70th Infantry Brigade War Diary October 1941.
Lt Col Marley continued to command the Brigade until the return of Brigadier Kirkup from command of Iceland Force during the U.K. leave of Major-General Curtis.
Brigade HQ staff remained as previously.
1st October 1941
Force Exercise No 10, which was to have taken place in the SAUERBAER area, was cancelled due to the bad weather and the condition of the roads. This was the seventeenth consecutive day of bad weather.
South-West Operation Instruction No 14 was issued, and attached to the War Diary as Appendix A. This document dealt with the interchange of 1st TS and 11th DLI Battalions – due to take place on 9th – 10th October. 11th DLI was due to move into the Reykjavik Sub-Sector and 1st TS to move into the Hafnafjordur Sub-Sector - the exact programme to be decided between the Battalion Commanders over the two day period.
Command was due to change formally on 12:00 hours 10th October, with completion of the relief reported to Brigade HQ. Advance parties of 10% strength of both units were to be exchanged on 7th October. Rear parties were to remain in place for 24 hours after completion of the move.
A list was set out of the buildings, stores, vehicles and equipment to be handed over between the Battalions.
7th October 1941
Force Exercise No 11, a Signal Exercise, commenced at 10:30 hours. This was the first exercise for the Force planned on a Divisional basis, as opposed to an Operational Exercise as Iceland Force.
Two Infantry Brigades together with supporting arms and troops took part. The 49th Division were assumed to be training in the SANDSKEID area when it was called upon to repel enemy landings at APAVATN, 20 miles North of Selfoss, and ODDI.
The 70th Infantry Brigade was given the task of destroying the enemy landing at APAVATN. The Brigade transport moved out of Camp at 05:00 hours and proceeded to the vicinity of ALVIDRA where Brigade HQ and Unit HQ areas had been allotted. Only Division, Brigade and Battalion HQs took part. The scheme finished by 20:00 hours and all transport was back in Camp by midnight.
9th October 1941
Advance parties of the 1st TS and 11th DLI had moved to the new Camps on 7th and 8th October and on this day, the relief commenced, Companies proceeding to their new Camps by Route March.
10th October 1941
The G.O.Cs. conference on Force Exercise No 11 was held in the Fish Shed Theatre, Reykjavik at 17:00 hours. Owing to the changes of location of Infantry, a revision was issued to the Force scheme for a counter-attack on REYKJAVIK AERODROME, and a copy was attached to the War Diary as Appendix B.
The original scheme had been issued from Brigade HQ on 11th August 1941 and it had now been revised to reflect the changes in location of 1st TS and 11th DLI. Effectively what was revised was the Appendix B for the Scheme for defending the South-West of Iceland, which dealt specifically with the aerodrome – a revision to the main scheme itself was due to be issued before the end of October so this change was to ensure that existing plans were up-to-date, pending that major revision.
The changes had reduced the scale of troops available to carry out a counter-attack to one Company (less one Platoon) at TOWER HILL. It was planned to use these troops only in the first phase of a counter-attack – if further objectives were to be dealt with O.C. 10th DLI, who had co-ordinating responsibility, was expected to consider using his reserve Company at RIPON CAMP and the Mortar and Carrier Platoons at HALGOLAND. There would continue to be Artillery and M.M.G. support.
The document stressed the importance of HOWITZER HILL as a vantage point from which an enemy could bring down rifle fire on the aerodrome, and therefore it stood as a key feature which any invading enemy would seek to capture.
Three plans were set out – dealing with HOWITZER HILL, RED HOUSE and the AIRFIELD itself and involved the agreed use of American tank support in any counter-attack. Careful co-ordination of Artillery Support fire would be necessary so as not to impede tank movement, although M.M.G. support fire was anticipated to be able to continue through a tank advance until Infantry reached the objective.
Each light tank was armed with a 37mm main gun and four 0.50” machine-guns, and there were expected to be three Platoons each of four tanks available.
Routes were set out to the various locations identified in the plans and actions identified. Action was expected to be continued until the aerodrome was recaptured.
12th October 1941
The Brigade Commander held a conference at HQ involving 25 Group Pioneer Corps and the C.Os. of units in Reykjavik town regarding the new defence scheme to be brought in on 1st November 1941. The substance of the conference concerned the large number of dilapidated posts and their substitution by “Keeps”, or defended areas, and a reduction in the size of the three defended zones.
13th October 1941
Arrangements for the defence of the South-West Sector, during the forthcoming exercise, were laid down. A skeleton force was to be left behind. Details were set out on Appendix C, which was attached to the War Diary. As this circumstance had occurred earlier in the year (see the War Diary for 20th September 1941), when the exercise concerned had to be cancelled, the same arrangements were put in place. The Appendix reiterated that, with the addition of the identification of the Sub-Sector Commanders, under the South-West Commander – Major McCoy DLI – as follows:-
Hafnafjordur – Captain H.C. Chudleigh 1st TS
MIDDLE – Captain C.R. Dean 10th DLI
Reykjavik – Captain J. Brewis 11th DLI
15th October 1941
Instructions were issued for Force Exercise No 12. This exercise imagined that two opposing forces were resident in Iceland – OLFUSA in the SOUTH and JOKULLAND in the NORTH.
The OLFUSA force consisted of 70th Infantry Brigade, plus 366 Field Battery, Royal Artillery, 187 Field Ambulance, a Section of 294 Field Company Royal Engineers and a Section of the Divisional Provost Company. The JOKULLAND force was based on 147th Infantry Brigade, with similar support.
The orders for the OLFUSA force were to secure GRAFINSTRETT and, after its capture, to advance and take HEIDA BARR on the edge of PINGVELLIRVATN.
The Operation Order for the exercise was attached to the War Diary as Appendix D.
The War Diary summarised the plan briefly as consisting of sending one Company of 1st TS in Motor Transport, one Troop of 366 Battery and the Carriers by road via ALVIDRA to contact the enemy at GRAF. The remainder of 1st TS, followed by the 11th DLI and their Carriers, marched direct, along a track through the GRAFINGHALS VALLEY to join up with the Mobile Company at GRAF.
Elements built into the exercise included; guarding against ambush by irregular forces, co-operation with RAF Lysander aircraft, bridge demolitions and bridge guarding, and co-operation between marching troops and the Mobile Column.
Brigade HQ and the remaining troops proceeded to an area in the vicinity of ALVIDRA leaving one Platoon of the 11th DLI and the Brigade Defence Platoon with “B” Echelon at REYKIR. The Mobile Column found the road impassable at HLID and made a forced march until contact was made with the enemy. The advance guard later joined up with them and took up positions. Due to the heavy rains, the roads were a sea of mud, crossed in places by streams, and in one part the road had collapsed.
Rain had been experienced from 08:00 hours throughout the exercise and at 15:00 hours it was prematurely concluded.
It was some hours before troop-carrying transport could reach the area and with the narrowness and condition of the roads a considerable time elapsed before the convoy could be turned. A number of vehicles were bogged or ditched, and it was midnight before Brigade HQ and 10th DLI arrived back in Camp, followed at intervals by 1st TS and 11th DLI.
Many valuable lessons were learnt regarding transport and it was obvious that transport could not be relied on in such conditions, although the percentage of breakdowns and accidents was very small.
16th October 1941
A revised scheme for the defence of Reykjavik Town was issued and attached to the War Diary as Appendix E.
This was a revision of the existing scheme and took into account the presence of other forces which had to be taken into account, in terms of their deployment and role in an emergency. As mentioned earlier, the concept of “Keeps” and Vulnerable Points was introduced, though this did not change the overall approach of “no withdrawal” from main positions. The additional forces were from supporting units, including the Base Stores Depot, the Force Postal Unit, the Field Bakery and Field Butchery, plus any other ancillary units quartered in Reykjavik. Every soldier in the Iceland Force in this part of the island was expected to play a role in its defence.
The town was now divided into three Zones and a Perimeter Defence Line. The Town Plan depicting the boundaries was, unfortunately, not included within the War Diary file, and may have been considered too sensitive to retain. Each Zone had one or more defensive Keeps with defensive posts and outposts. Withdrawal from outposts was permissible in certain circumstances, but there was to be no withdrawal from the main positions – they and their posts were to be held at all costs.
In addition to holding each Keep, each Zone Commander was expected to maintain a Reserve ready to counter-attack any infiltration immediately, and also was instructed to maintain an aggressive fighting patrolling regime, to intercept enemy movement, or fifth column action, and to maintain the confidence of the civil population.
Each Vulnerable Point was allocated a guard force as part of the overall scheme.
In the context of Civil Defence, depending on circumstances at the time, troops were allowed to be used on fire-fighting duties up to 50% of their strength – with priority given to protecting Government buildings, stores and Camps, then civilian houses important to the defence, then remaining buildings.
Medical Inspection Rooms had already been set up within the town and medical posts were to be established in each of the Keeps.
Fourteen days supplies and rations were to be held at unit HQs. On the alarm being given each man was to be issued with two bandoliers of ammunition, and a box of .303 placed at each post with a Bren Gun.
The three Zone HQs were to be at SKIPTON CAMP, the National Theatre and Bishop’s School (the N.W. corner of the Roman Catholic Cathedral enclosure).
While the Town Map was missing from the War Diary, the Appendix setting out some guidance on Street Fighting was included – this was drawn from Section 32 of Military Training Pamphlet 33 – Training in Fieldcraft and Elementary Tactics. The final sentence is the rather laconic – “Grenades will be useful if resistance is met”.
17th October 1941
A conference was held by the Chief Umpire, Brigadier K.A.T. McLennan M.C. on the recent inter-Brigade exercise. This was attended by the Brigade Commander and the Brigade Major. Owing to the inability of umpires to move about and breakdowns in communication, some events in the exercise were not known to the Directing Staff.
18th October 1941
The G.O.Cs. conference on Force Exercise No 12 was held at the Fish Theatre, Reykjavik. The difficulties of transport and communication were particularly stressed.
19th October 1941
The 2nd Battalion, Princess Louise’s Kensington Regiment just arrived from the U.K. took over from the 1st/9th Manchesters as the Machine-Gun Battalion at BYTOWN CAMP, Reykjavik. The 1st/9th Manchesters returned to the U.K.
21st October 1941
There was a rehearsal of Field Firing to be given by 1st TS and 366 Field Battery Royal Artillery for American Officers at Kleifervatn.
23rd October 1941
The Field Firing Exercise was to have been held at Kleifervatn but, on the arrival of Major-General Curtis and Major-General Bonesteel, U.S. Army, commanding the American Forces in Iceland, it was decided to postpone the exercise. Heavy rain and a high wind would have made the demonstration of little practical value.
Major-General Curtis C.B., D.S.O., M.C. re-assumed command of Iceland (C) Force on his return from leave.
Brigadier P. Kirkup D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., T.D. relinquished command of Iceland ( C) Force and the local acting rank of Major-General and re-assumed command of 70th Infantry Brigade.
Lieut-Colonel C.D. Marley D.S.O., M.B.E., T.D. relinquished command of 70th Infantry Brigade and re-assumed command of 10th DLI.
28th October 1941
The Field Firing Exercise, postponed from 23rd October was held, and watched by Major-General Curtis, Major-General Bonesteel and one Officer of the U.S. Army.
29th October 1941
Force Exercise No 13 for Intelligence Sections was held in the RALDARSEL VALLEY area, near Hafnafjordur. All three Battalions of both 70th and 147th Infantry brigades took part – the exercise being on a competitive basis.
31st October 1941
The Brigade Commander, Brigade Major and Staff Captain made a reconnaissance of the HVITANES area in HAVLFJORDUR as a Company training ground for Mountain Warfare. It is proposed to send one Company at a time to this area, to be accommodated in an existing Camp at HVITANES.
The G.O.C. held a conference in the Recreation Hut, HALGOLAND Camp, for all Officers and men taking part in Force Exercise No 13.
A revised scheme for the defence of the South-West Sector was issued and attached to the War Diary as Appendix F. This was a revision of the very comprehensive scheme described earlier in these War Diaries, set in the context of the strategic position of Iceland, but took account of the increased RAF presence and the increasing number of American troops in Iceland, as well as the changes in location of some units referred to earlier. Some of the more sensitive Appendices again do not appear to have survived to be included within the national Archives files.
Training during the month was hampered by the weather, as the rainfall was very heavy. There were not more than five days in the month when no rain fell. Towards the end of the month frosts were apparent at night-time and occasional high winds also showed that winter was approaching.
Owing to the heavy rainfall, football grounds were unplayable and only a very small amount of sport was possible.
A great deal of consideration was given to Educational Training for the winter months and units prepared schemes on the basis of one hour per day on five days a week.
The accommodation situation was not greatly improved during the month owing to a shortage of floor boards for new huts. At the end of the month C Company 10th DLI on the aerodrome had only two Platoons in huts, the remainder living in large aeroplane crates converted into small huts. The Mortar Platoon 11th DLI was in huts which lacked floor boards.
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