1st Tyneside Scottish October 1941

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2nd October 1941

The Battalion was reorganised as per War Establishment reference 11/1931/12F/2.

4th October 1941

All US troops having left the Reykjavik Sub-Sector, the Defence Scheme was amended accordingly. A copy was attached to the War Diary as Appendix 1 – for details see below.

5th October 1941

The eleventh Leave Party returned, and the thirteenth Leave Party left for the UK.

7th October 1941

Advance Parties for the forthcoming move were exchanged with 11th DLI at HAFNARFJORDUR. The instructions for the Inter-Battalion relief were attached to the War Diary as Appendix 2 – for details see below.

Iceland Force Exercise No 11 was held in the area of EYRARBAKKI – KOTSTROND – KERHOLL. This was a Signals Exercise, in which Battalion HQ and the Signals Platoon took part and is described on Appendix 3 attached to the War Diary – for details see below.

8th October 1941

One Section from C Company, and 2 drivers from No 4 Platoon took over the Post at KEFLAVIK from a Section of A Company 11th DLI.

9th October 1941

C Company took over SLINGSBY HILL Camp from A Company 11th DLI.

B Company, the Medical Section, the Pipe Band and the Provost Staff took over MILNESBRIDGE Camp from D Company 11th DLI.

10th October 1941

The Inter-Battalion relief was completed.

The Battalion was now disposed as follows: –

CLOISTERS - reference 2098 - Battalion HQ, HQ Company – less Nos 3, 4 and 6 Platoons.

AMOTHERBY – reference 2100 – HQ Company Nos 4 and 6 Platoons.

GARDAR ROAD – reference 2000 - One Platoon of A Company.

SLINGSBY HILL – reference 2101 – C and R Companies.

MILNESBRIDGE – reference 2099 – B Company, Medical Section and Pipe Band.

HVALEYRI RIDGE – reference 1998 – D Company and No 3 Platoon of HQ Company.

At 17:30 hours the Brigadier held a conference, on Force Exercise No 11, in the Fish Shed Theatre.

15th October 1941

Iceland Force Exercise No 12 was held, but the exercise was closed at 16:00 hours as the weather made roads, for the most part, impassable. Information about the exercise was set out on Appendix 4, attached to the War Diary – for details see below.

17th October 1941

The Brigadier held a conference on the outcome of Force Exercise No 12 in the Fish Shed Theatre.

18th October 1941

The twelfth Leave Party returned.

1/9 Manchesters were relieved by 2nd Kensingtons as the Force Machine Gun Battalion.

A Draft of 6 Other Ranks arrived from No 8 Infantry Training Centre, Perth.

19th October 1941

The fourteenth Leave Party left for the UK.

21st October 1941

A rehearsal was held for a Battalion Field Firing Scheme at the KLEIFARVATN Range.

22nd October 1941

Lt Col Oxley, the Battalion Commander, was appointed OC Troops HAFNARFJORDUR by General Routine Order 981/41 vice Lt Col Ware of 11th DLI.

23rd October 1941

The Field firing Scheme at Kleifervatn was cancelled due to bad weather conditions.

28th October 1941

The Field Firing Scheme at Kleifervatn Range was held – postponed from 23rd October – with Major-General Bonesteel and other US Officers as spectators. The arrangements for the exercise were set out on Appendix 5 attached to the War Diary – for details see below.

The Battalion Intelligence Section, and a detachment of No 1 Platoon took part in Force Exercise No 13 in the KALDARSEL VALLEY. This was an Intelligence Exercise with Major Walton and Captain Boyne amongst the Umpires.

31st October 1941

At 17:00 hours Lt Col Oxley held a conference on the exercise in the recreation hut at HAFNARFJORDUR.

A conference was held by the G.o.C. (Major-General Curtis) on Force Exercise No 13.

Appendices attached to the 1st Tyneside Scottish War Diary – October 1941.

Appendix 1 – Changes to the Defence Scheme to accommodate the US Marines Mobile Column.

This small document was Amendment No 2 to the Defence Scheme for the Reykjavik Sub-Sector and simply was a notification – dated 4th October 1941 – that the American Marines would act as a Mobile Column in conjunction with British Forces in the defence of ICELAND.

Appendix 2 - Operation Instruction for the moves between Reykjavik and HAFNARFJORDUR.

The first document was the Administrative Instruction for the Inter-Battalion relief between Hafnafjordur and Reykjavik – the mutual relief of 11th DLI by 1st Tyneside Scottish.

The composition of the Advance Parties from the Battalion were specified – they were due to be exchanged on 7th October, with the relief itself taking place 9th and 10th October. Rear Parties were to be left at the discretion of Company Commanders but all troops were to be clear of their existing Posts by 12:00 hours on 11th October. All G1098 stores were to be taken, but equipment, weapons and Defence Stores essential for the Reykjavik Sub-Sector were to be handed over (such as secret documents, Medium Machine Guns, Verey pistols and ammunition).

Reserves – such as rations and fuel, were to be handed over in situ. Signals Officers would arrange the takeover of telephone exchanges. Weapon Training Officers would hand over Ranges, and any plans for future developments of Ranges.

A march-out timetable was included.

Appendix 3 – Operation Instruction for Iceland Force Exercise No 11.


The exercise was predicated on US troops having taken over the defence of ICELAND, supported by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, with the UK forces, less 146 Brigade, concentrated at Reykjavik, preparatory to leaving for another posting overseas.

Without warning, German airborne landings took place in several locations – including APAVATN, together with fierce air attacks on the airfields. A total of an estimated three Battalions, with supporting Artillery, were understood to have landed.

70th Brigade was moved to deal with the threat from APAVATN, crossing the ALVIDRA bridge. 147th Brigade moved over the Selfoss bridge to deal with the threat from the ODDI direction. The briefing note then gave the locations of “own troops” at 10:30 hours – in the case of the 1st Tyneside Scottish, they were in Brigade Reserve located around the road and track junction reference 721937. The Germans had a Battalion and supporting Artillery opposite 70th Brigade.

Appendix 4 – Operation Instruction for Force Exercise No 12.

Operation Order No 1 for Force Exercise No 12 indicated that an enemy Infantry Brigade was located in the Pingvellir area. The normal guard at the artificial hop factory at GRAFNINSTRETT was reported as being weak and probably not more than one Platoon in strength. Well-armed and hostile guerrillas/anarchists were known to be roaming the area, and ambushes of Motor Transport, Headquarters and Despatch Riders – and Columns moving through the terrain – were considered likely.

The RAF were making six Lysander aircraft available for Army co-operation.

The OLFUSA Force (of which 70th Brigade was a part) was tasked to secure the GRAFNINSTRETT factory. 1st Tyneside Scottish, less one Company, was tasked to capture the mines at GRAFNINSTRETT utilising a Mobile Column (GRAF DET) composed of; A Company in Motor Transport, the Carrier Platoon – less one Section, one Troop of 366 Field Battery, a Royal Engineers Reconnaissance Party, a Medical Car Post and Wireless Telegraphy support. The detachment was under the command of Major W.L. McGregor and was under direct orders from OLFUSA but would return to 1st Tyneside Scottish control once the objective had been achieved.

The remainder of the Battalion would be marching troops – including C Company, who would be providing picquetting troops at the head of the Column as well as providing the Rear Guard.

Battalion transport would leave separately, accompanied by the remainder of 366 Field Battery and, once TORFASTADIR had been reached, would be distributed among the various Companies, and the advance would be continued. B Echelon transport would remain in the assembly area until called forward.

The usual instructions were given regarding water (including provision for sterilisation), operational dress, rations, communications and sanitation. A detailed march table was included and further, more detailed, administrative instructions, amplifying those above, were also issued.

Appendix 5 – Operation Instruction for Field Firing Exercise – issued 16th October 1941.

This set of documents described the arrangements for a Field Firing Exercise at Kleifervatn on 23rd October 1941.

The aim of the exercise was to:-

Practise troops in conditions as close as possible to War.

Practise the co-operation of Infantry and Artillery in an attack in hilly country.

The exercise was directed by Lt Col Oxley and it was anticipated that the spectators would include several senior American Officers. Arrangements were made for loudspeakers to be available so that Lt Col Oxley could brief the spectators as the exercise proceeded.

The exercise was to be rehearsed on 21st October.

The exercise would be run in three phases. Following a period of more intense enemy air activity around STAVANGER increased enemy aerial reconnaissance was reported. As a result, preparations against possible aerial landings and assaults had been made, including the bivouacking of 70th Brigade across the KEFLAVIK Peninsula, 1st Tyneside Scottish being located at Kleifervatn, supported by elements of 143 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery.

For the purpose of the exercise one Section of the Carrier Platoon had been detached to transport the Mortars – thus implying that Carden Lloyd Carriers were not available for the Mortar detachments. In view of the scale of live firing involved there were a considerable number of Safety Officers detailed. A trace of the map of the area was included with the papers.

Map Trace- KLEIFERVATN

An Intelligence Outpost had reported a parachute landing at reference 225890, with an estimated strength of 200 with Mortars and several heavy and light machine guns. On the basis of this information the Battalion was moved Northwards.

The Field Battery were to provide support from their existing position and the Battalion was moving towards CAMERON NECK when a further Intelligence Report arrived, indicating that part of the enemy had collected themselves and were moving South West towards the ISLAND, with others taking up defensive posts on Hill reference 2188 North of the ISLAND, while others were seen moving up the steep face of LANGAHLID 2388 - their objective appeared to be securing the heights around KLEIFARVATN and the road to Hafnafjordur. Given the importance of the road, the CO decided to attack the heights of the ISLAND and surrounding hills.

The first phase involved No 4 Platoon and the Reconnaissance Platoon occupying CAMERON NECK and the heights immediately North of that position. 4 Platoon found advance elements of enemy about 4 – 600 yards to their front and opened fire on them. The Reconnaissance Platoon occupied the heights without incident and held that position until the Main Body was through the NECK, when the Platoon came into reserve. No artillery was used in this phase.

The second phase saw the Main Body passing through the NECK and the leading Platoon of A Company, with No 3 Platoon under command, coming under enemy fire from the ISLAND – taking up a position from which it could return fire, while the second Platoon got into position to fire on the enemy on HAUHHNUKER. The Commander decided to use his third Platoon to take the foothills of the latter position, supported by the Mortars, and using smoke (imaginary) to prevent effective cross-fire from the ISLAND. The CO decided, given the progress being made by the left Platoon, to secure HAUHHNUKER with B Company, supported by an Artillery concentration, thereby flanking the enemy.

A strong pocket of enemy resistance was still occupying the ISLAND and the CO ordered both Artillery and Mortar concentrations with supporting fire from HAUHHNUKER – this overcame the resistance and enabled two Platoons of A Company to occupy the ISLAND. Between phases, the spectators moved from one set of observation positions to the next.

In the third and final phase the CO, on reaching the ISLAND, sees a number of enemy parachutes and several dazed soldiers in the area of the semi-dry lake BREIDALUR and a further 20 or 30 enemy occupying a position North of the lake. He orders B Company to attack FLAT TOP 219092 supported by 366 Field Battery, while A Company supported by 3 and 4 Platoons mop-up the area of the semi-dry lake. The reserve Company (C - imaginary) is than called through to consolidate in the area of point 160 reference 230910. This ends the exercise.

Additional information on safety issues was included in the papers, as were a detailed timetable of events. The most concentrated element of field firing occurred in the second phase when both Artillery and Mortars were firing on the ISLAND, supported by fire from Lt Ogg’s Platoon, while the two Platoons from A Company moved to secure the ground under the cover of the shell-fire. The final phase saw similar cover, together with the use of the Carrier Platoon and D Company in assaulting FLAT TOP.

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