70th Infantry Brigade War Diary February 1941.
Monthly Summary
The weather for the first three weeks was identical with that experienced in January and training proceeded on similar lines. The fine weather and the rapid increase of daylight hours allowed the maximum of outdoor training to be carried out.
In the Battalions emphasis continued to be laid on the Platoon and Company in the Attack and there were opportunities for the field firing of 2” and 3” Mortars, Light Machine Guns and rifles under ideal conditions. Night operations were held on one or two nights each week on a Company basis. The issue of 36 Thompson Sub-Machine Guns to each Battalion necessitated setting-up courses of instruction in these weapons, and despite a shortage of instructors with actual experience, the men soon became familiar with this weapon.
The results of Ski Platoon training were definitely disappointing owing to an almost complete lack of snow, except in the North where 10th DLI were able to manage three weeks of training between Reykerskoli and Borganes and obtained full value from it. 11th DLI Ski Platoon spent a week at Pingvellir but no skiing was possible, and 1st TS had a similar experience.
The training programme was varied by the holding of Brigade and Iceland Force exercises, details of which are set out further below.
At Brigade HQ the first few days of the month were spent in preparation for the Brigade exercises to be held in the first fortnight.
3rd February 1941
The first amendment to Brigade Operation Order No. 1 – revised 17th January 1941 and described in the January War Diary – was issued. This made some changes to this key Operation Order, especially to the details of the elements involved from 187th Field Ambulance. A new Appendix C was also issued, setting out the Table of Vehicles for the Brigade by its various component units, whether in the A or B Echelons, and whether the vehicles were the Brigade's own organic transport, of from the attached RASC component. A total of 333 vehicles were included when all the transport was taken into account, and this gives a useful picture of the scale of vehicles required to support the Brigade operationally.
5th February 1941
The Brigadier made a reconnaissance of the area around FORT YORK on the ALFSNES Peninsula for use in the Brigade exercise.
6th February 1941
An Inter-Company Exercise took place in the area of ULFARSFELL. This involved “C” Company of 1st TS and “B” Company of 11th DLI. The task of each Company Commander was to secure a large feature to ensure artillery observation and screen further movement.
As neither Company Commander was accustomed to Mountain Warfare they had not realised that the feature could only be held by sitting on top of it. Both Commanders chose to seize a part of the foothills, rather than the summit, and only made contact between the Companies as they happened to choose the same spot.
8th February 1941
The Brigade Major (Major Roper) visited “B” Company 10th DLI at Akranes and their Battalion HQ at Borganes. During the visit to Akranes he conducted two sand table exercises on “combined operations” based on the SUVLA campaign, ran a platoon exercise and also witnessed a Company exercise directed by the Company Commander of “B” Company.
Major Roper considered the main features of this particular garrison were:-
(a) the length of the coast – 3 ½ miles – to be protected by only one Company, of which the fourth platoon is expected to move to HVITAVELLIR BRIDGE on the issue of “JULIUS”.
(b) an excellent administrative layout – partly due to the good scale of accommodation and partly to the efforts of the local command.
(c) a distinct shortage of good training ground. The country is generally very flat, and what few features there are, are several miles from Camp.
9th February 1941
At 11:00 hours an enemy bomber, probably a Heinkel 111K, appeared at Selfoss and dived to within 100 feet of the ground. Bursts of machine-gun fire from the aircraft killed one man and wounded a sergeant of the platoon of 1st Tyneside Scottish stationed there. The detachment’s Anti-Aircraft post, which is permanently manned, opened fire with its Light Machine Gun and expended a magazine. Although it is believed that the machine was hit, it continued on its course to Reykjavik where it was fired on by Anti-Aircraft guns. The aircraft then flew out to sea, crossed the coast further south and again passed Kaldadarnes aerodrome where it was fired on by machine guns. The aircraft then flew away to the East.
The man of the Tyneside Scottish was the first to be killed in action in ICELAND. The German radio broadcast its usual exaggerated report of this flight to ICELAND.
More detail is given on this incident elsewhere in the Battalion War Diary.
13th February 1941
Western Sector Operation Order No 2 (Revised) was issued. This document updated the information on the disposition of the Iceland Force while retaining the description of the overall threat from a potential German invasion. The document confirmed that the Commander of 70th Brigade was responsible for both the defence of the Western Sector and for command of the Force Reserve. The document clarified that, if the 70th Brigade was required to operate outside the Western Sector, then 10th DLI would come under the command of HQ Iceland Force. As with the original version of the Operation Order, it spelled out the existing dispositions of troops down to Platoon level. The document also laid out in considerable detail the actions to be taken on the receipt of the various Code Words denoting enemy invasion. Instructions were also included as an Appendix on the actions to be taken by Coast Watching Posts should there be any approaches to the coastline under the hours of darkness - this included vessels approaching within 200 yards of coastal positions.
14th February 1941
A Brigade two-sided exercise of an opposed landing on the ALFSNES Peninsula took place, attended by Major-General M.O. Curtis C.B., D.S.O., M.C. General Officer Commanding Iceland Force. Two Companies and the Mortar Platoon from 1st Tyneside Scottish represented the landing force, commanded by Major K.K. Walmsley, the Second-in-Command. The defending force, playing the part of the First Echelon of the Force Mobile Reserve, consisted of 11th DLI, less one Company, 386 Field Battery Royal Artillery, less one Troop, one platoon of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine-Gun Battalion), and a detachment of 187th Field Ambulance – the whole commanded by Lt Col Ware M.C. - Officer Commanding 11th DLI. The practices which the Battalion had held of embussing and debussing in January – and mentioned in that War Diary – were seen to have proved their worth. Details of the exercise were attached to the original War Diary as Appendix C. The objectives were to:-
(a) Practise the First Echelon of the Force Reserve in dealing with an enemy seaborne invasion.
(b) Practise the units representing the enemy in securing beaches following a landing.
The orders given to the two exercise force commanders were based, on the one side, on securing a beachhead ready for further invasion troops, and on the other, to eliminate the force which had already landed.
The lessons which it was hoped the Exercise would reinforce were:-
(a) The battle procedures necessary to ensure; rapid reconnaissance, issue of orders and deployment, movement of troops across country and attacking with the support of other arms.
(b) The occupation of a defensive position, following a reconnaissance during the hours of darkness.
15th February 1941
A conference was held at the Battalion HQ of 11th DLI on the previous day’s exercise and several useful points arose for discussion.
17th February 1941
Between 08:30 and 16:15 hours a Force Signal Exercise was held to test communications, involving moves of Brigade and Battalion HQs, together with Force HQ. The general objectives of the exercise were to:-
(a) test communications,
(b) test alarm and defence schemes of formation and unit headquarters,
(c) practice formations and units in moving their headquarters.
The exercise proved of great value and, in particular, confirmed the signal experience of the previous few months. The main points were that:-
(a) due to the lack of roads, much is dependent on radio communication – particularly the No.11 wireless set – and both R/T and W/T worked satisfactorily, although the mountainous terrain affects the quality of reception and interference is marked when the “Northern Lights” are visible.
(b) from a technical standpoint a comment was made that Earth Return (L/T) had proved impracticable and all circuits had had to be metallic. High winds affected the stability of poled airlines.
(c) Standard Motorcycles had stood up to the poor road conditions with the help of good maintenance, with the lighter 350cc machines proving more reliable than the 500cc models.
During the exercise the two Battalions had deployed in different directions and Brigade HQ had expected to remain static. However, the Umpires decided that it had been “bombed out” of its HQ buildings and an alternative location had to be found. A nearby Camp about a mile away had been used, but this brought home the difficulties of a terrain where no cover from view was available and turning points or side roads may be ten miles apart – these might well have proved insuperable. The problem of disposing essential vehicles close enough together for HQ to work efficiently, without forming a vulnerable aerial target, proved rather delicate.
20th February 1941
The day was spent in improving defensive positions, which had been rather neglected due to the volume of training the weather had permitted.
21st February 1941
70 Brigade Operation Order No. 2 was issued, dealing with the relief of 147 Brigade, and attached to the original War Diary as Appendix “D”. The relief was planned to be gradual, taking place over the period 3rd to 7th March 1941. The plan included advance parties of up to 10% of the strength of the units involved preceding the main bodies at dates to be agreed, with rear parties remaining in existing locations for up to 24 hours after the changes had taken place. Key dates and times for formal handover of responsibilities at each relevant location were given. A considerable part of the Orders were concerned with the handover of ammunition and stores between units.
24th February 1941
A Force Exercise was held – the scheme being based on activity in the Hafnafjordur area with an enemy landing North of Saurbaer. The Company of 1st TS were soon in action and the First Echelon Force Reserve (11th DLI plus attached troops) was ordered to counter the enemy landing. This order was received at Force HQ at 13:55 hours. A warning order was telephoned to 11th DLI followed by confirmatory orders by Liaison Officer personal delivery, and by 14:20 hours forward groups – a Company of Infantry plus one section of Carriers – had left Camp and reached Brautarholt by just after 15:00 hours, followed by the remainder of the column.
The Kaldadarnes reinforcements – a Company of the 1st TS and a Troop from 386 Battery Royal Artillery – had also left BALDURSHAGI and operated at Kaldadarnes, remaining there for the night. The weather was so cold that a Canadian relieving Sentry found his comrade unconscious at his post. Due to the extreme cold the exercise was terminated at 20:30 hours.
25th February 1941
A fire occurred at the new HALGAFELL Hospital Camp, causing the loss of a Nissen Hut.
27th February 1941
Another fire occurred – this time at one of the 10th DLI billets at Bordeyri – and all the contents of the building were destroyed. As a result, the garrison was reduced to one Section, with the second Section being accommodated, as previously, at Reykerskoli.
28th February 1941
The weather had continued with gale-force winds and minor damage to huts in the Alafoss area. The Coast-watching Post at FORT YORK was blown to pieces in the early hours and had eventually to be abandoned, after the troops had spent several hours in great privation.
70 Brigade Operation Instruction No. 7 was issued together with the Scheme for the defence of the Reykjavik Sub-sector, as Appendix “E”
This set out in considerable detail the units, locations and responsibilities for the defence of the South-West of Iceland, including Reykjavik and the VESTMANNAEJAR ISLANDS.
The comprehensive set of Instructions covered a wide range of topics and arrangements for dealing with potential invasion and/or air attack.
The Administrative Summary for the Brigade is attached to the War Diary as Appendix “F”.
During the months of January and February, many of the previously existing administrative difficulties have been overcome and by the end of February the housing and essential services, clothing and equipment of the Brigade could be largely considered as satisfactory.
Accommodation
Following the visit of Brigadier Kirkup to the North the decision was arrived at to increase considerably the accommodation at Reykerskoli where two phases of development totalling 20 huts were authorised. The first phase was planned to be erected by February 12th and the second phase of ten huts as soon as available. Electric light was also to be made provided. One hut was also authorised for Bordeyri.
At the end of February a fire at Bordeyri HOUSE necessitated the immediate authorisation of two further huts as soon as this could be done. It was also planned to hand over the Village Hall to the inhabitants (presumably this had been in use for the troops) and application had been made for a further hut for messing purposes. This work was to be carried out as quickly as possible.
Elsewhere the accommodation question remained largely unaltered over this period except for ANNHOLT where considerable alterations to the Company billet had been in progress since January and were almost completed.
Rations
The existing scale of rations, and the supply over the period January/February remained quite satisfactory. Reports were even being received that the allowance was more than adequate. Certain commodities such as the cans of “M & V” and dried beans were not being used to the full. There were demands for more sugar, if that could be managed, and the bread ration was being consumed to the full.
The first Cooking Course for unclassified cooks arranged by Force HQ was taken up by Brigade HQ and Signal Section, 1st TS and 11th DLI. A second Course involving further cooks from 1st TS and 11th DLI took place in the second half of February. Cooking equipment had proved quite satisfactory and adequate in scale.
Equipment
The deficiencies which had existed in the G1098 official scale of equipment had been largely made up during January and February and the current position was that the remaining outstanding indents were few and unimportant. The Brigade was almost 100% equipped to G1098 scale.
Clothing
The position was seen as satisfactory as regards supplies. The indents for supplies of new battledress from 10th DLI had been heavier than those of other units as the Battalion – which of course was the advance guard of the Brigade in respect of the move to Iceland and had arrived several weeks earlier than the rest – had not been so well equipped as the other Units when proceeding overseas.
Indents were being met, however, and by careful use of Denim Canvas, which is being regularly emphasised, the condition of clothing – despite the harsher conditions being experienced compared to those in the UK – should be satisfactory for some time. Battle Dress is also being washed, but the existing charge in Reykjavik of 5 Krona (equivalent of 3/9d – or 19p) was seen as costly for a partly-worn suit. The 11th DLI and 1st TS were using these facilities but 10th DLI – apart from at Akranes – did not have those facilities and consequently were at a disadvantage.
Special clothing for the men of the Ski Platoons was drawn and distributed to the Battalions in early February.
Owing to the rough ground, and the inclement weather, boot repairs had been heavy over the period – averaging twice the demand expected in home units. An application had been made to Force HQ for authority to be granted for tradesman’s pay for a second shoemaker in each unit.
Arms
Complete arms inspections were carried out by Unit Armourers during February and the general report was “very good”.
Health
The average sick reports were very small and the general health of the Brigade was very high. Minor and few cases of frostbite have been treated in regard to Despatch Riders and Motor Transport personnel contracted in spells of duty at the end of February under the most severe weather conditions. My late father was one of these cases, having, while working on the Brigadier’s Humber Snipe Staff Car, caught the side of his face, and the lobe of his ear, with a spanner. This resulted in a frostbite burn from the metal of the spanner – he was wearing gloves which made control of the spanner more difficult – the mark of which he carried for the rest of his life.
Bathing
With the exception of 11th DLI who were using the public baths at Alafoss, units had continued to use mobile bath units which had functioned quite satisfactorily. The bath unit attached to 11th DLI had been unable to function until the end of February when it was put into partial operation.
Entertainments
Weekly cinema performances had been given to each unit during January/February and the E.N.S.A. Concert Party played at Borganes and Alafoss in January.
The 11th DLI Concert Party proceeded to Borganes early in February and gave performances for a week to the stations in the Western Sector concluding with a performance broadcast on its return.
Sport
Football had been impossible due to the frozen ground but boxing had taken place and in January 1st TS’s boxing team had beaten 11th DLI by six matches to five. Medals had been obtained for the winners.
Royal Engineer Services
Progress had been slow at Borganes due to the lack of material and climatic conditions. At the end of February Borganes had electric light installed except for one camp. Latrine and Ablution accommodation was practically completed but a water supply was not yet available.
Lighting remained a serious problem and in February a quantity of distemper was despatched to Borganes to lighten the accommodation. A scarcity of screw-type bulbs and lamp glasses affected each unit as the demand had greatly exceeded the supply.
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