GS Branch 23rd (Northumbrian) Division 1940.
Darlington - January 1940
The Division noted that a cadre of 187th Field Ambulance, RAMC, reported to the 23rd Division and were stationed at Houghton-le-Skerne, near Darlington. [For more details see the 187th Field Ambulance War Diary.]
Darlington - 7th March 1940
The Divisional staff were warned verbally at 17:00hrs (presumably by either Northern Command or the War Office) about the impending move of the Division to France between 14th – 21st April 1940.
Darlington - 9th March 1940
Preparatory order received at 10:00 hours by the Division regarding the impending move overseas. The troops expected to be included were the Divisional HQ, both Infantry Brigades, the Divisional Engineer units, some Signals personnel and one Field Ambulance.
Darlington - 10th March 1940
Information received that the date of embarkation was estimated to be 15th April 1940.
Darlington 10th April 1940.
Divisional advance parties despatched to the port of embarkation.
Southampton - 11th April 1940
Divisional transport loaded on to the “SS City of Christchurch” for movement to France.
12th April 1940.
Darlington.
Lecture by Brig Aubrey on the German Army to officers and men of the units of the Division.
Southampton.
The Divisional Advance Party embarked at Southampton on the “SS Lady of Man” – and docked at Le Havre 13th April.
Darlington - 14th April 1940.
The main Divisional Road Parties set off for Southampton, and arrived at the docks on 21st April. The troops embarked on the “Ulster Prince” – docking at Le Havre on 22nd April.
Infantry Road Parties were then despatched to Southampton. On the journey there was some experience of seeing enemy aircraft overhead, and then being fired on in anger for the first time.
France - 23rd to 27th April 1940.
On arrival in France the Division were concentrated at BOLBEC then moved to MIRAUMONT.
Darlington - 1st May 1940.
The Division’s Rear Parties left Darlington to join their comrades in France.
France - 2nd May 1940.
Units of the Division started work on aerodrome construction – the core reason for the Division being posted to the B.E.F.
France - 10th May 1940.
German invasion of Belgium and France begins. Some Construction Company casualties from air-raids. None in the Infantry Battalions.
France - 12th May 1940.
Division asked to take over airfield protection in Line of Communication area N & S of ABBEVILLE. Warning order passed to 70 Brigade to select a Battalion for this duty. Extra RNF transport sent to 10 DLI – the Battalion selected for this role.
France - 13th May 1940.
Extra Field Ambulance (transport) truck also sent to 10 DLI.
France - 15th May 1940.
10 DLI arrived ABBEVILLE – Operational order sent out. All woods in vicinity of airfields to be combed, dawn and dusk – emergency operations message. Transport provided to get troops to airfields.
France - 16th May 1940.
Aerodrome defence to take priority over all other work.
France - 17th May 1940.
Bridge guards ordered over all CANAL DU NORD bridges. All units at immediate notice to move. Operational order issued ordering occupation of line CANAL DU NORD from RUYAULCOURT to ARLEUX. 70 Bde HQ at RIENCOURT.
France - 18th May 1940.
Div Cdr (Gen M G Herbert) visits 70 Bde HQ and carries out reconnaissance on right of the Brigade's sector – considers this an open flank BERTINCOURT – YTRES – NEUVILLE – RUYAULCOURT and thinks this is excellent tank country – completely unprotected. Visits HQ 1 TS and briefs Lt-Col Swinburne. Sees 10 DLI in reserve and goes back to Div HQ, reporting open right flank to GHQ.
Allotted artillery turns out to be short of sights and signal instruments. Some guns not working but repaired during day. Two batteries allotted to right sector to cover right rear of right Brigade and two to left sector.
CHERISY 17:00 Verbal orders were issued to Commander Royal Engineers for all bridges to be blown except those on the main roads between ARRAS - CAMBRAI and BAPAUME - CAMBRAI. Thirty minutes later this order was altered to only those bridges NOT shown on the map to be blown now. All bridges on the left Brigade's front had been blown but those on the right Brigade's front had been held up.
Attacks on CRE demolition parties on right of 23 Div by tanks. Anti-Tank guns and ammo sent from GHQ. Troops had not been trained in their use. CANAL DU NORD positions bombed.
CHERISY 22:00 Orders received for liaison officers to be sent to the HQ of Petreforce (commanded by Major-General R L Petre) in ARRAS. Captains A S C Browne and R E Izod were allocated this duty, Captain Izod to return to Divisional HQ once he had reported to Petreforce. Twenty minutes later orders were received placing the Division under the command of Petreforce (the War Diary indicates that these orders were attached as an Appendix but, as mentioned earlier, most of those papers were missing from the file).
Major-General Herbert telephoned Major-General Petre to report the Division's situation and was told to be prepared to withdraw 23rd Division. Only civilian telephones were available and communications were difficult and delayed as a result.
CHERISY 23:10 Commander Royal Engineers was ordered to blow all bridges forthwith, including the two main road bridges. Attempts were made to speak to Brigadier Kirkup at 70 Brigade but the line was interrupted before information could be passed.
At 23:45 Brigadier Lord Downe telephoned to say that a French liaison officer had arrived at his HQ and reported Germans in CAMBRAI - the Brigadier was told to be ready to move.
A few minutes later, communications were re-established with Brigadier Kirkup and he was also told to be ready to move.
France 19th May 1940
CHERISY 00:42
General Herbert contacted General Petre and agreed with him that, in the light of events, the right flank of the 23rd Division should be withdrawn. A request was made for fighters to cover the withdrawal by daylight and this was agreed. Written orders were then sent via Despatch Rider for the Division to withdraw 70 Bde into anti-tank localities behind the railway line inclusive CROISILLES N5489 - excluding MARQUION. 69 Bde were ordered to anti-tank localities in their present area. 9th RNF and Divisional HQ were to withdraw to MONCHY N5597.
Despatch rider messages were then sent to Rear Divisional HQ, 186th Field Ambulance and 33rd Field Hygiene Section to move from MIRAUMONT to the area BAVINCOURT - AVESNES-LE-COMPTE and report to GHQ Troops. The Military Police Provost Company was ordered to move from ST. LEGER N5287 to the same area and also to report to GHQ Troops. Rear parties from 5 EY and 6 GH were ordered to move from GREVILLERS to ST POL and report to any British Officers they encountered.
Once these messages were on their way the Divisional HQ itself moved from CHERISY to MONCHY-LE-PREUX N5587, leaving at 01:55 and arriving at their destination at 02:25.
Once they had arrived at MONCHY a further message - to 9 RNF - ordered the Battalion to concentrate at LESTREM by 10:00 hours on 20th May.
At 03:30 the Divisional Rear Party - Lt Col Hare and Maj Allen - left CHERISY with the Rear Party of 8 RNF, arriving at MONCHY at 04:00.
8 RNF, plus one field gun from the "A" Field Regiment, and supported by Divisional HQ troops, prepared MONCHY for defence, blocking all roads into the village.
At 07:00 General Herbert and Lt Col Hare departed for ARRAS to try and obtain information and orders.
MONCHY - 10:00
The day was relatively quiet , warm and fine. Some German aircraft flew over the village but did not attack.
General Herbert and Lt Col Hare returned from ARRAS with orders for the Division to hold the line of the canal from excluding ROBERGC N3535 - to inclusive LA BASSEE N52. A move to THELUS aerodrome site was organised where it was hoped the Division would be able to access transport for the move to the canal line.
At 11:00 hours orders were issued to the two Infantry Brigades, Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers units to withdraw from their current positions after dark, in small parties, moving off-road wherever possible. The earliest start was anticipated to be up to one Company per Battalion, though not before 17:30 hours. No transport was to be allowed to move until after 20:30 hours. Royal Engineers were ordered to send a reconnaissance back to the canal line to assess bridges for demolition.
Probably because of the telephone communication problems, Maj Trenam, DAQMG was sent to give these verbal orders to Brg Kirkup for 70 Brigade's withdrawal to a position behind the LA BASSEE Canal.
At 17:30 hours a crucial message arrived by hand of Captain Browne - he arrived from ARRAS with a message which began,,,,"situation materially improved".... This message ordered the 23rd Division to hold the anti-tank localities on the line SAULTY N2993 - ARRAS - LENS with two Battalions designated for the defence of ARRAS.
Orders to move to new positions - as described above - had already been issued at 11:00 and it was realised at Divisional HQ that the first parties of the Battalions would already have started their withdrawals, in response to those orders, although it was anticipated that the main body of each unit could be contacted in time to prevent them following. The opening phrase of the order had apparently expressed the hope that those parties which had already set off for THELUS could be collected in due course. The original order has not been seen, but it is suspected that, as indicated, this sequence of changing orders was significant in the subsequent level of casualties suffered by 70 Brigade.
The position regarding the defence of ARRAS and LENS was seen as less clear, as the front to be held by a Division of only two Brigades was 22 miles in length and with two Battalions required for the defence of ARRAS, the remaining five Battalions would be on a very extended front.
Captain Browne was sent back to the HQ of Petreforce to clear up the orders regarding the defence of ARRAS and LENS, with the suggestion that the line of the River SCARPE would be a better anti-tank defensive line than the suggested line of ARRAS to LENS - unless Captain Browne returned with orders to the contrary the Divisional Commander, General Herbert, proposed to adopt those positions for the night 19th/20th May.
The two Infantry Brigades were then contacted with orders cancelling the previous order for the move to the canal line and giving instructions for the occupation of the line SAULTY - ARRAS - line of River SCARPE - to inclusive BIACHE H5901. 70 Brigade was ordered to the right of ARRAS and 69 Brigade to the left of ARRAS, with 8 RNF being sent to THELUS. While the line of defence to be occupied by 69 Brigade was therefore not much altered, this change required 70 Brigade to amend its line of withdrawal from a northerly direction to one going westwards and to routes south of ARRAS.
At 20:00 hours Divisional HQ left MONCHY and moved via THELUS to MON ST ELOI where it was established.
MON ST ELOI - 20th May 1940
04:20 hours - intense air activity heard over ARRAS and areas north of the town.
At 05:20 hours Captain Browne returned from HQ Petreforce and stated that the German attack had started on the line of the river SCARPE and South West of ARRAS at 04:20 hours.
See copy of detail diary – 26 pages
Copy of Operational summary – 11 pages.
Copy of narrative and summary 1 Tyneside Scottish – 17 pages.
Copy of detail diary – 7 pages
