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23rd (Northumbrian) Division

War Diary February 1940

Appendix A - Manpower Status of the Infantry Battalions

There is no "text" page for the month in the File.

This Appendix is the first item remaining in the AQ Branch War Diary File for this month. It consists solely of a single table, setting out the War Establishment figures for an Infantry Battalion, and comparing those with the number in each of the six Infantry Battalions in the Division.

The total War Establishment for a Battalion of this type is shown as 641, plus 129 First Reinforcements, and 108 to make Infantry Section strength up from seven men to ten - that figure is calculated on the basis of three sections per Platoon, three Platoons per Company, and four Companies per Battalion - making 36 Sections in all with provision for three extra men each. These extra men would act, it is assumed, as additional reinforcements - reference to their role may be found in the part of the history which describes the social and geographical background to the Brigade, based on the 1st Tyneside Scottish Reconnaissance Platoon.

These figures produce a total requirement of 878 men per Battalion.

The table compared the present strength of the six Battalions, allows for around 55 men per Battalion held for Brigade and Divisional duties, identifies the number of "immatures" as at 1st September 1940 (who would not be able to go overseas), notes the number of unfit men, and estimates the number needing to be transferred to Pioneer Battalions. Making those allowances, and comparing the adjusted strength against the War Establishment total of 878, produced a shortfall for each Battalion as follows:-

5th East Yorkshires 540

6th Green Howards 366

7th Green Howards 423

10th D L I 428

11th D L I 346

1st Tyneside Scottish 275

It will be seen, therefore, that 69 Brigade was 1,329 Infantrymen short and 70 Brigade some 1,049 short of their theoretical requirements for manpower. These figures should be considered against the position for equipment and vehicles and, I suggest, reflect the transfers which were made to bring the first-line Battalions of 150 and 151 Brigades up to strength before their departure for the B.E.F. It is possible that the ability of 1st Tyneside Scottish to recruit locally direct to their ranks may have affected their better position as against other units.

Appendix B – Equipment Return

This Appendix is only the second item remaining in the AQ Branch War Diary File for this particular month. In addition, there is no filed material for this Branch for the period September 1939 to January 1940 - this may be to do with the Division being administered initally by 50th Division, its parent formation.

Rather than prepare a complete table of the manuscript summary of the Equipment Return included within the War Diary, key features have been extracted and set out below.

It should be borne in mind that the Division – having been in existence at that time for five months or so – contained the following units:-

Two Royal Artillery Regiments (124th and 125th)

Two Royal Engineers Field Companies (233rd and 507th)

One Royal Engineers Field Park Company (508th)

Three Divisional Signal Companies (Nos 1, 2 and 3)

Six Infantry Battalions (5th East Yorks, 6th and 7th Green Howards, 10th and 11th Durham Light Infantry, and 1st Tyneside Scottish - though this unit was still being shown in some documents in its former name of 12th Durham Light Infantry, despite having transferred to the Black Watch on 1st February 1940)

One Motorcycle Battalion of Infantry (8th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers)

Two RAMC Field Ambulances (186th and 187th)

In addition, there were the following attached units:-

Two Royal Artillery Survey Regiments (4th and 6th)

One Machine-Gun Battalion of Infantry (9th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers)

One Royal Armoured Corps Regiment (2nd East Riding Yeomanry)

Two Royal Tank Regiments (43rd and 49th)

One Army Tank Signals Brigade (25th)

The manuscript table lists the full range of weapons and equipment of all kinds, and compares, unit by unit, the actual holdings against the expected levels set out in Army Form G 1098 – the “bible” as regards the items a unit was expected to have in use or in its stores. The differences between those two figures, together with the manpower situation, provide a useful perspective on the state of readiness of a unit, and its ability to transport itself and carry out the required training. The summary shows the “peace” scale of G 1098 equipment.

In looking at the figures I have concentrated on the units most directly associated with 70 Brigade.

The Divisional Artillery was short of everything – particularly guns, gun equipment (such as sights) and transport, although they did have some “Drill purpose” Howitzers in the 124th Regiment for training use, and nine out of the required twelve Howitzers in 125th Regiment. It is not surprising that the artillery units were given Infantry tasks in this early part of the War, as they did not possess any of their 24 Field Guns.

Small Arms showed a mixed picture. In respect of the Division’s units (other than those attached) there was in fact a surplus of .303 rifles – 457 more than the required 5,427 – roughly half of the surplus being in 70 Brigade, but in all other weapons in this category deficiencies were seen as follows:-

   Item          Required          In Stock          70 Brigade Position

 Boys A/T Rifle    171               108                    36 short

 Bren Gun          318               221                   101 short

 Lewis Gun          34                22                  Not applicable

 Pistol .38        252               245                    47 short

 Pistol .45        NIL               103                    32 in stock

 Mortar 2"          72               NIL                    36 short

 Mortar 3"          12               NIL                     6 short

Ammunition;

Rounds .303 Ball   No scale         542,281                157,021 in stock

Rounds .303 Tracer No scale          15,367                  3,617 in stock

Rounds .38         No scale           2,094                    816 in stock

Rounds .45         NO scale           1,044                    NIL in stock

Webbing and anti-gas equipment showed a very mixed picture. Each Infantry Battalion was supposed to hold 779 Respirators, both container and facepiece, and a Haversack for each respirator. 1st Tyneside Scottish was best equipped, with 625 of each. 11 DLI had 170 containers, but only 70 each of facepieces and Haversacks, while 10 DLI had 721 containers, but only 91 each of facepieces and Haversacks.

Anti-gas capes – sometimes confused with groundsheets – were on a better scale with what appears to be around one for each man. Packets of 6 anti-gas eyeshields were less evenly distributed with, again, 1st Tyneside Scottish best provided at 777, while 10 DLI had only 63 and 11 DLI 240.

Steel helmets in the Brigade almost exactly matched the anti-gas cape numbers, although the Division as a whole had an overall surplus of over 1900.

Webbing equipment was an extremely mixed picture with three patterns in use – 1908 pattern (familiar from the First World War as the standard set), Leather equipment – which again may have been the First World War 1914 pattern – and the then current 1937 pattern webbing set. Each Battalion should have had 752 full sets of 1937 pattern.

10 DLI had only 61 sets of 1937 pattern, plus 581 leather sets. 11 DLI had only 66 sets of 1908 pattern, leaving one wondering how they carried ammunition, water and so on in training, whereas 1 Tyneside Scottish was again best equipped Battalion in the Brigade with a total 691 of the 1937 pattern sets. Overall, the Division was 3,855 webbing sets short.

The Brigade had no wireless sets at all, no camouflage equipment, and no portable cookers. Some, but not all of, these deficiencies will be seen to be addressed as later pages in the War Diary are documented.

The position with regard to transport and fighting vehicles was no better.

Each Battalion was expected to have 7 Bren Carriers, and each had only one.

Each needed 8 G.S. 8 cwt trucks, and had none.

Each needed 18 G.S. 15 cwt trucks and each had only one.

Each needed 1 War Department Car and did not have one at all.

Each needed 11 War Department Motorcycles and did not have any.

Some of the shortfall was met by purchasing or hiring vehicles and there were 13 purchased and 6 hired cars between the Battalions, plus four hired three-ton trucks and seven motorcycles.

Again, references will be found in later War Diaries to the disposal and acquisition of vehicles from War Office sources – many at almost the last minute before unit movements took place.