANT and the Carmarthen Sub-area at CAMARTHEN itself. 70th Brigade was headquartered in “Taliaris”, LLANDILO, with the three Battalions at LLANELLY, CAMARTHEN, and Pembroke Dock, the artillery at CAREW and the Field Ambulance at VELINDRE.

29th December 1941

The Brigadier, accompanied by the Brigade Major, visited HQ, South Wales District at ABERGAVENNY.

30th December 1941

The Brigadier and Brigade Major visited HQ Western Command.

31st December 1941

The Brigadier and the Brigade Major visited three branches of the War Office in London (M.O., S.D., and M.T. branches) and G.H.Q. Home Forces.

The future of the Brigade was discussed at all HQs and it was ascertained that 70th Infantry Brigade would come under South Wales District for all purposes, pending HQ 49 Division’s return to the UK. The Brigade Commander, at the same time, made enquiries as to the future location of 49 Division on arrival but found that the situation was not yet finally decided.

Approximately 80% of all men who had disembarked had been sent on 14 days disembarkation leave.

The new location of Brigade HQ was to be at Taliaris HOUSE, LLANDILO (HQ Offices), with Brigade Transport, Signals and the Light Aid Detachment in LLANDILO itself, some five miles away. This division of the HQ was seen as most unsatisfactory and the Brigadier was anxious to move to CAMARTHEN, where a suitable house was available, where Brigade HQ would be centrally placed in relation to its units, and where the Brigade Commander would be in close touch with Commander, Carmarthen Sub-Area, the operational command of which he would assume in the event of hostilities in the U.K.

A summary of 1941 was attached to this, the final War Diary for the year. This read as follows:-

1.The close of 1941 saw the return of 70th Infantry Brigade from a 14 months stay in Iceland. The year’s tour was valuable experience yet often disappointing, a doubtful pleasure at the time, yet probably enjoyed in retrospect.

2.Coming straight from static defence positions on the coast of England, the Brigade, scarcely reformed from the Dunkirk withdrawal, was given the opportunity to become again an entity and to weld itself together. The ground provided ample scope for training, particularly field firing which could almost be carried out through the barrack windows.

Yet the weather, particularly in winter, was so consistently foul that normally one day’s outdoor training in three was a generous average and that could never be relied on in advance, making the organising of higher training most complicated. Then in summer when the weather was vastly better, the construction of the REYKJAVIK aerodrome absorbed the energies of all Battalions for fully half their working time. Most Battalions too had, sooner or later, to spend much time and men in Camp construction. Lack of classification rifle ranges was a grievous deficiency and it is regrettably true that the standard of shooting remained low.

From the scarcity of roads of any type and a complete absence of troop carrying transport, it was also impossible to bring up the standard of road movement training, in all its aspects, up to what it should have been.

The drain of static defences was generally reduced, but even to the last, most Companies were finding three guards per night.

In fact, on balance, however suited for certain limited types of training, conditions in Iceland did not make for a high standard of fighting efficiency.

3.The wild wintry weather with its 18-hour nights undoubtedly toughened every single man, and the standard of health was remarkably high. Particularly tested were transport drivers, Despatch Riders and Signal Line Parties who carried on under the most exacting conditions. Against that, the ration was remarkably generous (12 ozs of meat a day and everything else in proportion) cigarettes were duty free, liquor – when obtainable – also duty free and there was no black-out. Chief enemy of all was boredom, for cinemas were few and far between, wireless sets hard to come by, prices in shops exorbitant, football grounds execrable, and feminine company normally the privilege only of the most accomplished Romeo. Most – about 2/3rds – had leave at home, the period varying from 14 – 21 days according to the vigilance and whims of the Embarkation Staff at GLASGOW who rarely succeeded in disembarking a leave ship within 12 hours of its arrival, however accurately the time had been forecast.

4.It was naturally to most men of the Brigade their first experience of overseas service, particularly in what is in effect an uncivilised country. Moreover the much advertised ski-ing and salmon fishing were only within the reach of a select few; and even the nudist clubs seemed to evaporate on the arrival of the British Garrison.

But interesting experience it certainly was and the isolation of almost all Companies enabled Officers and men to get to know each other as they should. Most attractive also was the opportunity given latterly to all ranks to get to know the future allies, the Americans. Relations with them were universally cordial, and, making allowances for the inborn tendency of the American to advertise his wares, it is safe to say that all ranks of both forces, from General to private, were on the best of terms with their opposite numbers.

5.The most interesting operational time of the year was the Prime Minister’s decision to form Iceland Force (or rather its Infantry Division basis) into a Mountain Division capable of operating under Arctic conditions.

To this end a Winter Warfare School was established in AKUREYRI and 22 Officers from this Brigade attended. Skis and Snow Shoes were issued, and the services of special instructors obtained. Then, just as intensive Snow and Mountain training was due to begin for this Brigade, it was sent home to continue its training in South Wales, but with the added difference that the Division is now expected to carry out the roles of both Mountain and Infantry Division.

The authorship of this brief summary is not known – possibly it reflects the pen of the Brigade Intelligence Officer. What is slightly surprising is that he makes no reference to those members of the Brigade left behind in Iceland – in Blonduos and Fossvogur Cemeteries – victims of accident, illness, or –in one case – direct enemy action, although the scale of casualties over that period is miniscule compared to the losses while the Brigade was with the B.E.F. in France and Flanders, or later in Normandy. Nevertheless, their sacrifice is as much a part of this Memorial as is that of their comrades at FICHEUX or Rauray.

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