GS Branch Summary of 23rd Division Operations 10th to 31st May 1940

This Summary of Operations was attached to the GS Branch War Diary for May - contained in file WO 167/262 - and effectively sets out, in a more literary form, the activities, movements and actions in which the Division was involved - thus complementing the War Diary itself.

Where information subsequently cast doubts upon the statements made in this Summary I have indicated the queries by using italic script. Otherwise, the material is as it was submitted. Because of the length of the document it has been separated into sections by date.

PREAMBLE

23rd Division was despatched to France during April 1940 for labour on the aerodromes of the Air Component. The Division was to return to England to complete its training after three months. There were two other "second-line" Divisions also sent to France as a source of labour - including 46 Division, mentioned within the War Diary

Individual training had not been completed at the time of embarkation. Only a small proportion of the men had fired a rifle and none had been properly exercised in Bren Gun or Anti-Tank Rifle. This is partly challenged as far as 70 Brigade is concerned - reference is made in the Brigade and Battalion War Diaries to the efforts made to ensure that the War Course on the Rifle had been fired by everybody.

Since the Division was intended for labour overseas and not for operations during the three months in question, it was sent overseas with only a small and modified scale of weapons, equipment and transport. Each Infantry Battalion was allocated 8 Anti-Tank Rifles and 18 Bren Guns - although of this allotment some 25 Bren Guns remained in the UK for the defence of merchant shipping. No pistols had been issued. Battalions had only twelve vehicles each.

The Divisional Artillery and Signals remained in the UK and only a modified Despatch Rider Section under 2/Lt D Bell went overseas from that Signals component. Only one Field Ambulance, rather than two, went overseas - in this case 186 Field Ambulance accompanied by one Field Hygiene Section.

On arrival in France the Division was immediately dispersed over a wide area to the aerodrome sites on which they were to work, and where they were accommodated in tented camps. Work was well underway by the end of April with the intention that the week would consist of four day's labour work, two day's training and one day's rest.

On the day of the German invasion - 10th May 1940 - the Division was dispersed as follows:-

HQ 23rd Division Miraumont N47

HQ 69th Brigade Becourt N36

HQ 70th Brigade Hurlingcourt N10

HQ Royal Engineers Miraumont N47

HQ 233rd Field Company Royal Engineers Becourt N36

HQ 507th Field Company Royal Engineers Beaucourt N37

HQ 508th Field Park Company Royal Engineers Tinques H20

8th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Motorcycle Battalion) Dirval H21

9th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Machine-Gun Battalion) Monchy le Breton H21

5th East Yorkshires Grevillers N47

6th Green Howards Irles N47

7th Green Howards THELUS H40

10th Durham Light Infantry NUNCQ H10

11th Durham Light Infantry NUNCQ H10

1st Tyneside Scottish BEAUVOIR N19

Supply Echelon Beaudricourt N19

186th Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps Miraumont N47

33rd Field Hygiene Section Royal Army Medical Corps Miraumont N47

Provost Company, Corps of Royal Military Police Grandecourt N47

With the exception of the Field Park Company the Royal Engineers units were distributed around the Division in Sections.

At 05:30 hours on 10th May the aerodrome at GREVILLERS and the Supply Echelon at BEAUDRICOURT suffered serious casualties as a result of enemy bombing. Further casualties were caused by the later explosions of delayed action bombs at both sites. Immediate arrangements to prepare slit trenches and conceal tentage were made. Work on the aerodromes continued but air raid alarms at night meant that troops had few opportunities to rest during the subsequent three weeks.

On the night of 12th/13th May 10 DLI with one Platoon of 1 Tyneside Scottish under command were sent to ABBEVILLE for the defence of aerodromes North and South of the River SOMME. This was only achieved by pooling unit transport from 70 Brigade, 9 RNF, 186 Fd Amb and a Construction Company, Royal Engineers, rendering those units immobile while the movement was in progress.

On 14th May 23rd Division, with the addition of an Infantry Brigade from 46th Division,was made responsible for all aerodrome defence from the Belgian frontier to the River SOMME.

On 16th May 9 RNF and 5 EY were further dispersed in small detachments over enormous areas about LILLERS H23 and DOUAI H60 respectively to guard vulnerable points.

GHQ then, on 17th May at 08:30 ordered 23rd Division to hold a position on the CANAL DU NORD between RUYALCOURT N67 and ARLIEUX N79 - a front totalling some 17 miles. At the time the order was received the Division was dispersed over an area extending from LILLERS in the North to ALBERT in the South - 70 miles, and from ABBEVILLE in the West to DOUAI in the East - 80 miles. Units had little transport and little if any means of communication. The men were inadequately equipped and trained - it will be recalled that there was no Divisional Artillery and, in particular, no Anti-Tank Regiment available.

Following receipt of the above orders from GHQ - to which the Labour Divisions reported - a conference was held at Divisional HQ at which the Brigadiers and Commander Royal Engineers were present. General Herbert gave preliminary orders from the map and these were confirmed later in Operation Order No 1.

In outline these were that:-

The front was divided into two sectors - the dividing line being the CAMBRAI - ARRAS Road, the road itself being included in the left sector.

70 Brigade, supported by 507 Field Company would take the right sector and 69 Brigade, supported by 203 Field Company, would take the left sector. 8 RNF (Motorcycle Battalion) and the Provost Company would remain in reserve at ST LEGER N58. 186 Fd Amb would establish Advanced Dressing Stations in each of the two sectors.

186 Fd Amb and the Main Dressing Station would be at Miraumont N47.

The Infantry units would put out bridgeheads to cover the preparation of the bridges for demolition. All troops to be in position by 18:30 hours. Divisional HQ would be at CHERISY N59.

A reconnaissance of the CANAL DU NORD identified some 17 bridges in all - several not included on existing maps. The canal proved to be dry at several points - particularly across most of 70 Brigade's front - and there were many places which would allow Armoured Fighting Vehicles to cross without hindrance. Immediately to the right of the right sector the canal ran for three miles in a tunnel and therefore represented no obstacle at all.

By 18:30 all troops were in position on the line of the canal, with the exception of 10 DLI, Reserve Battalion of 70 Brigade, which had to be collected from its scattered positions around ABBEVILLE and as a result did not reach its canal positions until midnight.

At about 18:00 hours on 17th May Major Burns, Royal Artillery, reported to Divisional HQ that he was bringing an improvised Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (this is "A" Field Regiment mentioned in the War Diary) of 13 guns to support the position. He was advised that the right sector was the most vulnerable and to site the major portion of his guns to support that area. The guns did not actually arrive until the afternoon of 18th May and were a mixed lot - eight 18-pounders, three 25-pounders and two 4.5" Howitzers.

Major Burns had no signallers or signal equipment and no gun instruments. Guns had to be laid in some cases by peering up the muzzles. Four of the guns were discovered later to be missing oil in their recoil cylinders. The crews had never worked together before. Despite these difficulties Major Burns worked enthusiastically on 17th and 18th May, selecting gun positions which would allow direct fire on an advancing enemy, especially approach avenues for tanks. All guns were in position by the evening of 18th May.

Also on 17th May a batch of French Anti-Tank Guns and some more Anti-Tank Rifles came to the Division, The guns were of an unfamiliar new type but were issued to the Infantry Battalions. The Anti-Tank Rifles were issued to units throughout the Division. The Provost Company were despatched to join the rear Divisional HQ at MIRAUMONT.

Communication proved a constant difficulty - the Division had no radio or telephone equipment and the only link with GHQ at ARRAS was via Despatch Rider or civilian telephone - a "precarious link necessitating speech in parables on account of secrecy".

The Division was never able to contact MacFarlane's Force - supposed to be on 23rd Divisions left - nor 12 Division or the GHQ Royal Engineers, who were supposed to be holding the line in the South. French Territorial troops - supposedly holding the canal crossings to the front of the Division - were not there. This latter item is a crucial point and has only recently been highlighted for the first time, to my knowledge, in the current works on Dunkirk of both Hugh Sebag-Montefiore and Major General Julian Thompson. This point will be referred to in other War Diaries

Because GHQ did not have exact information on the whereabouts of enemy forces they issued a warning on 17th May at 10:00 hours for all GHQ troops (including 23rd Division) to be prepared to move at a moment's notice. GHQ also advised that no further pack trains were to be expected for at least four days - as a result ration scales were reduced to half scale (and even this was not available) and that troops were to "live off the country". No supplies actually reached the Division until its arrival in England some fifteen days later. Some mention of foraging will be found in other War Diaries.

The night of 17th/18th May was quiet although there was much troop movement - mainly French - observed along the CAMBRAI - ARRAS road. Superimposed on these movements were streams of refugees going in all directions, but mainly from CAMBRAI towards ARRAS and BAPAUME and these caused considerable road blockages. Roads were bombed and machine-gunned by low flying enemy aircraft in the evening of 17th May, leading to heavy casualties, both civilian and military. The village of BOURSIES suffered particularly badly.

18th May 1940

On the morning of 18th May the G.O.C. made a reconnaissance of the right Brigade sector, and the land over the tunnel immediately to the South of the sector - as mentioned above - and he reported that he was anxious about this flank. At 15:00 hours the Commender Royal Engineers from GHQ called at 23rd Division HQ and reported that his teams of Sappers, preparing bridges for demolition North of PERONNE had been fired on by enemy tanks. On telephoning this intelligence to GHQ the Division was ordered to refuse its right flank - this was done by withdrawing 70 Brigade into the villages between the CAMBRAI - ARRAS road and the railway running from MARQUOIN to BOYELLES N48.

70 Brigade was ordered to make tank-proof localities in those villages. On the left front, 69 Brigade were ordered to make similar localities in the villages behind their front.

23rd Division moved HQ from CHERISY to MONCHY LE PREOX N59 during the night 18th/19th May, arriving at MONCHY at 01:30 hours. 8 RNF joined HQ there from their previous location at ST LEGER. MONCHY was still inhabited and orders were given to evacuate civilians.

19th May 1940

Captain A S C Browne - the Division G III - was sent to GHQ at ARRAS as liaison officer. GHQ had moved and the Division was informed that they were now to be part of PETREFORCE, under the command of Major General Petre - who was in charge of the ARRAS defences. This change was confirmed by a GHQ Operation Instruction No 42 dated 18th May.

Divisional HQ and 8 RNF set about the task of putting MONCHY in a state of defence, barricading roads and setting up anti-tank positions. A field gun had been added to the defences. Before leaving CHERISY, orders had been given for all the bridges over the CANAL DU NORD to be blown, leaving the two main road bridges, carrying the CAMBRAI - ARRAS and CAMBRAI - BAPAUME roads till last.

At 06:00 hours on 19th enemy tanks had approached the canal positions and opened fire on the demolition parties. Despite this, all planned demolitions were completed successfully without casualties, with the exception of two men from 5 EY who were killed accidentally.

At 08:00 hours General Herbert and Col Hare (Divisional G I) reported the situation to General Petre in ARRAS. They returned at 10:00 with orders for the Division to move back that evening to the line of the LA BASSEE Canal between ROBECQ H3435 and LA BASSEE H5125. The Division was to march to THELUS, about six miles North of ARRAS, where it was hoped RASC transport would be available to embus the troops. With this in mind reconnaissance parties were sent to the new positions. These parties included the Commander Royal Engineers - Lt Col Kennedy, and the Commander Royal Artillery - Major Burns, while Col Gulland, A.A. and Q.M.G. went to HELUS to reconnoitre the embussing point.

At 16:00 hours Capt Browne came to Divisional HQ to say that the position had materially improved, that ARRAS was to be held at all costs and that the move back to the LA BASSEE canal was cancelled. The new Divisional role was to hold the line of the ARRAS to DOULLENS road from SAULTY N29 to ARRAS, together with the line of the ARRAS to LENS road, while also providing two Battalions for the defence of ARRAS itself. It was argued that these positions were devoid of anti-tank obstacles and that a better proposition would be to bring the line forward to the line of the River SCARPE between ARRAS and BIACHE N5901 - PETREFORCE agreed this suggestion.

Preliminary moves were, by this time, already underway to THELUS and it was seen as difficult to relocate 70 Brigade to their new positions West of ARRAS. This was done but took extra time - as a result of which the units were only just coming in to position at dawn on 20th May. It was at this point that enemy tanks appeared and over-ran much of 70 Brigade. The move of 70 Brigade to their new locations on the ARRAS - DOULLENS road had entailed a march of 17 miles as the crow flies - 25 using roads and tracks (none of which led in the right direction) - in darkness, by troops already tired, over unknown and unreconnoitred country. More detail of this movement and the Panzer Divisions attacks will be found in the Brigade and Battalion War Diaries.

20th May 1940

69 Brigade, on the left of the Division, was in position by dawn on 20th May and the Divisional HQ had moved to MONT ST ELOI. In view of the great length of the front the Division was expected to cover it was not possible to make two Battalions available for ARRAS defence and General Petre was informed of this.

At 08:30 hours Capt Browne arrived at Divisional HQ with orders for a Battalion to be released to reinforce the Welsh Guards in ARRAS. 8 RNF were ordered in from THELUS and the move was completed by noon.

Heavy firing West and North of ARRAS could be heard from MONT ST ELOI and, having had no news of 70 Brigade, Captain Hedley G III was sent at noon to GOUY N39, where the Brigade HQ was supposed to be. He had orders for the Brigade to withdraw to the area AGNIERES - FREVIN CAPPELLE - ACQ. When he reached GOUY he found the Adjutant and one company of 10 DLI (this should read 11 DLI ) engaged with enemy tanks in and around the village. This detachment was ordered to withdraw and Capt Hedley was sent on to SAVY H30 to find 70 Brigade HQ. En route he met Lt Col Marley with part of 10 DLI near FOISSEAUX N 39 and warned him that he was approaching an area containing enemy armoured vehicles - this initiative probably saved this unit from destruction.

When he reached SAVY Capt Hedley gave Brigadier Kirkup the G.O.C.'s orders for the withdrawal of 70 Brigade and the Brigadier accompanied him back to Divisional HQ. On reaching MONT ST ELOI Brigadier Kirkup reported that his Brigade had been heavily attacked early in the morning by significant armoured enemy forces, while moving to take up their new positions, and had been largely lost. Scattered exhausted elements of 70 Brigade were known to be still in the vicinity of the ARRAS - HOUSAIN road and Brigadier Kirkup left Divisional HQ to effect the withdrawal of the rest of his Brigade and to get them back to new positions.

12 Lancers were asked to co-operate from their HQ at MONT ST ELOI and later reported a party of about 100 men from 70 Brigade - including wounded - immobile from exhaustion near VILLERS-MINGOVAL H31. (An eye-witness account of the rescue of some of these men will be found elsewhere in the War Diaries).

The G.O.C. had meanwhile visited 69 Brigade and found their two forward Battalions intermingled with French troops on the River SCARPE, tired and without tools or equipment to improve their positions. General Herbert considered them redundant in that situation and later in the day requested PETREFORCE to agree that they be withdrawn to THELUS. He was instructed by the C.G.S. of GHQ that no withdrawal was to take place and that PETREFORCE (including 23rd Division) was now under the orders of 5th Division, with HQ at VIMY.

On returning to his HQ General Herbert found enemy tanks reported close to MONT ST ELOI so moved the HQ to SOUCHEZ H41 at 21:00 hours. where he planned to collect troops of 70 Brigade using all available transport. To achieve this, 2/Lt Bell was despatched by motorcycle to locate the detachments of 70 Brigade and Col Hare with Maj Slade-Powell went with transport to pick up parties. These forays were unsuccessful and the officers concerned reported to GIVENCHY H41, at 03:00 hours 21st May - the location to where Divisional HQ had now moved.

21st May 1940

2/Lt Moscrop of 11 DLI arrived in the forenoon, completely exhausted, to request transport to assist in bringing in 110 men of the Battalion whom he had kept together and who were now lying up near MONCHY LE BRETON H21. Transport was collected and, after a meal, 2/Lt Moscrop, with Sgt Chambers of 31 Line Section and three 3-ton lorries, left to collect his men. At the time of the summary being written no further word had been heard of 2/Lt Moscrop or his Party.

Capt Browne attended a conference at the HQ of 5 Division at Vimy at 07:30 hours and learned that the forward Battalions of 69 Brigade had been ordered to withdraw to THELUS, on being relieved by units of 50 Division. General Franklyn of 5 Division met General Herbert at 09:00 and gave him orders to move 23 Division, via LOISON H51 to SECLIN H62. 23 Division HQ moved from GIVENCHY at about 14:00 hours, arriving at SECLIN at about 20:00 hours.

At 23:00 hours Lt Col Marley arrived at SECLIN with men of the three Battalions of 70 Brigade - some 600 in total - having lost touch with Brigadier Kirkup. The men were quite exhausted and were guided to GONDECOURT H62, and were then attached to units of 69 Brigade. 69 Brigade itself moved, using the troop carrying company, from THELUS to the GONDECOURT - WATTIGNIES area overnight 21st/22nd May - the move being completed at 05:00.

22nd May 1940

General Herbert visited GHQ at PREMESQ H63 during the forenoon, the 23rd Division now being under the direct command of GHQ. He was given orders to move to the line of the River AA from the sea North of GRAVELINES H08 to ST OMER H15. Troop Carrying Companies were to be sent to SECLIN to carry out this move and protection was to be afforded by the light tanks of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry. 69 Brigade and Divisional HQ and RE provided reconnaissance parties to check out the new area.

The new dispositions were to place:-

69 Brigade on the right - from the sea to WATTEN H16 exclusive,

70 Brigade on the left - WATTEN to ST MOMELIN - both inclusive,

9 RNF from ST MOMELIN to ST OMER - both exclusive.

Only one of the transport companies allocated by GHQ could be found. At a conference at SECLIN between 14:00 and 16:00 hours orders were given out for the whole of this column - the Armoured Brigade Commander and the C.O. of No 4 Transport Company were both present. General Herbert then left for GHQ, accompanied by his G I and G II, with two G IIIs on motorcycles, to try and raise another transport company and to report the change of route of the columns - the left to go via HAZEBROUCK and CASSEL while the right were to take the route CASSEL and DUNKIRK.

A second transport company (No 12) were traced at LILLE and, having given them their orders, General Herbert and his staff went to SAILLY - HQ of POLFORCE - to speak to General Curtis, arriving at 21:30 hours. The two G IIIs - Captains Hedley and Izod were sent on to LESTREM to ensure that 9 RNF would be at the embussing point at the appropriate time. The gunners under the command of Major Burns, who had last operated with the Division on the CANAL DU NORD, were on the line of the LA BASSEE CANAL under General Curtis and it was agreed they would to return to the 23rd Division as of 05:00 hours 23rd May.

At 22:45 hours General Herbert was told, while at SAILLY, that a motor contact officer from GHQ had been despatched to STRAZEELE to halt the Divisional bus column. Major Allen, G II, was sent to ensure that the buses were stopped and he went as far as STRAZEELE but found no signs either of the bus column or the enemy. On his return to the road East of EASTAIRES he found Brigadier Norman accompanied by a sentry, posted by the motor contact officer, who were waiting to stop the column. Major Allen returned to SAILLY to report to General Herbert, who tried, but was unable, to telephone GHQ.

23rd May 1940

At about 01:00 General Herbert - still at POLFORCE HQ at SAILLY - was still out of touch with GHQ and, being anxious to complete the move to the River AA in daylight ordered Major Allen to return to ESTAIRES and ensure the column continued its movement to the river. The motor contact officer was met at ESTAIRES and was unable, himself, to telephone GHQ. Very shortly afterwards General Herbert managed to speak to the GHQ Brigadier General Staff - Brigadier Lees - and explained the action he had taken only to be told that the column move had to be halted as a matter of urgency and the troops returned to SECLIN as that area was of much greater importance. The General and Col Hare immediately proceeded to ESTAIRES and found Major Allen. It transpired that the bus column had been significantly delayed by the refugee and military congestion on the road with the result that they were nearly all able to be returned to SECLIN - arriving in that area at about 06:00, very tired. The troops of 70 Brigade in particular had been on the move and fighting continually for three days and nights.

Unfortunately some of the troops - 6 GH, the various reconnaissance parties and the Divisional HQ - were unable to be turned back as they had missed the route ordered during the night and were now some 70 miles away on the banks of the River AA.

Major Allen and Major Slade-Powell, Royal Artillery, were sent to BOLLEZEELE to instruct Divisional HQ to return to SECLIN and convey similar orders to the reconnaissance parties of Brigades and units. At this point in time only General Herbert and Col Hare of Divisional HQ were in SECLIN and they visited units in their billets during the morning, returning to HQ at 12:45 only to find a liaison officer from GHQ with orders, timed at 08:55 23rd May for the Division to move again to the River AA position. General Herbert returned with this officer to GHQ, leaving Col Hare to call C.O.s together and issue preliminary orders for the second approach to the line of the River AA. The rest of Divisional HQ was still at BOLLEZEELE. General Herbert found that, in issuing those orders, GHQ had assumed that the Division still had two Troop Carrying Companies under command, but these had been released on completion of the move to SECLIN.

General Herbert, as GHQ were unable to contact a transport company, undertook to track one down in LILLE, but was frustrated in this attempt as the unit concerned had changed its location. Having reported his failure to find transport General Herbert returned to GHQ and was informed that, in the circumstances, other troops would then be sent to the River AA line in place of 23rd Division. However, General Herbert's suggestion that 23rd Divisional Engineers - who had their own vehicles - should go forward and assist with bridge demolitions - was accepted by GHQ.

The Division therefore remained in the SECLIN vicinity for the next two nights, 23rd/24th and 24th/25th.

24th May 1940

During the night 24th/25th small parties of 8 RNF, who had shared the defence of ARRAS with 1st Welsh Guards, started to arrive at SECLIN, having been ordered to leave ARRAS in the early hours of 24th May, and also instructed to destroy all their vehicles and motorcycles. As ARRAS was almost completely surrounded by the enemy 8 RNF had suffered casualties during their movements in small parties northwards from the town, including the C.O. and Adjutant, who were both missing.

25th May 1940

On the morning of 25th May a reconnaissance towards DOUAI found parties of 8 RNF marching up the LILLE - DOUAI road. Transport was sent to collect these parties and they were billeted at WATTIGNIES alongside their sister motorcycle Battalion - 4 RNF of 50 Division. Major Challoner assumed command of 8 RNF.

During this period SECLIN was subject to air raids and casualties were sustained in Royal Engineer billets.

Captain Browne was sent for orders to GHQ at PREMESQ and returned with the information that the Division was now to come under RUSTYFORCE and was to move to the area ERQUINGHAM - LIGNY - BEAUCAMPS H53 on 25th May and to LE PETIT MORTIER on 26th May - continuing in Force Reserve.

The Division therefore left SECLIN at 23:30 hours with the Infantry of the unit equivalent to about three Battalions in total but without Commanding Officers of Adjutants, while the Brigadiers and their Brigade staffs were separated from their commands, all of whom, while engaged in reconnaissance on the line of the River AA had become involved in the fast-moving operations in that area.

26th May 1940

At 04:00 HQ was established at BEAUCAMPS H53 and the Division was now subordinate to III Corps. In the light of this further change General Herbert visited III Corps HQ at ARMENTIERES with Majors Trenam - DAQMG - and Goldingham - RASC. It was the case that no reliable flow of supplies had been forthcoming for seven days and the Division had been subordinate to a different Command almost every day. The DAQMG noted in his diary for this day that the Division could not expect supplies for a further two days. At III Corps HQ they were advised to seek supplies at either a Farm at N462706, or at the POPERINGHE Railway Station. Orders were also given for Major Trenam to collect 20 vehicles from the Ordnance Field Park at FURNES H48, for issue to those units of the Division without transport.

The two Majors left immediately for POPERINGHE taking with them three empty lorries for use should supplies be found. They have a difficult journey through YPRES because of bomb damage and debris and found POPERINGHE virtually deserted with the last supply NCO at the railhead trying to clear the last pack train. They collected three lorryloads of supplies and these were delivered later that evening to the Division by Major Goldingham. In the meantime Major Trenam left on his transport mission, arriving at FURNES at about 15:00 hours. No 1 Ordnance Field Park was eventually traced to camps some five miles west of FURNES where the staff were organising the destruction of the vehicles and stores prior to embarkation. Lt Col Crawford undertook to collect the required 20 vehicles at HOOGSTADT H47 by 18:30 hours. While waiting for these vehicles to be brought together Major Trenam contacted various officers, including Major Jones - S.O.M.E. - Major Cameron and other Divisional Royal Engineers and Lt Col Steele of 6 GH, all of whom, because of the tasks they had been given, were separated from the Division and were awaiting embarkation.

The vehicles were not ready to move from HOOGSTADT until 20:00 hours but they were driven quickly via ELVERDINGHE - VLAMERTINGHE - RENINGHELST towards LE PETIT MORTIER. As the column reached the outskirts of KEMMEL darkness was falling and they were travelling against the main traffic stream. The column therefore harboured by the road on the North side of MOUNT KEMMEL and a Despatch Rider was sent to try and find Divisional HQ - he failed to trace them as they had moved in the meantime.

27th May 1940

From the column harbour, Major Trenam sent a three-ton lorry at dawn containing the drivers he had been loaned back to their Field Park unit for evacuation to England, and himself set out to find Divisional HQ, which he did at STEENWERCK H54. There he collected drivers from 8 RNF and returned to MOUNT KEMMEL to collect his column of trucks. By 11:15 hours the majority of the vehicles were in service with the Division at STEENWERCK. The HQ had moved from BEAUCAMPS at 17:15 hours the previous evening, arriving and being established at STEENWERCK by 20:30 hours 26th May, followed by the Infantry units during the night. Troops counted a total of 52 enemy bombers attacking the movements of the Division en route.

III Corps had issued an order at 06:00 hours for the Division to move to the POPERINGHE area, and a conference to make arrangements for this was held at Divisional HQ at 09:00 hours. Units were directed by two routes, both involving halts in the WESTOUTRE H45 area on the way to POPERINGHE. Large formations of enemy bombers were active during the day and all roads were packed with transport, mostly French, moving Northwards.

Col Gulland went to TERDEGHEIM H35 to report to II Corps HQ but found that they had gone and the Assistant Provost Marshal he met was unable to locate it. The FORET DE NIEPPE area and the country between TERDEGHEIM and STRAZEELE had been heavily bombed and shelled with villages and farms left in flames.

Divisional HQ moved from WESTOUTRE at 18:15 hours 27th May and reached the woods an hour later to find 50 Division already in that position - General Martell asked that 23rd Division move to the ELVERDINGHE - POPERINGHE road and the HQ was then established at an Estaminet some mile and a half North East of POPERINGHE. All contact with III Corps had now been lost and efforts to trace them had failed. Contact was made with the HQ of II Corps moving through ABEELE H45. General Herbert then agreed with General Martel that the Division would move to the neighbourhood of KILLEM H37 - to which area 50 Division were also preparing to withdraw. In order to free up transport to carry as many men as possible orders were given to dump all stores and equipment except fighting kit - secret papers were then burnt.

28th May 1940

After the troops had moved off General Martel arrived at the Divisional HQ and passed on orders from the G.O.C. of II Corps to the effect that the Division was to come under orders from 50 Division and should be used as reinforcements. As men had already set off it was agreed that the reinforcements would be held at KILLEM H37.

HQ and units were in the area CROMBEKE H46 - STAVELE H47 by 16:20 hours and 100 men per Infantry Battalion were held in readiness to reinforce 50 Division. General Herbert, Col Hare and Major Trenam visited LA PANNE H49 in search of II Corps and eventually tracked them down at WINCKEM H48. They learned that efforts were being made to stockpile supplies on the beach at LA PANNE for issue to 23rd and other Divisions. The Division stayed overnight in the CROMBEKE - STAVELE area.

29th May 1940

At 09:45 hours General Herbert ordered the Division to move to KILLEM-LINDE H3994 and units were assembled around this village by mid-day. II Corps had been informed of where the Division was, and that the 100 men per Battalion were being held ready to assist 50 Division. As no orders had arrived, Captain Browne went to II Corps HQ and returned with orders for the Division to move across the FURNES-BERGUES Canal to the area around MOERES H4084, and come under the command of 50 Division. A liaison officer was therefore despatched to 50 Division HQ at CROMBEKE.

While this was happening, French troops, plus those of 42nd Division, were passing through KILLEM-LINDE from the direction of REXPOEDE H37, and reported that 42nd Division had been overrun. Earlier in the day, crossings over the canal North of KILLEM-LINDE had been reconnoitred and it was ascertained that no transport would be allowed to cross the canal. Wrecking parties were organised and most of the vehicles were disabled. 8 RNF and 5 EY were ordered to take up a position facing South-East to cover the withdrawal from KILLEM-LINDE and the process of wrecking the transport - the troops to remain in position until 19:45 hours. Battalions were instructed to move across country independently and to cross the canal using any available bridges between DULSCAMP H48 and HOUTHEM H48. Unit representatives were to be sent to a report centre at a road junction South-West of FURNES at around map reference H425850.

Notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the congested roads, units were in position as ordered by dawn and Divisional HQ opened at a farm one mile South of the rendezvous at 06:00 hours on 30th May.

30th May 1940

50 Division, with HQ at ADINKERKE H38 had withdrawn to to the line of the canal with 23 Division immediately in their rear. Of the reinforcements standing by only the 100 men and 3 officers from 5 EY were called on. Some shelling was experienced leading to two killed and three wounded within Divisional HQ. Bombs and trench mortar rounds fell on the front-line troops and Divisional HQ was also moved to ADINKERKE at 20:30 hours. Col Hare and Maj Slade-Powell were detached to assist embarkation at LA PANNE. Attempts were made to secure and distribute supplies during the day, but these had to be abandoned. Col Gulland and Captain Browne went to 50 Division at 23:15 hours and returned some forty minutes later with orders for the Division to move to the beach near BRAY DUNES for embarkation.

31st May 1940

HQ troops under Major Trenam moved off at 03:15 from ADINKERKE and arrived at BRAY DUNES at 05:30, followed in quick succession by troops of the Division's units. Embarkation from the beach was rendered difficult because of the onshore wind. After many failures and several hours of effort, troops were ordered to march along the beach to DUNKIRK - some seven miles. Troops took opportunities to try and embark all along the beach and casualties were caused by shelling. The Division arrived at DUNKIRK in good order, despite lack of food, and were joined by 6 GH who had been waiting on the beach for three days of the ten days they had been out of contact with the Division.

The DUNKIRK quay was narrow and hundreds of stretcher cases had to be handled. As a consequence of this activity units became fragmented and dispersed - resulting in troops being embarked without reference to their unit in any ship available. While shelling continued there were relatively few casualties. On the day of embarkation Divisional strength was about 3,000.

Troops were disembarked at DOVER and MARGATE during 31st May/1st June and were dispersed by train to all parts of England. The Division was re-assembled at LAUNCESTON in Cornwall by mid-June and men were then given 48 hours home leave. The Division, which had sailed some 6,500 strong in April, was able to muster 4,600 all ranks once units were collected.

Orders were then received for the Division to be dispersed.

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