70th Infantry Brigade War Diary July 1941.
Brigade HQ staff was the same as the previous month with the exception that Major M.J. Morrison M.C. took over temporarily the duties as Camp Commandant. Captain T.G. Wilkinson continued to officiate as Brigade Major until 24th July, when Major Roper returned from UK leave.
1st July 1941
The Brigade Commander held a conference at LYKLAFELL for Safety Officers taking part in the Brigade Field Firing Exercise and conducted them, together with the Carriers, representing tanks, and all Battalion, Company, Platoon and Section Commanders over the ground. A strong breeze and heavy rain throughout most of the day made conditions unpleasant.
2nd July 1941
The Brigade Commander attended the G.O.Cs. conference at Iceland Force HQ. Certain American units were due to arrive in Reykjavik and were to be accommodated in Camps occupied by 10th DLI and all Camps in the Alafoss area. 10th DLI were to move to tented Camps in the HOWITZER HILL and SKELETON RIDGE areas. These were sited that evening by the Brigade Commander who made a reconnaissance with the Deputy Assistant Director – Hirings. The C.Os. of 1st TS and 10th DLI were called to a conference at Brigade HQ on the evacuation of Camps.
3rd July 1941
The inter-Battalion exercise to be directed by the Brigade Commander between 10th DLI and 1st TS was cancelled. Tents were drawn and erected for 10th DLI and one Company of 1st TS. The latter moved from CRAVEN CAMP to a tented Camp at HOWIITZER HILL, one mile South of Reykjavik.
4th July 1941
The Brigade Commander attended a G.O.Cs. conference on the forthcoming American arrivals. The weather was warm and sunny.
5th July 1941
The weather was overcast and cool, turning to rain in the evening. The tented Camps were now in readiness.
6th July 1941
Weather dull and cool.
At 08:35 hours the Battalion HQ of 10th DLI was established at CRAVEN CAMP, adjoining Brigade HQ.
The Camps in the LAUGARNES Sub-Sector had now been evacuated by 10th DLI. B Company continued in its coast defence role by moving into tents adjacent to HARROGATE CAMP, LAUGARNES. The locations of 1st TS and 10th DLI were now as follows:-
10th DLI (less four Companies) CRAVEN CAMP, Reykjavik.
One Company 10th DLI Tented Camp 231060 HOWITZER HILL, Reykjavik.
One Company 10th DLI Tented Camp FOSSVOGUR CAMP, Reykjavik.
One Company 10th DLI less one Platoon SHERWOOD CAMP, Reykjavik.
One Company 10th DLI VATNSMYRI AERODROME, Reykjavik.
One Platoon 10th DLI VESTMANNAEJAR.
1st Tyneside Scottish (less four Companies) SKIPTON CAMP, Reykjavik.
One Company 1st TS KEIGHLEY CAMP, GROTTA
One Company 1st TS Tented Camp BALBO’s CAMP, Reykjavik.
One Company 1st TS (less two Platoons) Tented Camp THORNHILL CAMP, Reykjavik.
One Company 1st TS GARGAND CAMP Seluhelsgata, Reykjavik.
One Platoon 1st TS THORNHILL CAMP, Reykjavik.
One Platoon 1st TS MYRA CAMP (Harbour area), Reykjavik.
7th July 1941
A message was received from Force HQ that Liaison Officers, with 30cwt trucks, would be required to meet advance parties of incoming units. These stood by for two days.
A rehearsal, with troops, of the Field Firing Exercise, without actual firing, was held at SANDSKEID.
A large convoy of American vessels, accompanied by aircraft, was sighted off Reykjavik, moving into Hvalfjordur. The news of their arrival to take over the defence of ICELAND was announced on Icelandic Radio.
An Order of the Day by Major General H.O. Curtis G.O.C. Iceland ( C) Force, was published as follows:-
“For strategic reasons, England wishes to concentrate her forces. Iceland is therefore inviting the U.S.A. to protect the island during the war.
Today we are deeply honoured by the arrival of a token reinforcement of the famous U.S. Marines to co-operate mutually with us in safeguarding ICELAND for democracy.
This is a historic moment on the road to Victory in the anti-Nazi campaign, when once again the troops of the U.S.A. and Britain stand shoulder to shoulder in a common cause.
The British Forces in Iceland extend to the U.S. Marines the warmest of welcomes, and wish them the best of Good Luck.
To show their deep-rooted confidence in their friends, all British ranks will appreciate every opportunity of paying the U.S. fighting services the recognised compliments of our own services”.
The Order was to be read to troops early on the morning of 8th July.
The first paragraph of the Order was cancelled some six hours later but the complete original Order was published in the Icelandic paper (in English) the next day.
Liaison Officers reported late in the evening and the first advance parties of American units moved to the 10th DLI Camps at 02:30 hours on 8th July.
The Liaison Officers provided by the units of the Brigade stayed with the Americans for two or three days. The Americans were favourably impressed with the accommodation made available for them and the assistance given by British troops.
8th July 1941
1st Tyneside Scottish provided a Guard of Honour for Brigadier General Marston, Commanding 1st marine Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps.
During the course of the day, and succeeding days, the American units unloaded large quantities of equipment and transport, and some light tanks, at Reykjavik and Hafnafjordur.
9th July 1941
A Field Firing Exercise organised by 70th Infantry Brigade was held at LYKLAFELL, North of SANDSKEID Landing Ground, attended by the G.O.C. and members of his staff. Two American Officers also attended.
The weather was not favourable as, during the day, there were several periods of heavy rain and visibility was not good. A moderate wind would have been ideal for smoke screens had it not been perverse in its direction. A phenomenon experienced before in Iceland was apparent when, at the two extremities of a smoke screen, the smoke was blowing in opposite directions. This difficulty was overcome both by artillery and mortar personnel.
This was the first time in Iceland in which co-operation with tanks (represented by carriers), artillery, Machine Guns and Royal Engineers was practised. It was also the first time in which a complete Field Regiment (three eight-gun Batteries) had been deployed. In spite of the large number of vehicles belonging to units taking part, and to spectators, the traffic arrangements worked very smoothly.
Details of the scheme were attached to the War Diary as Appendix A as follows:-
This Appendix was concerned with the listing of the units taking part, the very comprehensive management of safety arrangements and signals, the ammunition allotted, movement plan and the traffic control details – particularly for spectators.
The objective of the exercise itself, which was directed by Brigadier Kirkup, assisted by unit Commanders, was detailed on a separate page as follows:-
(a)To demonstrate and practise the employment of Army tanks in co-operation with Infantry and supporting arms.
(b)To practise the Brigade in Field Firing.
The troops taking part were 10th DLI, 1st Tyneside Scottish (less two Companies), 143rd Field Regiment, One M.M.G. Company of 1st/9th Manchesters and Two Sub-Sections of 294th Field Company Royal Engineers.
The scheme had three phases –
1.The clearing of obstacles including an anti-tank minefield.
2.Tank attack against organised resistance in close co-operation with Infantry and supported by Artillery, Mortars and Medium Machine Guns.
3.The exploitation of success by Infantry.
The exercise scenario was based on repulsing an invading force by a flanking attack using armour closely supported by Infantry, Artillery, Mortars and Medium Machine Guns. Before the attack could proceed Royal Engineer assistance was required to clear an anti-tank minefield and other obstacles.
A detailed movement plan with very specific time allocations for the movement of some dozen separate groups of vehicles, ranging from 2 Ambulances to 90 Artillery vehicles, was attached to the exercise papers.
10th July 1941
At 09:30 hours the postponed inter-Battalion exercise, again directed by Brigadier Kirkup, for 10th DLI and 1st TS was held. This was the first occasion on which 10th DLI had had the opportunity to participate in an inter-Battalion exercise – they took the role of an enemy force advancing towards Reykjavik from Alafoss and 1st TS assumed the role of South-West Sector Reserve.
The details were attached to the War Diary as Appendix B as follows:-
The objectives of the exercise were to practise the Battalions in Battle Procedure and the manoeuvre of troops in the field.
The detailed arrangements for umpiring, safety, signalling and other communications were set out on the introductory page – including the requirement for 10th DLI to provide ten Icelandic Ponies for the use of the Umpires, and a bugler for sounding key orders.
No live ammunition was to be taken on to the exercise area, other than a sealed supply in case of an emergency arising during the exercise.
The basis of the exercise was an enemy invasion by sea and air, involving fighting in the AKUREYRI and HAVLFJORDUR areas – the latter being so serious that the Force Mobile Reserve was allocated to deal with it – thus denuding other areas of troops. In this scenario the exercise then assumed a three-Battalion parachute attack directed at Alafoss, which was only sparsely defended.
10th DLI had the role of the third of these Battalions and was tasked with concentrating in the Lagafell area, secure the crossing over the SALMON River, and threaten Reykjavik from the East. The Battalion had the support of a troop of 143rd Field Regiment and a Platoon of 1st/9th Manchesters.
The role of 1st TS as South West Sector Reserve was aimed at practising the Battalion in fighting a withdrawal action and also testing the machinery for the reconnaissance and occupation of successive positions in the rear.
The Battalion’s key role was to delay the enemy advance while a composite force was being organised. Key defensive positions were identified and the Battalion had, for the purpose of the exercise, access to an imaginary force of close support bombers.
The impression of a fast-moving attack was created by giving orders to 1st TS to withdraw after the Battalion had occupied defensive positions for some time.
Both Battalions had Artillery and Machine Gun support from 143rd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery and 1st/9th Manchesters.
The exercise was very successful.
11th July 1941
At 04:30 hours a Force Signal Exercise commenced and continued until 15:00 hours. This was intended to test the communications of Headquarters of formations and units, and several moves were involved.
Brigade HQ moved to the CLOISTERS, Hafnafjordur and then to KEILISNES on the KEFLAVIK road. 1st TS moved to KEILISNES and 10th DLI to VATNSENDI and Hafnafjordur. No movements of troops below the level of Battalion HQ was required.
The weather was warm and sunny during the whole of the day.
13th July 1941
The G.O.C. held a conference in Reykjavik on the Force Signals Exercise. He revealed that the American units, though not at war with Germany, would be available as a Mobile Reserve for the defence of the South-West Sector.
14th July 1941
The fine weather of the previous few days had gone and it was now dull and cool.
At 10:00 hours the Brigade Commander inspected a Guard of Honour of 11th DLI that had been formed for the arrival of a distinguished visitor (subsequently cancelled).
At 17:30 hours a conference was held at BYTOWN Camp to discuss the Inter-Battalion exercise of 10th DLI and 1st TS.
15th July 1941
The Brigade Major made a reconnaissance of VATNSMYRI aerodrome with the Commander of the 6th Marine Regiment of the U.S. Marine Corps for the siting of Anti-Aircraft guns in defence of the aerodrome. Arrangements were made for the introduction of American guns.
The Brigade Commander held a conference of Commanding Officers, chiefly on exercises and training. It was found to be impossible for any Battalion to provide working parties on aerodrome work during the forthcoming Force Exercise.
16th July 1941
The 147th Brigade Field Firing Exercise at LYKLAFELL was postponed until the next day owing to unfavourable weather.
17th July 1941
The Brigade Commander attended the 147th Brigade Field Firing Exercise – the weather was cloudy with some rain.
18th July 1941
Heavy rain continued throughout most of the previous night and lasted until 11:00 hours. An inter-Battalion exercise for 10th DLI and 11th DLI began in mist and rain, but weather improved and was fine by mid-day. This exercise was carried out as a “war game”, each Platoon and Company being represented by one or two men.
The details were attached to the War Diary as Appendix C:-
Again, the introductory page of the document describing the exercise set out the umpiring and safety arrangements. On this occasion only the Battalion and Company HQs of 10th and 11th DLI took part in the exercise. Supporting Artillery and Medium Machine Guns were only available in theory, and again, direction was in the hands of the Brigadier, supported by Umpires largely from 1st TS.
The objective of the exercise was to practise Battalions in the mechanism of command in mobile operations.
The subsidiary objectives for 10th DLI – who were assuming the operational role – was to rapidly assume the occupation of a defensive position and practise the troops in the launching of a counter-attack.
A scenario had been devised associated with an invasion of Reykjavik and Hafnafjordur from the sea, supported by large numbers of parachute troops. Defensive positions were being overrun and communications lost.
The Battalion Commander was ordered to secure a line to prevent further enemy penetration and to cover a counter-attack by the Force Mobile Reserve.
For the purposes of the exercise the Battalion Commander was given broad instructions from the Brigade Commander, key location details and information about the support and resources available (and equally important – not available) to him. He was left to make his own detailed dispositions.
The 11th DLI, in the role of the invading force, had their objectives as:-
(a)To study the action of a Battalion in the advance and attack in country where roads fit for wheeled traffic were few and far between.
(b)To study the employment of reserves in exploiting success.
The 11th were simulating being an attacking Parachute Battalion whose aims were disrupting communications and causing panic among the civil population.
Their tactical objective was to secure central ground from which the VATNSMYRI aerodrome was able to be observed and brought under fire. The Battalion had limited access to transport and only a modest level of Artillery and Machine Gun support – as might a genuine Parachute Battalion. Restrictions were placed on the distances which the unit would be able to cover in the time available, in an attempt to make the exercise as realistic as possible.
The final page of the exercise papers contained the umpires’ instructions, which reflected the restriction of the scheme to Headquarters only, with no troops being involved. Communications were clearly of key importance.
19th July 1941
A conference took place of representatives and Commanding Officers of all the units taking part in the Force Exercise due to commence on 21st July.
Instructions were issued regarding the defence of the South-West Sector during the forthcoming Force Exercise No 6, during which it was likely that the greater part of 70th Infantry Brigade would be outside the Sector. The instructions were attached to the War Diary as Appendix D as follows:-
During the two days of the Force Exercise, Major Walmsley, 1st TS, was given command of the South-West Sector. Positions were to be manned with a reduced scale of troops, from all three Battalions, plus supporting elements of 1st/9th Manchesters based in several of the key posts. The actions and responsibilities of all the posts, as laid down in the Scheme for the South-West Sector, were expected to be carried out to the last man – despite the small number involved while the Force Exercise was underway.
21st July 1941
Force Exercise No 6 commenced at 00:01 hours. This had been originally intended as an inter-Brigade exercise with 147th Infantry Brigade, but it had been modified to give a truer tactical picture.
The scenario of the exercise assumed an enemy force (Red) landing at Reykjavik and Hafnafjordur, represented by;
70th Infantry Brigade
Regimental HQ, one Battery and one troop of 143rd Field Regiment
294th Field Company, Royal Engineers, less two Sub-Sections.
187th Field Ambulance less one Company
17 A.I.L. Section
Detachment of R.A.S.C.
Detachment of Provost Company
The force had the (imaginary) assistance of 25 aircraft, based at Reykjavik Airport.
The exercise script showed an imaginary (Red) 101 Infantry Brigade landing and holding Reykjavik and Hafnafjordur while 70th Infantry Brigade and its attached troops pushed ahead to secure the reminder of South-West Iceland. Two Companies of (imaginary) parachute troops had landed at Kaldadarnes airfield and had been “mopped up” by (Blue) 147th Infantry Brigade and their attached troops.
Both forces then formed mobile columns and the main clash between them was on the road Reykjavik – GEITHALS – Selfoss – Kaldadarnes between 10th DLI – reinforced later by 1st TS – and 1st/6th and 1st/7th Duke of Wellington’s Regiment. Another mobile column formed by 1st/5th West Yorks – less two Companies – was met by 11th DLI in the Lagafell and Alafoss area.
The exercise ended at 11:15 hours on 22nd July 1941. Steady wind and rain occurred during the latter stages of the exercise, particularly during the early hours of 22nd July.
Many useful lessons were learned from this large scale exercise.
23rd July 1941
The G.O.C. held a conference on Force Exercise No 6.
24th July 1941
Major K.T. Roper returned from leave and resumed the duties of Brigade Major that had been temporarily performed by Captain T.G. Wilkinson.
Lt Col R.F. Ware M.C. also returned from leave and resumed command of 11th DLI.
Lt Col C.D. Marley D.S.O, M.B.E., M.C., T.D. left for leave in the UK and Major F. Hall took over command of 10th DLI in his absence.
Captain J.H. Trail, Brigade Staff Captain, also left on leave and his duties were assumed by Captain D.C. MacNichol, Brigade Transport Officer.
25th July 1941
The Brigade Commander held a conference of C.Os. to discuss training and the further alterations to dispositions. As 10th DLI had now taken over the defence of REYKJAVIK Aerodrome with one Company (the Anti-Aircraft defence being provided by detachments of the 12th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery and the U.S. Marine Corps) this area was taken out of the Reykjavik Sub-Sector. 1st TS took over the LAUGARNES Sub-Sector and the Sub-Sector boundaries were altered. 10th DLI took over a new Sub-Sector – MIDDLE Sub-Sector. This involved the inter-change of B Company 10th DLI and B Company 1st TS.
26th July 1941
The Brigade Commander was present at a review of 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment, U.S. Marine Corps by Brigadier General Marston – Commanding General.
28th July 1941
A Brigade Intelligence Course was arranged by the Brigade Intelligence Officer for Battalion Intelligence Officers and Intelligence personnel began at Hafnafjordur and lasted until the end of the week.
29th July 1941
10th DLI carried out a mobile column exercise under the direction of the Brigade Commander, in the area of the KEFLAVIK peninsula.
The particulars of the exercise were attached to the War Diary as Appendix E as follows:-
Each Battalion of the Brigade was to carry out this exercise separately – 10th DLI on 29th July, 11th DLI on 30th July and 1st TS on 8th August.
Each C.O. was left to organise the continuing security of their Sectors by leaving one Company, or a part of each Company, out of the exercise – the latter was recommended.
Battalions were expected to be fully motorised except for their B Echelon transport, which was excluded from the exercise. Battalion transport Officers were to liaise regarding any vehicle number deficiencies to ensure that sufficient trucks and lorries were available for each unit.
This was a one-sided exercise with only a skeleton enemy force provided by one of the other Battalions. No live ammunition was to be used and sounds were to be employed to simulate machine-gun fire. Bayonets were not to be fixed at any time. Communications was again of prime importance.
The exercise objective was to practise the Battalion in the role of a fully motorised column with the expected lessons being:-
(a)Movement by bounds of main bodies and forward protective detachments
(b)Main bodies not moving from one bound until the bound ahead is reported clear of enemy.
(c)Clearing of bounds which offer facilities for debussing.
(d)Adequate communications within columns by signal, wireless telegraphy and Despatch Rider.
The exercise scenario included intelligence on enemy landings, commandeering of transport and aerial attacks on Keflavik culminating in the landing of troop-carrying aircraft.
The role for the mobile column was to move at short notice to dislodge the enemy from Keflavik and drive them into the sea. No support, other than one flight of close support aircraft was available.
30th July 1941
11th DLI carried out the same mobile column exercise carried out the previous day by 10th DLI.
31st July 1941
10th DLI held a firing exercise for one Company at Kleifervatn.
In spite of the large amount of training carried out during the month, and the work involved in the changes of Camps, working parties of 800 men and 15 30cwt lorries had to be supplied by units of the Brigade and 1st/9th Manchester Regiment for work on REYKJAVIK Aerodrome.
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