70th Infantry Brigade War Diary May 1940 (part two).
70th Brigade War Diary May 1940 (part two)
24th May 1940
At 10:00 hours the Brigadier reported to Major-General Curtis at the HQ of POLFORCE in SAILLY and was given orders to move the Brigade to CHATEAU LA MOTTE in the FORET de NIEPPE and to contact the Brigade Commander – Brigadier Gawthorpe - of 137th Brigade in the 46th Division – the objective being for 70th Brigade Composite Force to take up a line on the HAZEBROUCK – MERVILLE canal where a gap apparently existed between LA MOTTE (incl) and a point some 1½ miles further North. The intention was for the Brigade to hold this line temporarily as the 2nd and 44th Divisions would be relieving them, as they were in the process of moving on their way to that area.
A warning order was issued for the move and the Brigadier, with reconnaissance parties, moved forward and contacted Brigadier Gawthorpe.
The Brigade Composite Force was re-organised into two Companies – No.1 commanded by Captain McCoy and No.2 by Captain Robson, both of 10th DLI.
The move of the main party of the Composite Force was carried out in daylight on roads which were still congested, with intense enemy air activity being experienced at various times throughout the journey.
The Force took up its designated positions at 18:00 hours and this was reported to POLFORCE. Brigade HQ was established at a farm located at SEC-AU-BOIS H3747 and contact was made with Lt-Col McLaren, Commander Royal Engineers of Chemical Warfare GHQ troops, who had Companies detached on the right flank of 70th Brigade, and also with Brigadier Gawthorpe of 137th Infantry Brigade which had troops on the left flank.
One drawback of the position of the Composite Force was that they had no tools to allow them to “dig-in” and improvised shelters had to be made.
At 22:00 hours heavy firing of both small arms and mortars was heard and Verey lights were observed from the area of HAZEBROUCK – MORBEQUE – FORET de NIEPPE.
At 23:00 hours the situation on the Brigade front was reported as quiet.
During the night, and in the early morning of 25th May, the 44th Division began to arrive and to move forward into position as expected, but no attempt was made to relieve either 70th Brigade or 137th Brigade. Brigadiers Kirkup and Gawthorpe remained in personal contact.
25th May 1940
Between 08:00 and 12:00 hours heavy air attacks took place on the troops at LA MOTTE with much material damage being sustained and one man killed.
The Brigade Major reported to the HQ of POLFORCE at SAIILY for instructions and was told that relief was expected that evening and, on that being completed, the 70th Brigade Composite Force should report to the HQ of 23rd Division – but that the location of the Division was unknown.
At 20:00 hours the 44th and 2nd Divisions had occupied positions on the left and right of 70th and 137th Brigades, but had still made no attempt to relieve them – it was apparent that some misunderstanding existed between the Divisional Commanders as to where the boundaries between their positions should be.
During the afternoon of 25th May POLFORCE had ceased to exist and General Curtis and his staff had moved to an unknown destination, leaving 70th Brigade, 137th Brigade and 9th RNF still in the line and not relieved as planned.
Brigadier Kirkup, after consulting Brigadier Gawthorpe at LA MOTTE, set off at 21:00 hours, accompanied by the Brigade Intelligence Officer, to contact 2nd Division at SAILLY, and also to contact 44th Division. The HQ found at SAILLY proved to be the rear HQ of 2nd Division but, fortuitously, the GSO I of 44th Division arrived at the same time and therefore, after considerable delay, contact between the staffs of the two Divisions was established.
The situation for Brigadier Kirkup was rather delicate and difficult, as both Divisions maintained strongly that they had taken up the positions ordered by GHQ, but both agreed immediately that the right flank of 2nd Division should be contiguous with the left flank of the 44th Division. That contact had not been made at 04:30 hours when the positions were occupied.
While the position in the FORET de NIEPPE was under discussion, the troops of the 70th Brigade Composite Force had carried out continuous patrolling over the 1½ miles of front they were occupying.
Brigadier Kirkup made a particular mention in the War Diary of the outstanding qualities of leadership shown by Captains McCoy and Robson of 10th DLI, 2/Lt Dunn of the 1st TS, Platoon Sergeant Major Wilson, and other senior NCOs during this period.
26th May 1940
At 08:00 further contact with the staffs of the two Divisions was made and the relief was agreed to take place at 12:00 hours.
At this time there was still no information as to where 23rd Division HQ might be located – the next destination intended for the Composite Force – and the only report available suggested that they may have moved further North – possibly because certain Officers and units of 69th Brigade were known to be in that general area.
Orders were therefore given that 70th Brigade would move to the ABEELE area, with a rendezvous established as the crossroads North of ABEELE, two miles South of WATOU on the ABEELE – WATOU road.
During the day extensive reconnaissance took place to try and locate 23rd Division, without success.
At 21:00 hours Brigade HQ was established in a farm house North of ABEELE.
27th May 1940
At 08:00 the Brigade Commander left his farmhouse HQ to contact GHQ which was thought to be at PREMESQUE, and the Corps HQ, which was understood to be at NEUVE EGLISE. This reconnaissance, like all the others, was carried out with difficulty and slowness of movement owing to the congested state of the roads.
No trace of the Corps HQ could be found at NEUVE EGLISE. The rear HQ of 2nd Division – last contacted the previous day at SAILLY – was met in a farm on the BAILLEUL road, with the D.A.Q.M.G. as the Senior Officer in charge. While the Brigadier was present, a message arrived for 2nd Division to the effect that enemy tanks were crossing at MESSINES, although no other information was available.
At BAILLEUL Major Steele of 186th Field Ambulance (23rd Division’s Ambulance unit) was met and said that he had been ordered, by 23rd Division, to move to WESTOUTRE. Lt Wrightson was then contacted at WESTOUTRE – he had information which suggested that the 23rd Divisional Commander would still be at BERTREN. It was thought impossible to reach there by car, owing to the congested roads, so a Despatch Rider was sent there to contact Divisional HQ, but once he reached there, no sign of them remained.
At 15:00 hours Col Gulland and Captain Hedley of 23rd Divisional HQ were met at a sunken road North of BERTREN. Col Gulland stated that the Divisional HQ was moving towards woods between POPERINGHE and VLAMERTINGHE, although he himself had not been able to make contact with the Divisional Commander.
Brigadier Kirkup returned to Brigade HQ and issued a warning order for a move to the woods specified by Col Gulland.
2/Lts Westray and Dunn of 1st TS made a further reconnaissance – this time of the STEENVORDE to CASSEL road from which area heavy shelling and machine-gun fire was coming. They reported that fighting was taking place West of STEENVORDE and that the town was in flames.
2/Lt Dunn then returned to STEENVORDE with a party of men to obtain rations from an abandoned ration dump.
(It will be appreciated that, as normal supply arrangements had collapsed, the usual regular flow of rations, water and ammunition to the Brigade had not taken place. This led to a variety of initiatives being taken by the troops. On one of the Brigadier’s many visits to higher Headquarters – probably GHQ – my father and the Brigadier’s batman – “Monty” – sadly I do not know his full details – observed a line of troops carrying stores from the HQ buildings to load into waiting transport – clearly to be ready for another move. They joined this line and were each handed a large carton to carry. However, they quietly diverted the cartons to the boot of the staff car, not knowing, of course, what they contained, and resumed their wait for the Brigadier to conclude his visit.
On returning to the Brigade HQ they dropped the Brigadier, moved the car out of sight and then collected the cartons and took them into their billet. One proved to be full of tins of corned beef – “bully” in Army parlance – while the second was full of bottles of whisky. They were then interrupted by the Brigade Major, who was looking for them. He expressed delight at their foresight, and commandeered the whisky “for use in bartering at a later date!”
On a separate occasion, after arriving at a village in which they were to set up Brigade HQ billets, they realised that they could smell baking. Caution was essential, as many of the villages had been denuded of inhabitants who had joined the torrent of refugees, and they had initially assumed the village was empty. With the roles the two men had, they were armed with revolvers and these were drawn as they made their way down the street – tracking down the smell, which by then they had realised was baking bread. On arriving at the village bakery, from where the smell was coming, they cautiously entered the building, to the absolute terror of the young ladies working to finish a batch of bread. Neither of these nineteen-year-olds had a word of French but the revolvers spoke volumes. As my father put it – “the girls were so pleased to find that it was only the bread that we wanted that they handed over as much as we could carry!”)
At 20:00 hours, after yet further extensive reconnaissance under considerable difficulty in the woods near POPERINGHE and VLAMERTINGHE, in which no satisfactory contact could be made, the troops were moved to OOSTYLETEREN in the hope that any further move North by 23rd Division might be intercepted.
28th May 1940
The Composite Force arrived at OOSTYLETEREN at 00:15 hours to find that no billets were available. Belgian Gendarme Officers indicated that space would be available at LOO. On arrival there at 03:15 ample accommodation was found to be available and the men of the Composite Force were billeted by 03:45.
At 04:30 heavy long-range shelling of the town of LOO took place, shells fell on the outskirts of the town, but no Brigade casualties were suffered.
At 07:00 the Belgian Agent Liaison to the Brigade – Lt Topes – reported that a fellow Belgian Officer had informed him that the King of the Belgians had capitulated at 04:00 that day. There were no other British troops in the vicinity.
The Belgian Colonel commanding the Garrison at LOO confirmed this fact and showed his orders that he had received on the subject. His demeanour was described in the War Diary as good – he and all his Officers were disheartened and disgusted by the turn of events. While he had no further information his strong advice to the Brigadier was to move the men of 70th Brigade off Belgian soil as soon as possible.
As there were no other British troops in the vicinity, and there was no knowledge of the locations of any higher formation, the Brigade Commander was faced with a dilemma. This was compounded when the Belgian Colonel gave the information that the enemy were now advancing rapidly – given that there was no longer any opposition from the Belgian forces – from OSTEND to NIEUPORT and that the Composite Force was in grave danger of being surrounded.
In order to avoid the complications of possible internment in an enemy country, the Brigadier gave the orders to move back into France via HOODSTADE and BEVEREN with the aim of crossing the frontier at OOST - CAPPEL.
On reaching OOST - CAPPEL no higher formation could be found and as all movement of British troops was in the direction of BERGUES it was decided to proceed there, as the CANAL DE LA COLME offered the possibility of a defensive position from which to continue opposing the advancing enemy.
However, on reaching a road junction some two miles South of BERGUES a Control Post of Military Police halted the column and ordered the vehicles into a field, the men to dismount and abandon their kit and all the vehicles – which would then be destroyed. The area was a mass of abandoned vehicles being set on fire.
When the Brigadier reached the Control Post he was informed that all troops were marching from this point and that embarkation was taking place at DUNKIRK.
(As far as can be ascertained this was the very first indication that the Brigade Commander was given that evacuation of the B.E.F. was indeed underway).
The Brigadier “did not feel disposed to act on this information” but as the Military Police were adamant as to their instructions regarding the abandonment and destruction of vehicles, he agreed to comply with that portion of the orders. All the Brigade HQ vehicles were abandoned and rendered immobile.
(In the case of the Brigadier’s Humber Snipe Staff Car, my father drove it into one of the adjacent fields, as directed, and removed the sump plug – allowing the lubricating oil to drain from the engine – and when that drainage had finished he ran the engine at a high rate of revolutions, thus burning the engine out and rendering it useless. He and the Brigadier’s batman then ripped out the electrics and used the vehicle tools to smash as many components as they could in the time available – throwing the distributor cap and the battery into a ditch. At the conclusion of this ordered vandalism, having maintained and nursed the vehicle throughout the campaign, and it never having let him down, he was “broken-hearted” at the wanton destruction).
Just at this time the enemy began shelling the cross-roads. It was decided to move the troops towards DUNKIRK in parties of fifty, with their own Officers, in the hope of contacting some higher formation and receiving instructions as to where a stand might be made, as there was no defensive position at, or near, the cross-roads as far as could be seen.
At the Canal Bridge at HOYMILLE the Brigadier met Lt-Col Kennedy, Commander Royal Engineers, 23rd Division who briefed him that his Royal Engineers were preparing bridges for demolition in the area and that they were about to be relieved by another Division. He also indicated that 6th Green Howards, of 69th Brigade, were carrying out Police Duties in the area, but were also about to be relieved, and that the Officer Commanding 5th East Yorks was at the Divisional RE HQ. Neither he, nor the two Battalion Commanders, were in touch with the HQ of 23rd Division or with any other formation commander.
At this point the Brigade Major met a Staff Officer of GHQ who, after clarifying the manpower position of 70th Brigade, issued orders that they should make for MALO les BAINS and report to an Embarkation Officer who would issue further instructions.
In the meantime Brigadier Kirkup returned with Commander Royal Engineers (who presumably still had access to operational transport at this point) to his HQ at Les MOERES, where he contacted the Commander of 5th East Yorks and assumed command of all the 23rd Division troops in the area. The relief of the 23rd Division Royal Engineers was completed shortly afterwards, as planned, except for a very small party under the direction of Lt Col Kennedy, whom it was arranged would be collected and brought forward later.
The main body of the Divisional Royal Engineers already had orders to proceed to BRAY DUNES and report to an Embarkation Officer once they had been relieved – which had now occurred.
Brigadier Kirkup and the Commander of 5th East Yorks then attempted to contact the Officer Commanding 6th Green Howards, but were unable to do so as his HQ had been bombed and there were no members of his Battalion in the vicinity. The Brigadier having; satisfied himself that no 6th Green Howards were left on Police Duties in the area, that the 23rd Division Royal Engineers were proceeding to BRAY DUNES, and that all 23rd Division troops were now to be relieved, proceeded with the Commander of 5th East Yorks to BRAY DUNES.
Under the command of the Brigade Major, Captain Fillingham, the 70th Brigade Composite Force halted and assembled at COUBERQUE on the outskirts of DUNKIRK whilst a reconnaissance of the arrangements at ST MALO was carried out. This Force then marched to ST MALO where Lt Col Wheeler ordered that parties of fifty be made up, each with an Officer, and the parties should embark from the beach and from the Mole respectively.
(It was during this journey that my father was wounded while marching along the beaches with his colleagues from Brigade HQ. He was hit in his left wrist by shrapnel from an aerial bomb, had this bound up by a colleague and initially did not think it was too serious.)
The War Diary records that ….”orders were carried out with perfect discipline and restraint on the part of the troops whose bearing was favourably commented on by the Embarkation Staff”.
On arrival at the Mole Officers, NCOs and men of the Composite Force assisted the Commander, Royal Navy, in command of assembly in maintaining order amongst straggler British troops and also in conveying wounded on to a hospital ship.
(My father and Monty – the batman – were not enthusiastic about just sitting or queuing waiting to be evacuated and liable to further air attack, and volunteered to help carry wounded from the Dressing Station, along the Mole, to the waiting ships. They were both young men of modest stature – my father was 5’ 7” – and they were directed by a medic to a stretcher on which lay a 6’ tall Coldstream Guardsman, suffering from acute shell-shock. As they picked up their load they realised he was about 16 stones in weight and was threshing about on the stretcher in some distress.
After a struggle, including putting him back on the stretcher at least once, they got him to the end of the Mole where a waiting Medical Officer got him aboard a waiting Minesweeper and the two men returned for their next load. As luck would have it, just as they got back to the Dressing Station the air attack occurred which many readers will have seen re-created in the film “Dunkirk” in which a bomb fell directly on to the Mole, killing men queuing there and blowing a gap in the Mole itself.
A scrambling net was rapidly thrown into place over the gaping hole but one can imagine the trials of two physically modest-scale soldiers manhandling a stretcher bearing a large badly-wounded guardsman across the chasm blown in the Mole. Nevertheless, the job was done and the two returned for their third load. As they reached the Medical Officer at the end of the Mole with the next stretcher he took one look at them and just said…”OK lads – you’ve done your share – get on board”.
The two were directed below decks and a friendly matelot saw their exhaustion, and recognised they had been working as temporary stretcher bearers …”You lads hungry?” They nodded and sat down in a mess deck space. Within minutes they were each holding “the biggest bully beef sandwich you have ever seen” and a pint mug of steaming cocoa. Never had a meal tasted so good.)
The final embarkation of this Force was completed at about 02:30 hours on 29th May.
Brigadier Kirkup and the Commander of 5th East Yorks arrived at BRAY DUNES at about 19:00 hours on 28th May and made contact with the Report Centre and Movement Control, regarding the arrival of any 23rd Divisional troops. Captain Smith, Adjutant of the 23rd Divisional Royal Engineers was met at about 23:00 hours. Major Cameron, Commanding 507th Field Company, Royal Engineers, reported that 350 of the 23rd Divisional Royal Engineers had arrived at BRAY DUNES and had been placed on a priority list for embarkation.
29th May 1940
At about 03:00 Brigadier Kirkup and the Commander of 5th East Yorks were instructed by Movement Control to embark from the beach in small boats and board a destroyer – this was accomplished and the destroyer departed at 14:00 hours on 29th May.
31st May 1940
A note regarding transport was added to the Brigade War Diary as an Appendix as follows:-
From 20th to 21st May the transport in the possession of the 70th Brigade Composite Force and with which all ranks were moved consisted of:-
1 Humber Snipe Staff Car (driven by Pte R.B.Dixon)
2 15 cwt trucks
2 French Government Lorries
1 French converted Paris omnibus
3 R.A.F 3-ton lorries
2 Civilian motors
1 Cow trailer
1 Carrionette
1 British RASC 3-ton lorry
Other British and French lorries were rescued, used until worn out and replaced by other ditched vehicles.
Considerable credit was reflected upon the work of the Brigade Motor Transport Officer (Captain W.B. Kirkup) and the Brigade Transport Sergeant (Sgt N. Beveridge) for the manner in which they secured and maintained this transport in serviceable condition, and for the way in which the convoy was conducted through roads subjected to enemy air activity and congested with refugee traffic.
Appendix 3 to the War Diary recorded the weapon and transport position of the Brigade.
The armament of the Battalions of the Brigade on May 17th was, in addition to I Rifle per man as follows:-
1st TS 16 Bren Guns, 4 2” Mortars, 10 Anti-Tank Rifles.
10th DLI 14 Bren Guns, 4 2” Mortars, 10 Anti-Tank Rifles.
11th DLI 14 Bren Guns, 4 2” Mortars, 10 Anti-Tank Rifles.
Although each Battalion had four 2” Mortars there was only one sight available per Battalion. (However, in the author’s experience the 2” Mortar could be used reasonably effectively by even a relatively inexperienced crew without a sight).
Battalion transport (each Battalion) consisted of:-
1 8 cwt Truck
3 30 cwt Trucks
8 15 cwt Trucks
1 Water Truck
1 Motor Cycle
There was no detachment of either RASC or Royal Signals at Brigade HQ.
Brigade HQ transport consisted of:-
1 Humber Snipe Staff Car
2 15 cwt Trucks
2 Motor Cycles
Weapon Training
1,400 of the total strength of approx. 2,000 had not fired the Bren Gun. 400 had not completed the War Course with the Rifle. No firing had been done with the Anti-Tank Rifle. No Officers or men had had instruction on Anti-Tank Guns, such as were issued on May 18th at RIENCOURT. No firing and very limited instruction had been completed on the 2” Mortar.
(The War Diary for earlier in the year makes the point that arrangements were put in place for Militia recruits posted to the Battalions to fire the Rifle War Course at Whitburn. These were the latest recruits to the Brigade as far as is known, so it is not clear who the troops were who had not completed the Rifle War Course).
Training – General
The general policy in training the Brigade had been to develop resource, energy and imagination among the junior Officers and NCOs. When the Brigade was thrown almost overnight into action against enemy Armoured Fighting Vehicles and Infantry under harassing air attacks, the steadiness of the Junior Leaders, their determination and resource was most encouraging. Both they and the men stood up to the stress of operations, marching considerable distances daily, in accordance with the best traditions of the service.
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