War Diary - G Branch - February 1941
1 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) The G.O.C’s. TEWT was continued at the Force Tactical School.
(2) Force Intelligence Summary No. 41 was issued. Copy filed as Appendix No. 1.
2 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Confirmation having been received from the War Office that the hot water pipes for the ICELANDIC Government might be shipped from Sweden provided appropriate security measures were taken H B M Minister was informed accordingly.
3 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) The G.O.C’s. TEWT on the new organisation for the Division continued at the Force Tactical School this morning and evening.
(2) HQ 146 Brigade were advised that the S.S. IMMO RAGNAR might sail as soon as the 31 Finnish Seamen for repatriation were aboard and the Commander was satisfied all was in order.
(3) The following were issued :-
a. Operation Instruction No.35 on the Thompson Sub-machine Gun. Copy filed as Appendix No. 2.
b. Amendment No 6 to Operation Instruction NO. 13 (Revised). Copy filed as Appendix No. 3.
c. Amendment No. 1 to Operation Instruction NO. 34. Copy filed as Appendix No. 4.
d. Addition to list of Code Names. Copy filed with the War Diary as Appendix No. 5.
4 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) The G.O.C’s. TEWT at the Force Tactical School was concluded at the end of the morning session.
(2) An unconfirmed report was received that an unidentified aircraft had been seen by a civilian at VIKINGARSTODUM (nine miles North of EGILSSTADIR) in the North East Sector at about 08:00 hours today.
5 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) A conference was held by Major-General Curtis (G.O.C.) on combined orders and instructions for the seaward defence of Reykjavik harbour. It was attended by Lt Col H L Davies (G.S.O.1) Major Heard (G.S.O.2) Col. Walters-Symons Royal Artillery (Commander Fixed Defences ICELAND) Lt Col Colley Royal Artillery (Officer Commanding Reykjavik Fire Group) Captain Stokes Royal Navy (Chief of Staff) and Lt Commander Clements R.N.V.R. (E.D.O.). As a result, draft orders were prepared and submitted to the Flag Officer in Charge (F.O.I.C.) for concurrence.
(2) A message having been received from the War Office on the question of the opening of the VATNSENDI W/T Station, a reply (0 534) was sent stating that negotiations had been suspended as instructed and that as the Air Ministry were not prepared to take over the station it would not be opened unless it could be manned by military personnel.
6 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) A recce by the Chief Engineer of the HORNAFJORDUR area was ordered to find out the following information :-
a. Whether the transportation of Royal Engineer stores and equipment necessary to improve the site for use by bomber aircraft is a feasible project and
b. Whether a seaplane base in the lagoon is a possibility.
7 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) The following were issued :-
a. Force Intelligence Summary No. 42. Copy filed as Appendix No. 6.
b. Amendment No. 1 to Force Operation Instruction No. 24. Copy filed as Appendix No. 7.
(2) An agreement was reached with the Icelandic Government for the opening of VATNSENDI W/T Station for communication with the UK, the station to be manned solely by Royal Signals personnel.
8 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Force Operation Instruction No. 4 (Revised) on Security issued. Copy filed with the War Diary as Appendix No. 8.
9 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Between 09:50 hours and 10:25 hours approximately, an aircraft was heard at VATTARNES, ESKIFJORDUR and BUDAREYRI but owing to poor visibility it could not be seen. No friendly or neutral aircraft were known to be in the vicinity at the time.
(2) At 11:00 hours a hostile twin-engined bomber was at Selfoss flying West at low altitude. It was engaged by one Light Machine-Gun and replied, Killing one Other Rank (Pte HUNTER, 1st Tyneside Scottish)and wounding an N.C.O. of the detachment 1st Tyneside Scottish at that station. The aircraft then flew low over Kaldadarnes aerodrome, then West towards Reykjavik which it reached at 11:10 hours. It was engaged by Anti-aircraft fire. Its height was then between 4600 and 5000 feet. Its course was westwards over Alafoss then out to sea North of Reykjavik, from there it described a half-circle through 180 degrees reaching land again over HAFNARFJORDUR. It then flew South in the direction of KEFLAVIK, east along the Southern coast to Kaldadarnes passing 800 yards South of the aerodrome at a very low height and being engaged by Light Machine-Gun and Small Arms fire. It then turned North and flew over Selfoss to BALDURSHAGI and SANDSKEID at a low altitude. From civilian sources its subsequent course was towards the South coast and along the South coast to VIK at heights under 1000 feet. From there it climbed to a high altitude and continued Eastwards. One Battle aircraft took off to engage it but was unable to intercept. Visibility in the Kaldadarnes and Reykjavik areas good save for a smoke haze over and to the North of Reykjavik harbour.
(3) On the instructions of the War Office a daily patrol by 98 Squadron RAF during the hours of daylight over the area 63 degrees 25 minutes North 21 degrees 42 minutes West, 60 degrees 25 minutes North 20 degrees 30 minutes West, 60 degrees 25 minutes North 21 degrees 50 minutes West 63 degrees 25 minutes North 20 degrees 31 minutes West, was instituted today and is to be continued daily until further notice from Coastal Command. Two Battle aircraft were on this patrol when the hostile aircraft referred to in para (2) was in the vicinity of Kaldadarnes. In view of the shortage of air crews a message (0 547) from Major-General Curtis to Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff was sent pointing out the small aircraft resources available and again emphasizing that long distance seaplanes were the correct answer for naval patrols of this nature or, if it were impossible to supply these, the existing air crews must be reinforced.
(4) A message (0 543) was sent to the War Office in reply to their enquiry as to Icelandic steamship services from USA to UK via Iceland informing them that such a service existed and supervision of aliens in transit was satisfactory.
(5) Information was received from HQ 146 Infantry Brigade that the relief of Royal Marines Coastal Defence Battery at HVALTEYRI by “Z” Independent Coast Battery, Royal Artillery, had been completed.
(6) The following were issued :-
a. Preliminary Instruction as to Force Exercise No. 1 of 1941 for the general defences. Copy filed with War Diary as Appendix No. 9.
b. Instruction for Force Exercise No. 1 of 1941. Copy filed as Appendix No. 10.
10 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) On instruction, the air patrol by 98 Squadron RAF was continued today. The first patrol of two aircraft took off at first light and, at the request of the F.O.I.C. investigated a report of a cruiser encountered by a trawler at 07:30 hours at position 62 degrees 58 minutes North 15 degrees zero minutes West and not satisfactorily identified. Their report was negative. The second patrol left on a Southwards patrol in the early afternoon and their report was also negative. Visibility was good North of latitude 61 degrees 30 minutes North but South of that there were clouds and rain.
(2) The Swedish ship GOTEBORG arrived at SIGLUFJORDUR, and an armed guard was placed on board and enquiries as to her intended movements were made. At the moment she has not her papers for sailing.
(3) Amendment No. 7 to Force Operation Instruction No. 13 (Revised) issued. Copy filed with the War Diary as Appendix No. 11.
11 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Weather conditions prevented any patrol by 98 Squadron RAF. A strong gale was blowing from South East and visibility was very poor.
(2) A message having been received from the War Office as to the proposed release and return of the two Icelanders PALSSON and FINNBOGASON interned in the UK for operating W/T sets contrary to orders, after consultation with H B M Minister a message (0 560) was sent to the War Office that no objection was raised to their return.
(3) A message (0 559) was sent to the War Office urging that the 3” Anti-aircraft guns at AKUREYRI were of no military value, that to use trained Anti-aircraft personnel for their operation was uneconomical and that third light anti-aircraft should be sent with their equipments.
(4) Force Operation Instruction No. 36 on Anti-aircraft defence was issued. Copy filed as Appendix No. 12.
12 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) No air patrol was possible today. Sharp thaw had made the Kaldadarnes aerodrome unserviceable. A message (51336) was received from the War Office that no further patrols were required after today.
(2) The following works were ordered to be given priority over all other works in hand. Construction of third runway at Kaldadarnes. This is to have priority over all other work.
(3) Construction of a seaplane base at BUDAREYRI was ordered. It was decided not to proceed with any landing ground at BUDAREYRI.
(4) Major-General Curtis (G.O.C.) held a conference attended by Brigadier Griffith-Williams (Commander, Royal Artillery) Lt Col Davies (G.S.O.1) Lt Col Mason (A.A. & Q.M.G.) and Major Morrison (for Chief Engineer) in the final distribution of Anti-aircraft resources. The distribution was decided as follows :-
Reykjavik – 4 Heavy Anti-aircraft Battery.
Hvalfjordur – One Heavy Anti-aircraft Battery less one Section. Six light Anti-aircraft guns.
Kaldadarnes – One Section Heavy Anti-aircraft Battery Two light Anti-aircraft guns.
Until the Anti-aircraft reinforcements arrive the Anti-aircraft Battery at SKELETON HILL will move to Hvalfjordur as soon as accommodation can be arranged.
(5) Additional notes on Force Exercise No. 1 were issued. Copy filed with War Diary as Appendix No. 13.
13 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) An enquiry having been received from the War Office as to the censorship of cables from Iceland a message (0 566) was sent in reply that partial censorship in Iceland by means of the manager of the cable was unsatisfactory and that a full censorship here could be provided with the additional establishment of three Officers and three Other Ranks.
(2) Preliminary instructions for Force Exercise No. 2 of 1941 (a signal and movement exercise for Signals and HQs) on 17th February were issued.
(3) Force Intelligence Summary No. 43 was issued. Copy filed as Appendix No. 14.
14 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) A message (0 568) was sent to Commander, British Troops in FAEROE ISLANDS suggesting that advice of hostile aircraft from FAEROES should be sent by cable with priority to Officer Commanding Garrison SEYDISFJORDUR as a preliminary warning and requesting his comments.
15 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) A conference of umpires was held by the Chief Umpire (Brigadier Griffith-Williams Commander, Royal Artillery) for those concerned in Force Exercise No. 1.
(2) List of Code Names to come into operation on 2nd March 1941 was issued. Copy filed as Appendix No. 15.
16 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) The Joint Operation Instruction on the coastal defence of Reykjavik harbour area having been agreed with the F.O.I.C. the instruction was issued as Force Operation Instruction No. 37. Copy filed as Appendix No. 16.
(2) Information having been received that the use of the batten signals by naval vessels as emergency signals during an invasion had been abolished, Force Operation Instruction No. 15 dated 14th August 1940 was cancelled. Copy of letter filed as Appendix No. 17.
17 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Force Exercise No. 2 of 1941 was held from 08:00 hours to 16:00 hours today. It was a skeleton exercise for Force HQ, Force Signals (in full) and HQ’s of Brigades, Battalions and Royal Artillery Regiments and involved the movement of all the HQs involved. Contrary to previous experience in Force Exercises the weather remained fine throughout the day.
18 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
NIL.
19 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland
(1) A message (0 577) was sent to the War Office reporting the facilities for flying boats and float planes at Reykjavik, AKUREYRI and BUDAREYRI.
(2) Major-General Curtis held a conference of all concerned on Force Exercise No.2 of 1941, held on 17th February 1941.
20 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
NIL.
21 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Force Intelligence Summaries No. 42 and 43 were sent to Commander British Forces in the Faeroe Islands to inaugurate an exchange of information.
(2) Amendment No. 6 to Force Operation Order No. 2 was issued. Copy filed as Appendix No.18.
22 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) The following were issued :-
a. Force Intelligence Summary No. 44. Copy filed as Appendix No. 19.
b. Amendment No. 7 to Force Operation Order No. 2 (Revised). Copy filed as Appendix No. 20.
c. Instructions on Inter-Brigade relief. Copy filed as Appendix No. 21.
23 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Lt Col Davies (G.S.O.1) accompanied by Lt Col Mason (A.A. & Q.M.G.), Brigadier Bliss (Chief Engineer) and Lt Cdr Jackson Royal Navy carried out a further recce of the Hvalfjordur area.
24 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Force Exercise No. 1 of 1941 was held today from 08:40 hours to 20:30 hours. Weather was fine and clear but very cold with a strong wind from the North East. The measures laid down in Operation Order No. 2 for Western and South Western Sectors were practised, battle positions were manned, the first echelon of the Force Mobile Reserve moved to Brautarholt and the Kaldadarnes reinforcement to Kaldadarnes.
25 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) Conference of umpires on Force Exercise No. 1 of 1941 held by Chief Umpire (Brigadier Griffith-Williams Commander, Royal Artillery) at Force HQ.
(2) Force Operation Instruction No. 38 on command and organisation of Fixed Defences ICELAND issued. Copy filed as Appendix No. 22.
26 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) A conference was held at Force HQ attended by Lt Col Davies (G.S.O.1) Brigadier Griffith-Williams (Commander, Royal Artillery) Brigadier Bliss (Chief Engineer) and Lt Col Mason (A.A. & Q.M.G.) on the arrangement of the defences in the Selfoss – Kaldadarnes area. The following decisions were reached. To out into force the G.O.C’s. policy on the subject.
a. Anti-aircraft Section at SKELETON HILL to be dismantled on the 7th March and established at AUDSHOLT by 11th March.
b. Selfoss detachment to be increased by one Company, one Section to be established at AVIDRA BRIDGE, probably middle of March.
c. BALDURSHAGI Troop, Royal Artillery to prepare positions and communications at AUDSHOLT ready for immediate occupation but to remain at BALDURSHAGI.
(2) Message (0 585) sent to War Office requesting despatch of instructor to run a local course in bomb disposal work.
(3) Additional list of Code Names issued. Copy filed as Appendix No. 23.
27 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) The Following were issued :-
a. Amendment No. 8 to Force Operation Instruction No. 13. Copy filed as Appendix No. 24.
b. Amendment No. 1 to Force Operation Instruction No. 30. Copy filed as Appendix No. 25.
28 February 1941 – Artun, Iceland.
(1) A strong gale (Force 9 in the BEAUFORT SCALE at Reykjavik and Force 12 at Hvalfjordur) developed in the early hours of the morning moderating slightly during the day. Considerable damage was done to shipping. Communications were badly affected and civil telephones to North East and South were put out of action. By nightfall the positions of communications was as follows:-
No reliance could be placed on civil telephones.
No communication could be established with BUDAREYRI and SEYDISFJORDUR but AKUREYRI had been in touch by W/T for five minutes only.
Communication by W/T to the UK intermittently affected.
Communication by W/T to KALDADARNES and VESTMANNAEYJAR not affected.
(2) In response to a request a message (0 593) was sent to the War Office reporting the sentences imposed by the Icelandic Government on the distributors of subversive leaflets and confirming that there had been no apparent effect on the troops.
(3) Information and regulations as to Anti-aircraft gun practice in the Reykjavik area were issued to the F.O.I.C. ICELAND and to H B M Minister for the information of those affected.
(4) W/T communication with the UK was established through VATNSENDI wireless station for the first time.
Appendices attached to the February 1941 War Diary of G Branch of the Iceland Force HQ.
Either the identified appearances were missing from the file, or were not photographed on the occasion of the visit to The National Archives.
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